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PREFACE 
This study endeavours to show how the social and political 
influences of the environment within which an electricity undertaking 
operates can be incorporated into an economically efficient pricing 
policy. We have taken one undertaking, the State Electricity 
Commission of Victoria (SECV), and closely examined the outside 
influences on its pricing policy. We then show how these influences 
can be included in a pricing system which reflects costs more 
accurately than does the existing system. 
The study is in three parts. In Part A we discuss the theory of 
Peak Load Pricing and reconcile this theory with the work done on 
optimizing welfare under a budget constraint. Part B is devoted to an 
examination of the social and political factors which influence the 
SECV's pricing policy. In Part C, the final two chapters, we explain 
the SECV's present pricing policy and present an alternative which 
retains all of the existing outside influences explained in Part B 
while reflecting the economic costs of supply. 
Like most similar studies the subject matter has been changing 
while the text was in preparation. On the theory side for example, 
we have not had sufficient time to incorporate the recent contributions 
of Crew and Kleindorfer in the Economic Journal. On the practical side 
the SECV have made some alterations to their prices. The changes have 
not necessitated any drastic alterations because they do not reflect 
changes in policy. It has only been necessary to take account of the 
new prices in Chapter Ten where the discussion turns upon profit rates. 
The other chapters relate to the price structure prior to the most 
recent changes. The details of the changes are included in Appendix 
Ten. 
The abbreviations used throughout the study, particularly in Part A, 
are common economic abbreviations and terms, 
e.g. SR = short-run 
MC = marginal cost 
AC = average cost 
AFC = average fixed cost 
AVC = average variable cost 
The use of abbreviations of electrical terms has been restricted 
to such common ones as kWh for kilowatt-hour and kW and MW for kilowatt 
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and megawatt respectively. 'Demand' has an economic meaning and a 
different meaning in the electricity industry. In the industry, electric 
energy (or the flow of electricity) is measured in kilowatt-hours. 
Electric power (or demand) is the rate of flow and is measured in 
kilowatts. Where the word 'demand' has been used the sense in which it 
is meant has been indicated except where the usage is obvious. 
The numbers in square brackets e.g. [234], refer to references in 
the bibliography. The bibliography is reasonably large, but with only 
a few exceptions has been restricted to references of an economic nature 
concerning either marginal cost pricing or the electricity industry. 
Not all of the references will be found in the text but it was felt that 
the opportunity to present a comprehensive list of the relevant English 
language texts should not be passed up. 
Finally, I would like to express my thanks to Mr Ken Muir of the 
Electricity Authority of New South Wales for his assistance on a number 
of occasions and to the State Electricity Commission of Victoria for 
making certain information available for use in this study. 
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PART A 
CHAPTER ONE 
MARGINAL COST PRICING 
The major interest in the first part of this study is the theory-
known as Peak Load Pricing. It is a particular application of marginal 
cost pricing which has its origins in the general theory of welfare 
1 economics. 
Since the 1920's, theoretical welfare economics, with its aim of 
deriving policies to achieve the maximum welfare for a community, has 
attracted the attention of many economists. The economic conditions 
which were formulated for a summit position of welfare, based on a 
2 Paretian optimum, are well known and need not occupy us here. 
Of more interest is the development of the 'new welfare economics' 
and, in particular, the developments which followed the publication of 
Hotelling's now famous article in 1938 'The General Welfare in Relation 
to Problems of Taxation and of Railway and Utility Rates', [21] During 
the 1940's the main stream of the welfare discussions centred on the 
applicability of 'the marginal cost rule' and its use in the formulation 
of rules for the operation of public utilities. The discussion was 
partly inspired by the writings of the 'socialist' economists, such as 
Lerner [26] and Lange [27], who saw the marginal cost rule as having 
obvious applications to State-run enterprises and/or societies. 
Since the conditions to derive a Paretian optimum were fairly 
cumbersome there was a strong desire to find one all inclusive rule 
which would meet all of the marginal optimum conditions. The suggested 
rule was that the prices of all commodities be set equal to their 
marginal costs of supply. It was argued that with the price of every 
1 
There are a number of good reviews of theoretical welfare economics. 
In chronological order they are by Reder, 1947 [46], Myint, 1948 [36], 
Ruggles, 1949-50 [47,48], Little, 1950 [29], Graaf, 1957 [16] and 
Mishan, 1960 [34]. 
2 
These rules are common knowledge to all students of theoretical welfare 
economics and are described in practically all of the articles mentioned 
in the previous footnote, e.g. See Mishan [34,p.206]. 
3 
A stimulating treatment of the principle of marginal cost pricing, 
its history and future is given by Beckwith [2], See also Bonbright 
[72,Chpt,20], A recent potted summary of the principle can be found 
in Kolsen [96,Chpt,2]. 
product set at its marginal cost and with consumers free to choose 
among goods without restraint, resources would be allocated in an 
efficient manner.^ 
Pri or to the turn of the century Marshall had shown interest in a 
form of marginal cost pricing, and Dobb and Lerner had also discussed 
its applicability to socialist economies in the 1930's. But it was 
not until 1939, with the publication of Hotelling's paper, that the 
theory received widespread attention, Hotelling provoked a new line 
of thought and it is to his work that the controversy of the 1940's 
can be directly traced. 
After that time the emphasis of the discussion shifted to the 
practical application of the principle and aroused the interest of 
public utility economists. Some of the public utility aspects of 
the debate carried on in America concerning the electricity industry 
are relevant to our study and their details are included in Appendix 
One. 
It was also during this period that the thesis of the proportionality 
of price and marginal cost (rather than equality), which was proposed 
earlier by R.F. Kahn [23], was reintroduced. It received some support 
until it was pointed out that it was only applicable where all goods 
were final products, all factors were original inputs and where there 
was a zero elasticity of supply for all factors. If these conditions 
were not met, setting prices proportional to marginal costs meant a 
failure to meet one of the optimal conditions, that of the choice 
2 
between work and leisure. As the debate progressed it became obvious 
that the marginal cost pricing rule would not fulfill its early 
expectations, 
In her evaluation of marginal cost pricing as a general pricing 
system, Nancy Ruggles outlined a number of the assumptions which would 
be necessary if marginal cost pricing were to satisfy all of the 
optimum conditions. She felt that it was improbable that these would 
ever be fulfilled and concluded that: 
1 
Mishan [34.p.208] gives a description of the method by which it was 
felt that the marginal cost rule met the conditions required for a 
general optimum. 
2 
See Ruggles [47.p.17], Mishan [34.p.208] and Beckwith [2.pp.67, 
123-5]. 
No one formula can be established which will be valid 
as a general principle. But one statement can be 
made: the search for a panacea, for a single rule 
by which to guide all conduct, is, because of the 
technological requirements of the different parts 
of the economy and because of the problem of 
redistribution, a vain search and even a foolish 
one. [47.p.43] 
In the same year, 1950, Little, in his 'Critique...', was very scathing 
in his opinions of the marginal cost principle as a general rule. He 
said: 
The general case against marginal-cost pricing is clearly 
overwhelming. All the arguments, even the rather dubious 
theoretical ideal-output argument, are against it. In 
general there isnothing to be said for it...[29.p.194] 
Graff, in 1957, was of a similar mind. 
The measure of acceptance the marginal cost pricing 
principle has among the professional economists would 
be astonishing were not its pedigree so long and 
respectable. [16.p.142] 
Mishan too, felt that the practical problems involved in having such 
a rule would weigh heavily against its use. 
A practical difficulty...is that the optimum rules, 
corrected for differences between social and private 
valuation, must be met in ALL sectors for any welfare 
inference to be valid. If this stringent requirement 
cannot be met for any reason there are no general 
rules to fall back upon... However we must remind 
ourselves again that price equal to marginal cost 
in all sectors is not by itself enough to meet the 
necessary conditions of an optimum...The marginal 
cost pricing rule is yet less satisfactory when, as 
is generally the case, we envisage setting prices 
only for one of several industries, while having to 
acquiesce in a diversity of relationships between 
price and marginal cost in all other sectors of the 
economy. [34 .pp,212-3] 
Despite these criticisms the marginal cost pricing rule is still 
regarded by many as a workable concept for public utilities. The 
reason for this can probably be found in the need to have some concept 
with which to relate costs and prices, and the still very strong 
influence of marginal analysis, one of the very cornerstones of economic 
theory. 
Vickrey made a similar point: 
...whatever arguments may be advanced for departing in 
various degrees from a strict marginal cost-pricing 
policy, no sound pricing policy can be developed without 
using marginal cost as one of the principal determinants, 
[60.pp.612-3] 
And Oort, as well: 
The marginal cost pricing principle certainly does not 
solve all problems of welfare economics...But in spite 
of this reservation, the principle is a very important 
tool of welfare theory. [40.p.180] 
So it appears that while there is no general support for marginal cost 
pricing theory from theoretical welfare economics, there is also no real 
argument which can effectively negate it as a basic part of a rational 
pricing system. But in doing so, it will only have the support of 
partial equilibrium analysis and not the general equilibrium model. The 
Theory of Peak Load Pricing is an example of a partial analysis marginal 
cost pricing model. But before we outline this model we have two areas 
of theory, both related to the marginal cost controversy, which are 
relevant to our later work. The first relates to the subject of 
decreasing costs and the deficit which would result under marginal cost 
pricing, and the second relates to the demand assumptions made in the 
discussion. 
1. Decreasing Costs 
It is often assumed in textbooks that the electricity industry is 
a decreasing cost industry. The obvious growth of plant size and 
reduction in the relative real price of electricity have probably been 
responsible for this belief. The empirical support for this belief 
will be examined in Chapter Four, Section 1(a) but here we want to 
consider the role of decreasing costs only in the formal theoretical 
structure of marginal cost pricing. 
The basic problem, which has long been recognised, is that the 
application of the rule of marginal cost pricing to a decreasing cost 
industry will result in that industry having a deficit. Marshall 
[30.p.468] and Pigou [44.p.224] had recognised the case and supported 
the notion of State 'subsidies', or 'bounties', to pay for the deficit 
but the problem did not become prominent in the debate until the 1940's. 
The situation is similar to a public utility operating under a 
budgetary constraint. Quite often, due to social or political 
pressures, an industry may be required to provide a service outside 
of its normal business. It is not uncommon that the revenue earned 
from these services is insufficient to cover the cost of providing them. 
The task of financing this deficit poses similar problems to those 
discussed in the debates surrounding the marginal cost controversy. 
The protagonists in that debate fell into two main camps. On one 
side were those who felt that the deficit should be financed from 
sources external to the industry^, while on the other side were those 
who felt that the industry should cover its own deficit from internal 
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sources. The arguments in favour of using sources external to the 
industry generally revolved around the relative merits of income taxes 
and excise taxes while those who supported internal financing favoured 
the use of some form of price discrimination which raised the extra 
revenue from the consumers' surplus of those who consumed the particular 
product, 
Clemens [7] felt that practically any form of price discrimination 
was acceptable but such an attitude was far too general and added little 
to the theoretical discussion. More specific contributions were by 
Coase [13,14], Norris [39] and Lewis [138]. The discussions revolved 
around multi-part pricing which can take on many forms. Block tariffs, 
for example, are one way of appropriating consumers' surplus. The 
first 'block' of consumption is charged at a higher price than the next 
or any succeeding 'blocks', with any reasonable number of blocks being 
employed. Pigou described it as second degree price discrimination, 
and it includes discrimination between different units going to the same 
consumer. Another form of multi-part pricing is a two-part tariff (as 
opposed to a two-block tariff). In this case a fixed charge, which is 
similar to the selling of a 'right' to consume, is made before any 
actual consumption takes place. Sometimes the amount of the fixed 
charge will be related to some outside variable such as income, or the 
rateable value of property, or the size of a dwelling but generally it 
is related in some way to the value of the service to the consumer. 
1 
See Hotelling [21], Montgomery [35], Lerner [26], Meade and Fleming 
[31], Nordin [38] and Vickrey [59]. 
2 
See Paine [42], Lewis [138], Clemens [7], Coase [12,13,14] and 
Wilson [61]. 
Regardless of the particular form the multi-part price took, the 
marginal unit was always priced at its marginal cost. In this way it 
was felt that the ideal output could still be achieved at the margin. 
A two-part tariff with a service charge and a two-block tariff can, 
in fact, give the same result. Figure 1.1 illustrates such a case. 
DD' represents the individual's demand curve (on the assumption of 
diminishing utility) and NP' equals marginal cost. Whether the utility 
uses a two block tariff (i.e. sells OM at price OR and then sells MN 
at price OQ), or a two-part tariff with the variable rate at OQ 
(equal to marginal cost), along with a fixed charge equal to QSPR, the 
outcome with regard to consumers' surplus will still be the same. 
Figure 1.1 
Price 
M N 
•Quantity 
The electricity industry has had a long-standing interest in 
two-part tariffs which goes back to 1892 when Dr Hopkinson first 
introduced the idea.^ Block tariffs have also been used by the 
industry for many years and a discussion of the price structure of 
See Lewis [137] or Davidson [129] for descriptions of the history 
of the two-part tariff in the electricity industry. 
the State Electricity Commission of Victoria in Chapter Eleven will 
look more closely at this form of pricing.^ 
There are some flaws in the argument that multi-part pricing can 
be used to replace marginal cost pricing. With the two-part tariff, 
the imposition of the fixed charge may drive some previous consumers 
away even though they were prepared to pay the marginal cost of the 
units concerned. In this case the marginal conditions will not be 
achi eved= In much the same way, when a block tariff is being employed 
there is no way to ensure that all the consumers are consuming a 
sufficient amount of the product to ensure that their marginal 
purchases are being made at the marginal cost of supply. It would be 
possible to calculate the average or maybe median rate of consumption 
per consumer and try to ensure that the last block in the tariff falls 
at about that level, but the imposition of the earlier blocks may alter 
the level of consumption and make the previous calculations redundant. 
All of the arguments for the use of multi-part tariffs to replace 
the pricing rule based on marginal cost were using the multi-part 
tariff form of price discrimination as an approximation to perfect 
price discrimination (Pigou's first degree price discrimination). 
Perfect price discrimination would both satisfy the marginal conditions 
and at the same time transfer all of the consumers' surplus to the 
seller. But such perfect discrimination is impossible of course. 
Little [29.p,199] argued that when it came to real policy making 
it would be foolish to try to gain any 'ideal' state of affairs because 
at its best it has only a 'rough and ready application'. To him the 
disadvantage of multi-part pricing lay in the fact that it 'involves 
price discrimination, which may be thought to be unfair' [p.200], and 
whether it 
.,,can be worked in this way depends mainly on whether 
suitable impersonal categories (e,g, size of motorcar, 
or house) can be found as a basis for discrimination. 
[29.p.200] 
The problem, as Little saw it, was not so much one of whether price 
discrimination gave an identical answer to marginal cost pricing, but 
whether it was feasible. Where the ideal result was impossible there 
may very well be situations in which price discrimination can be used. 
Economic interpretations of block tariffs, which include the optimum 
form for profit maximisation can be found in Davidson [129] and Gabor 
[84], 
In her summary of the marginal cost pricing controversy, Nancy 
Ruggles adopted much the same line as this. She argued that there 
may be times when price discrimination will approximate the correct 
answer. 
... 5 it is quite likely that in certain sectors of the 
economy, price discrimination which would meet the 
marginal conditions would not be difficult to arrive 
at, despite the protestations to the contrary by the 
proponents of marginal cost pricing. Demand curves 
are not smooth and continuous and single valued; they 
contain many discontinuities, and there are many 
products for which demand is almost perfectly inelastic 
within the relevant range. Taking advantage of such 
discontinuities and inelasticities, the construction 
of workable systems of price discrimination which will 
not violate the marginal conditions is quite feasible. 
For example, it is probably true that the use of block 
systems of rates for electricity does not appreciably 
interfere with the meeting of the marginal conditions. 
[47.p.40] 
The importance of the contributions of Little and Ruggles is in their 
refusal to accept the notion of an attainable 'ideal', or a single rule 
which might be generally applicable. To them discrimination is only 
one of many pricing practices which exist in the world and one which 
may be turned to valuable use in securing an economic goal. 
2 . Peakiness in Demand 
Our second specific area of interest concerns the nature of the 
demand assumed in the discussions of welfare economics. The theory of 
Peak Load Pricing had its starting point in 1949 with the publication 
of a paper by Boiteux. Until that time the subject of peakiness in 
demand had not been treated in any depth by economists. The normal 
assumption (usually implicit) in the theory was that demand was 
determined solely by price and that for a given price demand was 
constant over time. We do not mean that the subject of peak loads was 
not discussed at all. Hotelling did recognise the problem and 
incorporated it in his solution, but not explicitly. 
We do not propose to investigate the matter in any depth at this 
point, rather the aim here is to indicate that of the few who did 
recognise this specific problem, fewer still saw the answer which was 
to be suggested later in the form of Peak Load Pricing. The key to 
Hotelling's treatment lay in his investigation of the case where demand 
was greater than supply in the short-run. In this situation he suggested 
that a 'rental' charge be added to the marginal cost of that demand, 
...if demand exceeds supply, and no enlargement of 
supply is possible, a charge must be made...to reduce 
the demand to the supply. Such a charge is an element 
of marginal cost as here defined. [21.p.249] 
Ruggles correctly interpreted Hotelling when she said: 
Hotelling's marginal cost pricing thesis does not 
necessarily imply the use of the same rate for both 
peak and off-peak periods...He had recommended 
adjusting prices in such a way as to even out peak 
loads, by charging a rent in addition to marginal 
cost whenever the demand at marginal cost would 
exceed the available supply. [47.p.20] 
This will later be seen to be very similar to the Peak Load Pricing 
solution. 
Troxel [54.p.463], in his summary of Hotelling's suggestion, 
extended the argument until it even more closely approximated the 
solution which x^ as to be proposed later by Boiteux. Unfortunately, he 
never fully appreciated the implications involved in a situation where, 
for a given price, demand was not constant over time. This is 
illustrated in his book in 1947. 
Daily, weekly and monthly fluctuations in demand are 
expected. Most companies, indeed, keep a reserve 
plant capacity so that sudden, temporary demand 
increases can be met. Perhaps semiannual or even 
annual price changes are adequate for most demand 
conditions... [115.p.453] 
Bonbright, writing two years after Hotelling, also missed the point of 
Hotelling's argument. Commenting on Hotelling's position concerning 
decreasing costs, he wrote: 
...the striking discrepancies often found to exist 
between mere marginal or incremental costs and 
average costs are due primarily not to the 
operation of the 'law of decreasing costs'... but 
rather to the temporary or chronic presence of low 
load factors and of excess plant capacity. [6.p.385] 
His lack of attention to the short-run demand conditions led him to 
approach the problem from an excess capacity point of view,^ a long-term 
principle identical with over-investment. 
1 A number of authors, particularly those associated with public utilities, 
mistakenly supported marginal cost pricing on the grounds that a low 
price would increase sales and thereby lower costs through the action of 
increasing returns to scale. Davidson [29.p.101] provides a good summary 
of this 'excess capacity' point of view. 
10 
Two authors, prior to 1949, did recognise explicitly that demand 
was not constant for a given price, and that the peakiness of demand 
in many industries did pose a problem for the establishment of an 
efficient pricing system. One was Lewis, and while he failed to 
foreshadow in any way the later proposals of the Peak Load Pricing 
theorists he did recognise two important properties which were later 
to be incorporated into their analyses. In an article on the two-part 
tariff in 1941, he wrote: 
Peak and off-peak marginal costs are different [137.p.47] 
[...and, as a result...] The best theoretical solution 
is...to charge different prices for peak and off-peak 
consumption. [p.54] 
Vickrey, in 1948, also recognised the short-term peak demand 
situation. While he gave no specific answer, he cautioned that 
...it should not be thought that marginal-cost pricing 
would necessarily be uniform, or even more uniform 
than present systems of rates. [59.p.220] 
These then were the major contributions concerning pricing the peak 
which preceded the later analyses of the Peak Load Pricing theorists. 
Practically all of the other writers in the marginal cost debate 
implicitly assumed that for a given price demand was constant. Even 
where it was recognised explicitly that a peak existed, the treatment 
of off-peak capacity as excess capacity in a number of cases turned 
out to be misleading. However, Hotelling did have in his analysis 
the seeds of what was later to emerge in Boiteux's analysis. 
3. Conclusion 
In this chapter we have outlined the 'price equals marginal cost' 
rule, as a workable basis for a study of Peak Load Pricing. In doing 
so, we have noted that the search for an overall rule which would give 
a simple answer to all the allocative rules of the economic world has 
been a mistake; the world is too complex and man's comprehension too 
narrow. Not that valuable knowledge has not come from the study, 
much has, but the initial aim now has been recognised as being far 
too optimistic. 
The marginal cost rule, which resulted from the search, would not 
necessarily lead to an optimum welfare position. In practice there are 
many very important determinants of welfare which the theory does not 
include and which we have not discussed here. Among them are the 
11 
disparity between social and private valuations of cost and benefit; 
the choice between income and leisure; choices between the intangible 
determinants of welfare; the choice between consumption now and 
consumption in the future; and the choice between different degrees 
of public and private ownership. In addition, there is the ever 
present ethical problem of the distribution of income which has no 
e conomi c an swer, 
It was clear from the start of the discussion that the 
implementation of a rule such as the marginal cost pricing rule would 
be easier under government control. As a result, the argument moved 
from a discussion of socialist economies to government-owned, or 
controlled, public utilities, many of which were felt to be operating 
under conditions of decreasing long-run average costs. 
The question then arose would the rule still work and have 
justification if it was applied only to one sector of the economy? 
In the general welfare sense the answer was no. And the further the 
debate was pursued the further it became removed from the original 
welfare concept. To suggest the use of marginal cost pricing in one 
industry, such as the electricity industry, on the basis of general 
welfare economics would be to ignore many of the criticisms made of 
welfare economics over the last twenty odd years. 
Of course these same points have been recognised before but most 
writers still saw a role for marginal cost based prices. Wilson 
•^Trote in 1945: 
...the outcome [of future additions to welfare theory] 
is likely to be a series of detailed studies. The 
marginal analysis will still, of course, be useful in 
a humbler role, but the economics of welfare is likely 
to be much more untidy and subdivided into sections 
with few rules applying with complete consistency 
throughout. [61,p.459] 
And Ruggles wrote in 1949: 
The search...for a single rule by which to guide all 
conduct, is...a vain search and even a foolish one. 
A set of tools is available with which to accomplish 
a complicated job. A better job can be done if 
each tool is used where it is appropriate... [47.p.43] 
One such tool which has been proposed for the particular situation 
characterised by regular periodic fluctuations in demand, is Peak Load 
Pricing. In accordance with Wilson's prophecy, and Ruggles' advice, 
12 
it is only a partial analysis, limited in its application, and only 
one tool of the many which would be required if we were to move, even 
slightly, towards maximising community welfare. It is, however, a 
step in the right direction. 
13 
CHAPTER TWO 
PEAK LOAD PRICING 
Being the expression of the simultaneous convergence 
of desires, peak demand costs a great deal. 
Pierre Masse [274.p.150] 
We assume in this chapter that the history of Peak Load Pricing, 
as a branch of economic theory, started with the publication of 
Boiteux's paper, in French, in 1949 [123].^ The same problem, with 
virtually the same answer, was studied independently by Houthakker [135], 
Steiner [144] and Hirshleifer [133].^ Davidson [129], also, developed 
a theory of pricing the peak which was published in 1955. He mentioned 
Boiteux in a footnote [p.181] but failed to look at his analysis in 
any detail. 
It was not until 1959, in a short article in the Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, that Hirshleifer brought to everybody's attention the 
fact that Boiteux had indeed anticipated all of the other works. 
Hirshleifer wote: 
All of us who have participated in the English language 
discussion should, I believe, feel somewhat chagrined 
at having been so thoroughly anticipated (and, in my 
opinion, surpassed) in this way... [134.p.498] 
1 
We are certainly right in assuming this if we are looking only at the 
electricity industry. There may be some reason for clarification though, 
Jacques Dr^ze in a very interesting article, published in 1964, 'Some 
Post-war Contfibutions of French Economists to Theory and Public Policy' 
[78], attributes the first statement of the principle of Peak Load 
Pricing to Professor Allais in 1947. His statement was pertinent to 
the French transport industry. Dreze's article traces the efforts of 
the French 'marginalist' school in such areas as Peak Load Pricing 
(which was particularly relevant to the operations of Electricite de 
France - EDF) and brings out quite strongly the fact that the 
contributions by the French in such fields were far from individual 
efforts. Boiteux was not alone in the EDF at that time. Articles by 
Masse and Dessus [77] were published almost simultaneously with 
Boiteux's and are really only different parts of the same overall 
picture. So while in this text we will be referring to Boiteux alone, 
it would probably not be unfair if one thought of Boiteux and the 
French school as being synonomous. 
2 
Houthakker's contribution receives less attention than the other 
works in this chapter. This is the result of the emphasis of the 
chapter being placed upon the formal Peak Load Pricing model. 
Houthakker's very significant contribution is more- in the field of the 
practical application of the basic principles which he had outlined. 
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As well, he recognised the 'strikingly similar' analysis used by 
all of the contributors. It is this similarity, even to the assumptions 
used, which has prompted the method of treatment here. Rather than 
give a chronological account of Peak Load Pricing theory a composite 
presentation is offered which brings together the major contributions.^ 
The bulk of this chapter is devoted to the pricing rules derived 
from the theory. However, the pricing rules are arrived at conjointly 
2 
with investment rules. A brief explanation of these simple investment 
rules and their possible relevance to investment guides in the real 
world is given towards the end of the chapter. 
Our discussion of the theory is entirely in terms of the electricity 
industry but it should be remembered that the principles are applicable 
to any industry with peaks in its demand. 
1. Objectives 
Either implicitly or explicitly all of the contributors start with 
the concept of maximising welfare through the use of the price equals 
marginal cost rule. Steiner [p.587] and Hirshleifer [p.451] 
specifically aim to maximise the sum of consumers' and producer's 
surplus but at the same time they recognize the restrictions which 
surround such a goal - a given distribution of income, consumers are 
rational and their decisions reflect their preferences which are 
paramount. 
The French school, and Davidson, are not as explicit in terms of 
welfare in their objectives, but implicitly their aims are clear. 
Boiteux, in 'Marginal Cost Pricing' [5], attempts a down-to-earth, 
logical explanation of the advantages of marginal cost pricing in 
terms of consumer preference which leaves no doubt as to the welfare 
basis underlying his earlier 'Peak Load Pricing' [123]. 
1 
There is one contribution which is not discussed in the text. It 
is a pamphlet published by the OEEC in 1958 [143]. The pamphlet 
contains the views of an OEEC Committee (which included Boiteux) on 
marginal cost pricing, and expounds the basic theory of Peak Load 
Pricing. It is, in fact, full of minor errors, but it does contain 
one of the very first statements in English of the principle of sale 
at marginal cost in a peak demand situation. 
2 
Two recent summaries of Peak Load Pricing are by Sullivan, 1968 [215], 
and Meek, 1968 [201]. 
15 
2. Assumptions 
The typical situation envisaged is the sale of a non-storable, 
non-transferrable product subject to regular periodic fluctuations in 
demand, a situation which is quite common in public utilities such as 
transport, communications and power. 
(a) Demand 
The simplest situation is to assume two independent demand 
functions representing demand in two different time periods of equal 
duration. For a given price the quantity demanded in the two periods 
is unequal, but it is constant within each time period. To economists, 
this would best be represented as in Figure 2.1, with the quantity 
measuring the demand for capacity in kilowatts. 
Figure 2.1 
Price 
Quantity (kW) 
Those in the electricity industry might more easily recognise the 
situation envisaged in the form of a highly simplified load curve, 
which in this case, with the assumption of a single price operating in 
both periods, plots demand (in kW) against time. Figure 2,2 shows such 
a load curve. 
Figure 2.2 
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Much more complicated demand situations can be imagined, but for the 
moment we will keep to this simple form. 
(b) Costs 
On the cost side we will assume that constant costs (i.e. constant 
returns to scale) prevail, plant is perfectly divisible, operating 
costs are a linear function of output and, in the short-run, plant has 
a fixed capacity. 
This last assumption is chiefly an expository device although in 
some cases it may not be too far from reality in the electricity 
industry. It is the extreme case of a plant with an inflexible 
capacity. If we define an optimum output as that point where SRMC is 
equal to LRMC, i.e. where SRTC is tangent to LRTC, the assumption of 
fixed capacity plant ensures that the optimum output for each plant is 
also its maximum output. 
Figures 2.3 and 2.4, using Vinerian envelope curves, illustrate 
the optimum and maximum output points showing some of the total and 
marginal cost curves with plant of fixed capacity and plant of less 
than fixed capacity respectively. In the case of plant of less than 
fixed capacity it is possible to achieve more output from the plant 
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once the optimum output has been reached but only at a relatively high 
cost due to the low efficiency of plant beyond the optimum output point. 
Figure 2.3 Figure 2.4 
Total 
Cost 
Cost/ 
Unit 
SR^ IC SM^C 
SRTC 
LRTC 
SRTC 
Cost/ 
Unit 
SHMC 
LRMC 
LRTC 
Figure 2.5 shows in more detail the short-run cost situation for a 
plant of fixed capacity. Under our assumptions SRMC is equal to AVC 
(both are constant) and is less than SRAC by the amount of SRAFC= Output 
Cost/ 
Unit 
Figure 2.5 
SRAC SRMC 
Quantity 
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ql is the point of operation of the plant and is both its maximum and 
optimum output. The rest of the assumptions we need are as follows. 
Let b be the operating cost per unit of output per period which is 
constant and equal to AVC. Let 3 be the cost of providing new capacity 
per unit of output. Because different authors have chosen to express 
their capacity costs in different ways we will also use an expression 
for capacity cost per unit per period. This we will call = We will 
assume that our basic cycle is a day and that the cost of providing 
capacity, per unit, per cycle is 3. Within each cycle we will assume 
a number of demand periods. For example if we had three demand periods 
then the cost of providing capacity per unit per period would be t = it 
(assuming the demand periods are of equal duration.) We are in a 
position then, to express capacity cost in two ways, per cycle and per 
demand period. If there is more than one demand period per cycle, 
capacity cost per period will be less than capacity cost per cycle. 
We will further assume, following Boiteux, that LRllC has two 
components, a marginal capacity cost (mainly depreciation and interest), 
and a marginal energy cost component (mainly made up of fuel and other 
running costs). If we assume constant returns AVC will not alter 
as plant size changes, in which case long-run marginal energy cost will 
be equal to AVC times the number of demand periods. In the analysis 
which developed from Boiteux, long-run marginal cost was defined as 
LRMC = LRM Capacity Cost + 2(AVC), or 
LR>IC = 3 + 2b 
which suffers from the restriction of expressing capacity cost per 
cycle, but energy cost per period. 
A more appropriate general formulation might be as follows. Let N 
= the number of demand periods (of equal duration). 
LRMC (per cycle) = B + Nb, 
LRMC (per period) = LRiMC = 3 + b, where S = ^ > 
N N N 
UTiere before we had two expressions for capacity cost we now have two 
expressions for LRMC, one per cycle and one per demand period. 
3. Firm Peak 
A firm peak situation is one where the peak period remains the 
peak even after differential prices for the peak and off-peak periods 
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have been charged. Because the production of another unit in the 
off-peak period does not involve any addition to capacity the price 
for off-peak electricity should be equal to operating costs, b. All 
of the capacity costs, therefore, are allocated to the peak period 
whose price should be b + 3 , or in a two demand case we could also 
express it as b + Zir.^ 
Figure 2.6 which shows Dn intersection b at less than maximum 
output, illustrates such a case. 
Figure 2.6 
Cost, 
Price 
Pd 
Pn 
SRMC 
Quantity 
Steiner, in his formulation, expressed his capacity costs per 
period. His general formulation of the prices in a two period case 
[144.p.590] can be shown as 
PI = b + I + kd 
P2 = b + I + kn 
where kd + kn = 0 
This is the same as saying 
PI = b + IT + kd 
and P2 = b + TT + kn. 
See Steiner [p.587], Davidson [p.182], Boiteux [p.74] and 
Hirshleifer [p.452]. 
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In our two demand firm peak case in Figure 2.6 this means that 
kd = + TT and kn = -tt . The prices then being 
PI = h + •n + -n 
and P2 = b + TT - TT . Steiner gives us exactly the 
same result but we will have need to refer back to Steiner's form 
of presentation later. 
It is also possible to derive an investment rule in this simple 
firm peak situation. We saw earlier that if SRMC = LRMC then plant 
is of optimum size. We can re-interpret this as: if SRMC = LRMC then 
the optimum plant is in operation for that particular output. Where 
we have no indivisibilities the optimum situation is where the cost 
of moving to a new plant to meet a new demand (LRMC) is the same as 
meeting that new demand from the existing plant (SRMC). 
If we assume for the moment that there is only one demand period 
we can illustrate two useful outcomes from the assumption that plant 
is always of optimum capacity (i.e. SRMC = LRMC). 
(1) With constant returns all costs will be covered, and 
(2) if plant is of such a size that SRMC (= price) is not equal to 
LRMC then plant size should be expanded or contracted to bring about 
this equality. The resultant size plant will be the optimum size plant 
This is the basis of the peak loading pricing Investment Rule and is 
illustrated in Figure 2.7. 
Cost, 
Price 
Figure 2.7 
SRMCb SRMCa 
b + 3 
D 
Quantity 
In the single demand period case LRMC per cycle is the same as LRMC 
per period and so 3=11^ . We have used 3 in the diagram above because 
we will generally expect TT, when used, to be less than 3. 
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If plant labelled SRMCa was in operation, a price of p' would be 
charged. But p' (=SRMC) is less than LRMC (=b +3 ), so plant should 
be contracted until SRMC = LRMC = price at p'' with plant size SRMCb. 
In this simple single demand case the investment rule is, if 
SRMC > LRMC plant should be expanded and vice versa. 
Returning again to our assumption of two independent demand 
periods of equal duration, night and day, we can ask what is the 
investment rule in the simple firm peak case? Boiteux's rule would 
have us compare the sum of the SRMC's with LRMC (per cycle). In 
the two demand case this is 
SRMCd + SRMCn = LRMC per cycle . 
For the optimum size plant this is the same as 
Pd + Pn = LRMC per cycle , 
With LRMC being equal to 3 + 2b, and B being equal to 2?: this could 
then be expressed as 
Pd + Pn = 2(b +TT ) 
The investment rule in these terms then is to equate the sum of the 
prices with the long-run marginal cost per cycle. (One problem with 
this expression is that the prices are expressed per period but the 
costs are expressed per cycle. We can alter this rule slightly to 
overcome this; i.e. 
Pd + Pn , , 
= b +TT 
which states that the rule is to equate the average price with the 
LRMC per period. We will have cause to return to this particular form 
of the expression later.) 
1 
In a situation where demand is growing all the time, and capital 
decisions once carried out are irreversible, the rule would be to 
continue to produce from a given plant until SRMC>LRMC and then expand 
capacity. A more sophisticated model by Williamson, which takes account 
of this situation, is examined later in the chapter. 
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Figure 2.8 illustrates the investment rule in the two demand firm 
peak case. 
Figure 2.8 
SRMC 
SRMC" 
Quantity 
If the SRMC' is the plant in operation it is obviously a non-optimal 
plant because Pd' + Pn'>2(b +TT ), Plant size should be expanded until a 
plant with a maximum capacity q^ is reached. The price of peak 
electricity has fallen so that it just covers the capacity costs not paid 
by the night demand. In this situation the sum of the SRMC's is equal 
to LRMC, plant is of optimal size and total costs are covered. Any 
deviation from this is a non-optimal situation. 
It should be noted here that the fulfilment of this investment 
rule is a prerequisite for the use of the pricing rule discussed earlier. 
The pricing rule is based on the assumption that the plant is of optimum 
size, which means that the investment rule has been fully implemented. 
4, Shifting Peak 
Boiteux [p.74] recognised that a situation may arise such that the 
peak, if priced as the peak (i.e. carrying all capacity costs), would 
cease to be the highest level of consumption. It was this shifting 
peak situation to which Steiner devoted most of his attention, and it 
was the clarification of this situation to which he contributed most. 
2J 
The illustration of the firm peak case in Figure 2,5 is only one 
of many combinations of the two demands. Figure 2.9 shows a different 
combination where the use of the simple pricing rule of charging all 
of the capacity costs to the peak, would cause the demand for consumption 
qn, previously the off-peak demand, to become the new peak demand. 
Figure 2.9 
b + 2Tr 
Quantity 
qd qn 
Davidson recognised this problem [p.194] but his theoretical 
treatment of it is not very concise. He suggested that if the peak 
shifted, the correct procedure would be to gradually raise the off-peak 
rate, and lower the peak rate, until the quantities demanded were equal. 
At this point, the prices would not necessarily be equal, but the 
'off-peak' rate would be below b + IT and the 'peak' rate would be above 
b + TT. 
This can be illustrated as a situation where the two relevant 
demand curves cut the vertical part of the SRMC curve as shown in 
Figure 2.10. Optimum scale (and the investment decision) is still 
characterised by Pd + Pn = LRMC (per cycle) [= 2(b + ir ) ] , but the point 
now arises as to how the capacity cost is allocated between the two 
periods. Boiteux described the distribution of the capacity cost 
between the two periods as being 'in proportion to the intensities... of 
the two demands above the horizontal [AVC]'. [p.78]. He called these 
proportions the demand's 'peak responsibility'. 
Either implicitly or explicitly, this same result found its way 
into all of the other solutions. If capacity is fixed and prices are 
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Figure 2.10 
SRMC 
b + -rr 
Quantity 
used to equate supply and demand, the answer will lie in equal outputs 
and unequal prices,^ or as close to equal outputs as the price 
elasticities will allow. We can summarise this simple presentation 
of the theory as follows. 
Pricing. The correct pricing procedure is to charge a price equal to 
the SRMC of each identifiable demand. (The problem of the indeterminancy 
of the SRMC on the vertical portion of the curve is discussed in 
Chapter FourJ . If plant is optimal the sum of the prices will be equal 
to the LRMC of supply per cycle. 
Investment. If plant is of a non-optimal size, i.e. the sum of the 
SMRC's is not equal to the LRMC per cycle, then plant size should be 
changed. With the optimum plant, short-run supply equals demand at 
LRMC per cycle. 
The ideal result would be a complete flattening of the load curve 
as shown by the dotted line in Figure 2.2. However, such a case is all 
but impossible to attain. In most cases, off-peak capacity would need 
to be sold at much less than SRMC to increase off-peak demand sufficiently. 
(See Houthakker [135.p.12] and Boiteux [123.p.79].) The two separate 
and quite different aims of flattening the load curve and accurately 
reflecting costs in prices, are discussed in Chapter Five under the 
heading 'Allocation of Resources'. 
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Allocation of Capacity Cost. In a position of optimal pricing, if there 
are two or more demands competing for peak supply, any charges above 
operating cost (i.e. capacity cost), should be apportioned between the 
two or more demands in proportion to their demand intensities. These 
will be the prices to equate supply and demand.^ 
It would be misleading to give the impression that these results, 
just summarised, had not been suggested in any way prior to 1949. 
Hotelling, Troxel and Clemens had all foreseen one part or another of 
the total answer which Boiteux so elegantly constructed. The details 
of their contributions can be found in Appendix Two. But we cannot 
leave the theoretical constructions at this point because a number of 
other major contributions were made after 1958. 
In this chapter we briefly examine the less practically oriented 
contributions, leaving the more practically minded contributions to 
Chapter Four. Up to 1958, the results of the basic formal theory were 
subject to many qualifications. Most of these were the result of the 
quite extensive simplifying assumptions which had been made. So the 
first obvious way to extend the theory was to attempt to remove some 
of these assumptions. 
One of the first to point out a supposed formal deficiency of 
Boiteux's analysis was R.L. Meek in 1964 [32]. Meek pointed out that 
under Boiteux's assumptions of a rigid capacity plant and constant AVC, 
...if total variable costs increase in proportion to 
output up to the point of capacity, the short-run 
average cost curve must necessarily still be falling 
when the output of the plant is at its maximum. [32.p.231] 
This is consistent with Boiteux's other assumptions concerning long-run 
costs (i.e. either constant or increasing). In these cases the optimum 
output was equal to the maximum output and Boiteux's conclusions 
1 
It is possibly a debatable point whether the pricing rule or the rule 
for the allocation of capacity cost is the major outcome of the theory 
of Peak Load Pricing. In other words, is the particular allocation of 
capacity costs the result of the pricing rule, or is the pricing rule the 
result of the special form of capacity cost allocation? Whether one 
favours the former or the latter depends on whether one sees the basic 
problem as one of pricing or costing. 
For the most part we have treated the pricing rule as the foremost 
result. However, the other argument, that the solution to the problem 
is dependent upon a new approach to the allocation of capacity is 
equally valid. Obviously elements of both are involved and either 
approach would be acceptable. Capacity cost allocation is examined 
further in Chapter Four. 
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followed. This is shown in Figure 2.11 with both the optimum output 
(at SRMC^LRMC) and the maximum output occurring at output q^ under 
conditions of increasing costs. 
Figure 2.11 
SRMC 
LRMC 
LRAC 
Quantity 
However, if long-run costs are falling at all steeply this would not be 
the case. In the case depicted in Figure 2.12 the maximum output is not 
Figure 2.12 
Cost, 
Price SRMC 
ijuantity 
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the optimum output because the optimum output exists where the 
appropriate SRMC is equal to LRMC. Meek felt that this situation 
was an omission on Boiteux's part. While it did not mean that long-run 
marginal capacity cost was not being covered (long-run marginal 
capacity cost being defined as part of LRMC), it did not allow for any 
contribution to be made to the overheads of the existing plant. As a 
result a loss would be incurred equal to SRAC minus SRMC times the 
output. This, of course, is not a new result for a decreasing cost 
situation and none of the major contributors ever claimed that in this 
situation the result would be any different. 
O.E. Williamson [154] made a major contribution to the debate in 
1966. His first aim was to introduce indivisibilities into the 
analysis. Using the optimization of the sum of the consumers' and 
producers' surplus as his welfare goal, and assuming that there is 
only a single constant demand for the product, he derived the conditions 
which are illustrated diagramatically in Figure 2.13, 
Figure 2.13 
b H- 3(= b + 
Quantity 
When we are considering Williamson's model we need to show 
care because it was necessary for his purposes to express all of his 
costs, both operating and capacity costs, per unit per cycle, and not 
per period, as we have done.earlier. This causes some slight problems 
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when we come to interpret his model in relation to the investment rule 
derived earlier. 
Let b = operating costs per unit per cycle, and 3 = marginal 
capacity costs per unit per cycle. Because there is only one demand 
period (N = 1) we could just as easily have used it to represent the 
marginal capacity costs, g being equal toir where we have a single 
demand period. We have not done so because, as in our previous case, 
we will prefer to use it to represent something less than 3j i.e. in 
those situations where N > 1. 
Likewise, LRMC per cycle is the same as LRMC per period and equal 
to b + 3. 
The system is in an optimum position with price equal to Q^M with 
a demand of D^ and plant with costs given by SRMC^. The question which 
arises is that if demand increases to D^, and the next possible plant 
is of size SRMC^, should the investment in this new plant be undertaken? 
Williamson's conclusion is that if the area IJM is greater than 
the area JKL there will be a net gain in the sum of consumers' and 
producer's surplus [p.815]. (With marginal costs constant, i.e. the 
elasticity of supply infinite, this amounts simply to an increase in 
consumers' surplus.) If the two areas are equal there will be a zero 
net gain in consumers' surplus. Therefore, under our assumptions, any 
increase in demand greater than that to D„ would warrant the extra 
1 ^ investment being undertaken. 
One other restrictive assumption removed by Williamson was the 
assumption that demand is broken into subperiods of equal duration. 
To do this he constructed a curve of the 'effective demand for capacity' 
The assumption that costs are expressed per cycle facilitates this 
construction. Demand in each cycle is weighted by the fraction of the 
cycle over which it occurs. For example, in Figure 2.14, Dn is the 
off-peak demand of eight hours duration and Dd is the peak demand of 
16 hours duration. They are labelled Dn^^^^^ and Dd'"^ ''^ ^ respectively. 
So while all costs are expressed per cycle we still have demand periods. 
1 
One of the natural results of this would be that if demand were 
growing over time, up until IJM>JKL (with a price of P^) a profit 
would be made. Once IJM=JKL and the new plant was installed with 
price equal to P2, a loss would be made until JKL=0 when total 
revenue once again equalled total cost. The time element involved 
in this will be discussed shortly. 
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But to distinguish this from the demand periods discussed before we 
will refer to Williamson's demands as being recorded per 'sub-period' 
of the cycle. 
Figure 2.14 
Cost 
Price 
Pd 
b + 3(=b + 7 T ) 
Quantity 
As in other models, with constant returns to scale and perfectly 
divisible plant, the optimum plant will be characterised by a zero net 
revenue. 
Williamson obtains his 'effective demand for capacity' curve (DE) 
by 
...taking the vertical difference between the periodic load 
curve and short-run marginal cost curve (b), multiplying this 
difference by the fraction (w.) of the cycle during which the 
periodic load in question prevails, and adding vertically this 
weighted demand for capacity curve to the short-run marginal 
cost curve. [154.p.818]. 
Having done this for both sub-periods he adds them vertically to get 
his curve DE. Optimum plant is where DE intersects LRMC per cycle, the 
optimum prices being Pd and Pn. At these prices a zero net revenue is 
earned, so 
...the amount by which revenues in the off-peak load period 
fail to cover pro-rata total costs is precisely offset by 
revenues in the peak load period in excess of pro-rata total 
costs. [p.819] 
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In the case shown in Figure 2.14 this amounts to the area abed being 
just half of the area cde.f.^ This might be more readily seen in the 
firm peak case shown in Figure 2.15 where Pn makes no contributions 
towards capacity costs at a l l . 
Figure 2.15 
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In Steiner's terms it is obvious that kd is no longer equal to 
k n . N o w that we have unequal duration sub-periods the relative 
difference between price and b no longer indicates the relative 
contribution of the separate demands to capacity cost. To express 
prices in Steiner's terms, and still have kd + kn = 0 , we need to 
weight these values by the relative duration over which the sub-periods 
r u n . 
Let wl = fraction of the cycle over which sub-period D ^ runs, and 
w2 = the fraction of the cycle for sub-period D ^ . 
The equivalent form is now 
wl 
w2 
.kd + kn = 0 
It is interesting to note that we could have achieved this same 
result if we had divided our cycle into three equal duration sub-periods 
of eight hours each, and made the two peak demands identical. In the 
case of Figure 2.15 above the result would have been that the two peak 
demands contribute towards covering all of the capacity costs equally. 
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so Steiner's prices can be expressed in the above case as 
Pd = b + 3 + kd 
and Pn = b + 3 + kn where ^ . k d + kn = 0 
w2 
Prices are now set not only in relation to the intensity of the two 
demands but also in relation to the relative duration of the demand 
periods. The shorter is the duration of the peak demand the higher 
will be the price per unit relative to that period's absolute 
contribution to capacity cost. 
Boiteux's investment rule in Williamson's case requires a little 
more thought because it does not follow as simply as the pricing rule. 
Previously the investment rule relied on the equality of Pd + Pn and 
LRMC per cycle. In the case outlined here we have already seen that 
with N = 1, LRMC per cycle is equal to b + 3. 
But i f P d = b + 3 + k d and 
Pn = b + 3 + kn then it is quite clear that the sum of the two 
prices is certainly not going to equal b + 3. If kd and kn are 
appropriately weighted by the duration of their respective demand 
period the sum of kd and kn will be zero. The sum of the prices then 
is 2(b + 3), but this is not equal to LRMC per cycle. This apparent 
conflict between Williamson's result and the earlier result stems from 
the way in which the variables are expressed. In Williamson's case we 
are expressing prices per demand sub-period and costs per cycle. We 
could overcome this problem by either expressing costs per sub-period 
or expressing prices per cycle. We have already decided that it is 
necessary to express costs per cycle so the easiest solution is to 
express prices per cycle as well. The relevant variable now is the 
average price per cycle. With the k's cancelling out (after appropriate 
weighting) the average of the prices Pd and Pn is b +3 , which is equal 
to LRMC per cycle. 
The next step would be a combination of both unequal demand 
periods and indivisibilities but the outcome is fairly easy to imagine 
being a combination of Figures 2.13 and 2.14 or 2.15. Figure 2.16 
further on is an illustration of this case. 
One interesting outcome of Williamson's work is that even though 
constant returns apply if plant is indivisible (or if capacity is given 
rather than determined by the system) budget equilibrium will not 
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necessarily exist at any particular point in time. The problems which 
arise from the introduction of a budget constraint are discussed in the 
next chapter. 
One factor which has recently emerged in the literature and 
expanded the basic theory further is the inclusion of two alternative 
ways to meet an increase in peak demand. Such an increase can be met 
by the addition to the base load plant of an indivisible unit such as 
the one dealt with by Williamson, or, as an alternative, by the addition 
of a smaller, more divisible unit designed specifically to meet peak 
loads. The characteristics of these alternatives which make them 
interesting are that the 'peaking plant' will usually have a lower 
capacity cost (per kW) but also a higher running cost (per kWh). 
If we use the superscript 't' to denote the peaking plant, the 
conditions just mentioned give us the following assumptions: 
b^ > b 
t 
3 < 3 
Two separate and apparently independent attempts have been made 
to incorporate this feature into the analysis. One was by Crew [128] 
and the other by Meek [201]. Crew chose to extend Williamson's model 
because it was the one most capable of dealing with the problem of 
indivisibilities. He posed his problem as one of the choice of a 
smaller, more divisible plant or a larger indivisible plant. 
Crew's basic assumption was that ( g*" + b^) > (g+ b)^, although 
he did use a special form of this which is the same as the inequalities 
given above. Using the same technique as Williamson he derived two 
curves for the 'effective demand for capacity'. Each one was based 
OH the cost of one of the two alternative investments. Figure 2.16 
illustrates his conclusions. 
Crew uses Williamson's assumption of a peak (16 hours duration) 
sub-period and an off-peak (eight hours duration) sub-period. His 
starting point is where DE intersects LRMC halfway between an existing 
plant, SR>IC' and the next size base load plant, SRMC". In this position 
as in the case of D" in Figure 2.13, the net gain in consumers' surplus 
1 
Both the b and 3 used here are used in the same way as in the 
Williamson model, i.e. they relate per unit per cycle in the situation 
where N = 1. 
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from installing the new base load plant is zero. There is however an 
available alternative, and this is to install a peak load plant. In 
appraising this situation it is the values of 3*" and b*" which are 
important. A new 'effective demand for capacity' curve can be derived 
based on the weighted average of the demands above b*". This has been 
sho^-m as DE*". The optimum size peaking plant would be that with a 
SRMC cutting b^ + g^ where DE*" intersects b^ + If such a plant, 
sho\m by SRMC ''' in Figure 2.16, is installed, there will be a net 
gain in consumers' surplus as sho\TO by the shaded area VGA. Therefore 
it would be desirable to install the peak load plant rather than the 
base load plant because the net gain is greater. 
Prices and costs under Crew's model are more difficult to explain. 
Prices would be Pd and Pn for peak and off-peak respectively. The peak 
price would cover its running costs, the capacity costs of the peak 
plant and an amount to cover the shortfall in capacity costs by which 
Pn is below b + 3. 
Figure 2.16 
SRMC' 
Quantity 
34 
Neither Williamson's, nor Crew's analysis at this point, takes 
account of the time element involved in the decision. It is fairly 
obvious that Williamson's analysis, as shown in Figures 2,14 and 2.15, 
is a static construction. If it were to incorporate a steadily growing 
demand, such as generally characterises the electricity industry, some 
discounting procedure would be necessary to compare the gains and 
losses to be made on either side of the zero net gain point. 
Crew recognises this problem in his construction and notes the 
need for discounting where the immediate net gains from the peak load 
plant would have to be compared with the future net gains from the next 
available size base plant. This applies when demand is growing (i.e. 
DE is moving to the right) and the assumption of zero net gain does not 
hold. As we can see from the diagram, Crew assumed (3^ + b*") > (3 + b) 
and also b^>b and 3^<3, 
Meek used a different construction to that of Crew. He allowed 
for the differences in capacity cost in the same way as Crew, but he 
assumed that the running cost of both types of plants was the same, 
i.e. b = b. His argument is framed in the terms of the Boiteux-Steiner 
diagram. Much of the difference in the two analyses comes from the fact 
that Meek was trying to do something rather different to Crew. Rather 
than simply extending the theory, he was attempting to construct a 
theoretical basis upon which to appraise the new Bulk Supply Tariff 
which had recently been announced in Britain. This tariff is framed 
to take account of the fact that the capital costs of smaller output 
peaking stations (either new or very old) are less than those of other 
plants. Because of this fact the capacity charge of the new tariff is 
divided into two parts: 
A basic capacity charge related to kW taken over the 
winter workday 'plateau'; [and] 
A peaking-capacity charge based on the fixed costs 
of peaking plant and related to kW taken at annual 
system peak over and above the winter 'plateau'. 
[223.p.67]l 
Under Meek's assumption, b = marginal operating costs, 
g ^ = peaking capacity charge, and 
3 = basic capacity charge. 
1 
A more detailed description of the new tariff can be found in references 
[201] and [223] by Meek and Watts respectively. 
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If we assume that demand is broken up into three periods, one fully 
off-peak (D^), one fully on-peak (D^), and the other occurring somewhere 
on the peak 'plateau' the following prices should apply. 
pi = b 
p2 = b + and 
p3 = b + 6 -
The conclusion concerning the price of the third period demand is 
the direct result of the unique method used to calculate the basic 
capacity cost for this demand. It is calculated as the residual of 
total costs after deducting all operating costs and the 'peaking 
capacity costs'. Meek's argument, which follows from this, is that, 
all other things remaining the same, if there is an increase in demand 
in period 3, and therefore in costs, there will also be a saving of 
per unit on the 'Peaking capacity charge', and 
...in the long-run, then, if we take this view, the 
'marginal cost' of period [3] electricity will not 
be [b + 3 but b + 3 - 3^]. [201.p.58.fn] 
In a later number of the Economic Journal, Turvey [217] criticised 
Meek's assumption that b was uniform for both forms of capacity. After 
acknowledging the criticism. Meek concluded his reply with the statement 
that: 
If someone could now solve the very difficult technical 
problem of incorporating non-uniform running costs 
into a model of this type,... I would, of course, be 
only too pleased. [p.968] 
As we have seen. Crew had gone some way towards meeting this requirement 
with his extension of Williamson's model. 
Crew and Kleindorfer [316] have recently extended the analysis to 
a model which includes two plants, each with different running and 
capacity costs, both being available at the peak. Under these 
assumptions they outline the conditions under which either plant alone, 
or both plants, will operate. Their analysis is interesting in that it 
1 
In their very brief note they claim to have deduced a new pricing 
result for the firm peak case under these assumptions. Unfortunately, 
their rather incomprehensible diagram only compounds the problems 
caused by the lack of a proof or an explanation for their result. 
There is the possibility too that their two-plant case may turn out 
to be a special case and not alter the basic pricing rules very much. 
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concludes that with both plants operating, even in a firm peak case, 
the off-peak price will be greater than the running cost of the base 
load plant. 
Kay [315], has recently outlined a programming model to derive 
optimal prices in the general case with k plants of different capital 
intensity, and demand being required over n equal length sub-periods. 
He interprets the duals of the cost minimization problem as the shadow 
prices of the outputs. 
Finally Crew and Kleindorfer [318] have shown how their results 
with two plants are consistent with Kay's more general model. 
Unfortunately, these three contributions appeared too late to be 
included in our discussion here. 
As well as the mainstream contributions some other, less significant, 
contributions were made. We mention them briefly because generally they 
fall outside our own area of interest. 
Buchanan [125] and Gabor [132] outlined some of the problems 
associated with finding an optimal set of prices when the distributional 
problems are specifically taken into account.^ Minasian [141] attempted 
to show the likely outcome of introducing assumptions concerning the 
interdependence of the various demands. He also introduced a very 
interesting notion of applying the theory of queues to the peak demand 
situation. He shows that quite similar results can be achieved by 
either explicit differential pricing or implicit differential pricing 
through the use of queues. The real price in this latter case is 
p + Wt where Wt is the money equivalent of disutility of waiting at 
each time of the day when queues of varying length form. 
5. Investment 
The 'investment rule' we have discussed to date is far too simple 
to let stand without some further comment. On the other hand it is 
not our intention to discuss the very complex problems associated with 
1 
Turvey wrote a rather cutting reply to these two articles. 
He argued that 
...the income elasticity of demand, the share of income 
spent on electricity and variations in marginal relative 
to average price would all have to be impossibly high 
for this complication to be worth bothering about. 
[148.p.104] 
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the theory of investment in the electricity industry,^ Instead we will 
allow ourselves a small diversion, not to extend the theory of 
investment, but simply to show that this investment rule, while simple, 
is in no way inconsistent with modern investment appraisal techniques. 
Its biggest re striction is that it is framed within a static m o d e l . 
Most electricity industries are growing over time and requiring 
continuing additions to capacity. This will mean regular additions to 
base load plant to meet the predicted growth, and sometimes extra 
additions to overall capacity to meet an additional marginal increment 
in demand which is over and above the expected growth rate. In general 
terms these two separate situations have been classified as 'global' 
and 'marginal' problems respectively. 
The global investment problem is one of general development, the 
long-term investment plan. It is primarily concerned with the question 
of the optimal mix of different types of plant over time. Normally the 
decision requires a choice between two or more different types of plant. 
As the system grows it will need both more base load capacity and more 
peak load capacity as well. There are likely to be different types of 
base load plant available, with different characteristics. The choice 
of peaking plants will involve not only the type of plant available 
but also the decision as to whether or not to retain some older thermal 
plant as a stand-by for peak generation. 
The theoretical problem is one of cost minimization subject to a 
number of constraints which include the estimated load, availability 
of water for hydro stations, available sites for thermal stations, and 
3 
the general availability of other natural and manufactured resources. 
As a rule, when new base load plant is introduced into the system 
it will be cheaper and more efficient than other base load plant and 
1 
References [254] to [293] relate to many of the practical problems 
of investment in the electricity industry. 
2 
The background and development of these terms have been explained 
by the author in an article in the Electrical Engineer[268]. The 
terms were originally used by the French economists and later taken 
up by Meek [279] and are used quite commonly now. 
3 
Meek [279], M a s s ^ [275.p.196] and Turvey [147.p.37] have all shown 
that this is a problem which can be tackled by the use of linear and 
non-linear programming. M a s s ^ and Gibrat [277] have written on the 
use of linear programming in this field. 
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will be used more than the other plant. The system cost curve will 
shift to the right and create a saving in running costs at all times 
of the day when cheaper plants would then be operating.^ This saving 
in total system running costs should be set against the capital cost 
of the new plant purchased, thereby lowering the real cost of the 
introduction of the increased capacity. 
This means that a modification is necessary to the simple 
investment rule that we had earlier. Turvey [146] has one exposition 
which in essence means that: 
...the marginal system cost of the postulated increase 
in peak hour consumption is, in capital terms, the cost 
of the new plant less the PV of the saving in total off 
peak running costs. [146.p.424] 
2 
Naturally any fuel savings achieved will continue into the future. 
If these negative costs are going to be used in the decision making they 
have to be discounted back (at an appropriate rate) to the time the 
decision is made. 
Any investigation of the provision of alternative generating types 
cannot escape the fact that the station or sets involved cannot be 
appraised solely on their own. History has decreed that there will 
usually be a system already in existence with established stations, 
costs and time patterns of operation. The problem therefore is not 
one of appraising the worth of two alternative projects (which is the 
one posed by Crew), but of comparing the present worth of the costs of 
the system including one alternative and excluding the other. 
Turvey was very explicit on this point. 
The net change in the present worth of all system costs 
arising from the addition or subtraction from a year's 
plant programme... of generating capacity of any given 
type, given the load to be met in all future years can 
See Chapter Four, Section 2(b), 
1 
2 
The time period envisaged in a global problem such as we are 
discussing here may well be thirty or more years. An additional 
problem which we have not mentioned is the fact that over this 
period a particular generating set or station will not retain its 
original place in the cost merit-order of operations. This means 
that some of the parameters of the problem will change over time. 
Two of the parameters which will change are the availability of 
the plant to meet peak loads, and the savings which will be 
achieved in fuel costs by its introduction into the system. 
39 
now be seen to be...the capital cost of the 
addition to capacity 
less the present value of the fuel savings involved 
(which is the difference in running costs between 
the new and the old generating units, multiplied by 
the usage of the new machine) 
plus the present value of the Fixed Other Costs 
such as maintenance etc. [147.p.16]^ 
This expression is, in a sense, a LRMC calculation for the 
addition of a particular type of plant. If it was calculated for each 
type of plant contemplated, the optimal mix of plant over time would 
be where this expression was the same for all types of new plant 
...and for the old existing plant which is just on the 
margin of being scrapped. If it is not the same, a change 
in the composition of the plant programme would reduce 
the present worth of future system costs. [147.p.17] 
These are, of course, only the first-order conditions for a cost 
minimization. The second-order conditions can be found in Turvey's 
book. [147.p.19] 
It should be noted that this rule for optimal mix cannot be used 
to make up an investment programme. But it can be of great use as a 
check on existing proposals for development, and as a guide to indicate 
2 favourable changes in those proposals. 
The marginal investment decision concerns the decision to make a 
marginal increment to capacity over and above that which is the forecast 
normal growth rate. Such a situation could arise if a large consumer 
(such as a large electro-chemical complex) wished to be brought onto 
the system. This type of problem is very relevant to the calculation 
1 
This brief outline follows the same lines as in Turvey's book and 
more detail can be found there concerning the treatment of such problems 
as the different lives and peak availability of the alternatives under 
consideration. It should also be noted that Turvey was not the first 
to explain this investment problem in this manner. The French economists 
pioneered this field. Masse [ 275.p.193] and Boiteux [256] were leaders 
in this respect. It is a pity that Turvey could not find time or space 
in his book to fully acknowledge his debt to them. 
2 
P.E. Watts of the C.E.G.B. in Britain has offered a not too 
dissimilar analysis of LRMC and its use in solving the optimal mix 
problem in the Economic Journal (1968) [223]. It has been criticised 
on a number of points by Turvey in a later issue of the same journal 
[217] . 
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of LRMC on two accounts. The first is in the method of meeting the 
demand, and the second is the price which should be charged. 
Once again the emphasis is on system costs. It is impossible 
to ignore the existing plant and cost structure. As Turvey wrote: 
Long-run marginal cost, in present worth terms, is 
simply the present worth of all system costs as they 
will be with the increment in load which is to be 
costed, less what they would be without that increment. 
[147.p.44]^ 
Because we are dealing with only a single addition to the system, 
the practical approach to the problem is slightly different. It is 
2 
possible in this situation to use cost-benefit techniques. If the 
load to be met is the same, regardless of the method of meeting it, 
then the benefits remain constant and the problem reduces to one of 
the different costs involved in meeting this load in different ways. 
The problem therefore is one of system LRMC, the LRMC itself being 
very important in the setting of the tariff for the consumer. 
How does all of this fit in with Boiteux's simplified investment 
rule proposed in his theory of Peak Load Pricing? Peak Load Pricing 
would have it that a system is of optimal capacity when SRMC equals 
LRMC. Dessus expressed it as: 
The correct adjustment of installations is precisely 
defined by the equality of the marginal cost of 
potential overloading to that of equivalent additions 
to equipment. It follows that the increase in costs 
necessitated by an expansion in output may be defined 
either as the increment in the cost of utilizing a 
fixed quantity of equipment or as the cost, per unit 
of time, of the necessary additions to installations 
operated at constant cost. [77.pp.44-5] 
If we imagine that the 'expansion in output' is steady, year by 
year, and that costs are discounted system costs, this is the same 
1 
Turvey has produced a more detailed description of this concept 
in the Economic Journal, 1969. See particularly [150.p.289]. 
2 
Two excellent discussions of this type of problem in a cost-benefit 
vein are by Herman G. Van der Tak [291] (showing a practical choice 
between hydro and thermal by the World Bank in Venezuela in 1962) 
and an article by Turvey in 1963 [287] (in which he criticized a 
report on cost calculations for alternative investment plans in 
Scotland - the MacKenzie Report). Both of these authors emphasize 
the need to look at system costs and not simply the costs of the 
individual alternative projects. 
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general rule which Turvey developed for his optimal mix of plants over 
time, the global investment decision. 
Optimal investment is achieved when the LRMC of development in all 
alternative ways is equal, and also equal to the cost of operation of 
existing plant. If they are not equal the inequality will suggest the 
direction of the next investment. If the cost of operating from 
existing plant (SRMC) is greater than the cost of putting in new plant 
(LRMC) then new capacity should be added, and the increment in demand 
be met from the new plant rather than trying to meet it from increased 
use of the plant at the margin of the system. 
So the investment guide lines of the static theory of Peak Load 
Pricing are not entirely out of touch with reality. Admittedly, they 
are greatly simplified, take no account of the problems of calculation 
and are directly integrated with the pricing policy, but they are not 
inconsistent. 
It is possible that the relationship with the pricing decision 
is not very realistic. As we have observed, the investment procedure 
just outlined accepts a forecast estimate of load. One of the 
assumptions of the forecast will be that the effect of prices remains 
the same in the future as in the past. This means that the investment 
decision, in practice, is made assuming the pricing mechanism has been 
taken care of. In the theory, however, we saw that the pricing decision 
is made assuming that the investment decision has been accurately made. 
But this reversal of roles is not important and certainly does not 
negate the judgment that the theory of Peak Load Pricing does offer a 
basis for a relevant decision process for investment policies. 
We have couched our description in terms of the electricity industry, 
but to be of any practical use to that industry the theory has to be 
developed further. Some good examples of the changes necessary to apply 
this type of theory to other industries are available.^ Generally they 
follow the basic theory discussed here, but naturally each industry has 
its own peculiarities. 
1 
One is a relatively older application by Hazelwood (1950/1)[90] for 
Telephone Service. Another one, by Johnson, is more up to date (1966) 
[94] and applies to the application of optimal pricing for 
Communications Satellites. Yet another is by Ponsonby and deals with 
the problem of the Peak and Road Passenger Transport [105]. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
PEAK LOAD PRICING AND A BUDGET CONSTRAINT 
In the practical world there are many constraints on an optimal 
pricing policy for a public utility. Here we discuss the imposition 
of a profit rate greater than would be possible with the prices decreed 
by the peak load pricing theory. Under the model used up to date, with 
its constant costs and no indivisibilities, the optimum prices lead to 
a zero net revenue. Our goal now is a positive net revenue. 
First we will summarise the early work done on this problem and 
also some extensions published in 1970. Following this we will 
illustrate the results of this work in terms of the simple peak load 
pricing model already summarised. Finally a reconciliation of our 
interpretation will be made with one of the most recent models which 
includes a budget constraint, that of Herbert Mohring. 
Both the early and later work has concentrated on the general 
equilibrium welfare-maximising model subject to a budget constraint. 
Rather than looking at the overall rules we will attempt to interpret 
these rules as they would need to be applied to an electricity 
undertaking which is committed to peak load pricing as a first-best 
solution. In all the cases considered the search is for a sub-optimum, 
or a second-best solution, whether it be called quasi-optimization,^ 
sub-optimization or simply a pareto optimum subject to a budget 
2 
constraint. The implicit aim in all cases is that customers, via 
their free choice of goods, will lead the undertaking to produce an 
economically efficient set of outputs thus maximising welfare. 
In some of the models an extra constraint of a non-taxable sector 
3 
is added to the model. On the whole we ignore this added problem 
and concentrate only on the results relevant to the budget constraint. 
Where before we have shown that the prices should be set equal to 
marginal cost, in the second-best situation now prevailing this rule 
will not automatically be the right one. The task now is to find a 
new pricing rule, or set of rules. 
1 
See Baumol and Bradford [311.p.267]. 
2 
See Manne [303.p.323]. 
3 
See references [311, 312 and 313]. 
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The first clear statement of the problem was by Ramsay [301] in 
1927, and by Pigou [302] in 1928. It was taken up again in the early 
fifties by Manne [303] and Fleming [304] and more recently (1968, 1970) 
it has appeared again. 
Generally the problem was seen as that of the deficit which arose 
if price was set equal to marginal cost under conditions of increasing 
returns. We have already outlined in Chapter One the arguments put 
forward and the practices suggested for financing such a deficit from 
sources internal to the industry or firm. What makes the contributions 
referred to here different is the explicit inclusion of the budget 
constraint into a general equilibrium model and the close attention 
paid to the demand conditions for the products. Some of the models to 
which we will be referring assume a number of single-product government-
owned undertakings, and in this case it is the total costs of all the 
undertakings which have to be recouped by the imposition of various 
taxes on the products. For example, Baumol and Bradford posed the 
problem like this. 
Resource allocation is to be optimal under the constraint 
that government revenues suffice to make up for deficits... 
of the individual firms that constitute the economy. [311.p.265] 
But this problem is equivalent in all its aspects to that of a 
single multi-product firm which is also responsible for recouping its 
full costs and may do so by the imposition of surcharges on top of the 
prices which would be set equal to marginal cost. Because it is more 
appropriate, our discussion will be based on a single multi-product 
firm. But whichever way the problem was posed most of the authors 
assumed that it was one of a deficit which arose as a result of a 
combination of marginal cost pricing and increasing returns. The 
simplest budget constraint in this case is one of breaking-even. 
Rees, and also Turvey, went beyond this simple explanation of 
the need for a budget constraint by suggesting that a budget 
constraint in some form was necessary to maintain managerial efficiency. 
To Rees, the higher prices which would be expected to follow from the 
inclusion of a certain minimum profit.... 
...undoubtedly represent less allocative efficiency than 
in the first-best case, but this loss is necessarily a 
part of the trade-off between allocative and (hopefully 
increased) managerial efficiency which a policy of 
financial targets implies. [307.p.973]. 
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Turvey also saw the budget constraint as being directly related to 
managerial efficiency. 
While it is difficult to see that this [the constraint] 
would serve any useful purpose as regards resource 
allocation, it will justly be said that some form of 
financial target does serve a useful purpose in keeping 
management on its toes. [305.p.343] 
Our reason for getting involved with the problems of budget constraints 
stems neither from a desire to keep management on its toes, nor from a 
desire to avoid a deficit resulting from marginal cost pricing. In 
the undertaking we will be examining we feel there is probably adequate 
incentive to managerial efficiency stemming from the political 
implications (from both the government and consumers) of the level 
of electricity prices. Rather our interest lies in the need of the 
undertaking to earn extra revenue, both to cover the loss made on 
certain sales where the price has been kept artificially low as a 
social objective (e.g. country areas), and also because a certain 
amount of capital expenditure has to be financed from revenue. Part 
B of the the thesis is devoted to an examination of the extent of 
these problems. 
1. A Simple Model 
Assume a single multi-purpose public enterprise, for our purposes 
an electricity undertaking selling electricity at different times of 
the day. There is no relationship among the various demands so we can 
say that there are no 'cross-effects' or, alternatively, cross-elasticity 
is zero. Further, we assume that marginal cost is constant which can be 
interpreted as saying that the elasticity of supply is infinite. 
Our starting point will be the 'proportional reduction' rule first 
formulated by Ramsay in 1927 and expanded by Pigou. Subject to the 
assumptions of linear demand and supply curves the rule stated that 
...the optimum system of proportionate taxes yielding a 
given revenue is one that will cut down the production 
of all commodities and services in equal proportions. 
...we ought always so to arrange our taxes as to preserve 
the proportions in which these diverse things [the 
commodities subject to tax] are severally produced. 
(Pigou) [302.p.106] ^  
1 
See Ramsay [301.p.47] for the earlier statement. 
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The more obvious form in which to state the rule is with regard to the 
implications for pricing policy. Such a restatement will need to be 
in terms of price elasticities of demand. It is in this form that the 
basic principle is better known now. Baumol and Bradford, looking at 
the case of only two demands, described it as 
If we propose to (say) contract the demands of A and B 
each by precisely k per cent, then if A's demand is 
much more elastic than B's, clearly A's price must be 
raised by a substantially smaller percentage than that 
of B. [311.p.271] 
For Pigou, the answer was the same. 
If the elasticities of all the supplies are infinite, 
i.e. if all commodities are produced in conditions 
of constant returns, the rates of tax must be inversely 
proportionate to their elasticities of demand. 
[302.p.108] 
The rule is only another way of expressing the 'proportional reduction' 
rule which was proposed first. For our purposes, the taxes which 
result are surcharges, or tolls, to be added to the LRMC of supplying 
the various demands of the undertaking we are considering. For 
example, for goods which have equal 'own' price elasticities the 
relative surcharges would be identical and we would have a situation 
where the surcharges were proportional to marginal costs. 
More specific formulations, (most of them based on constrained 
welfare maximisation) have been presented but basically they all 
amount to a similar expression of this 'inverse elasticity' rule. 
As an expression of the 'proportional reduction' rule, in the absence 
of cross-effects, the inverse elasticity rule is quite straightforward 
and there is no need for an outline of the various forms in which it 
has arisen. Baumol and Bradford have offered possibly the best summary 
of the case. 
In most conventional and familiar terms this rule asserts 
that pareto optimal utilization of resources in the 
presence of an absolute profit restraint requires 
(considering substitution effects alone) that all outputs 
be reduced by the same proportion from the quantities 
that would be demanded at prices equal to the corresponding 
marginal costs. The rule takes an even simpler form in 
the event cross-elasticities of demand are zero. It then 
See Baumol [310.p.122], Baumol and Bradford [311.p.270], Rees 
[307.p.973] and [108.p.266], Lerner [312.p.289], Dixit [313.p.297], 
Manne [303], Fleming [304], and Dreze on Boiteux [78.p.31]. 
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requires that each price be set so that its percentage 
deviation from marginal cost is inversely proportional 
to the item's price elasticity of demand. 
...the social welfare will best be served... by causing 
unequal deviations [in prices] in which items with 
elastic demands are priced at levels close to their 
marginal costs. The prices of those items whose demands 
are inelastic diverge from their marginal costs by 
relatively wider margins. [311.p.267] 
A more interesting situation arises when we allow demands to be 
interdependent. 
2. Related Demands 
We now relax the assumption of no cross-effects and allow cross-
elasticities to take on values other than zero. They may be positive 
or negative depending on the relationship between the relevant goods. 
(We still retain the assumption of an infinite elasticity of supply, 
however.) The problem is a wider one now because the total effect on 
revenue and output depends partly on how the quantity of other goods 
changes in response to price changes in any one good. 
Of the early writers, Ramsay specifically avoided the problem 
of interdependent demands while Pigou acknowledged it in only 
a general way.^ Most of the contributions to this part of the debate 
have been made in recent years and it is these we shall consider. But 
first let us state what would appear the intuitive answer to the 
inclusion of interdependent demands. 
Assume two goods, A and B, which are substitutes. Assume further 
that they have an own price elasticity which is the same for each 
good. In the absence of any cross-effects they would draw the same 
proportional tax. However, if they are substitutes, increasing the 
price of A will lead to an increase in the demand for B and vice versa 
If the quantities of both goods are to be reduced proportionally then 
both goods will need to receive a larger tax than they would have 
received in the absence of the cross-effects. 
Alternatively, assume that B is a complement to A. Imposing a 
tax on A will lead to a decrease in the demand for B even in the 
absence of a tax. If the same tax as before were to be imposed it 
would result in a more than proportional reduction in B. B therefore 
requires less tax than it would in the absence of the complementary 
cross-effects. 
^ Pigou [302.p.107] 
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It is possible in this latter case of complementarity that the 
increase in the price of A (as a result of the tax) would lead to a 
more than proportional reduction in the demand for B which would 
require the payment of a subsidy to adjust the price of B , so as to 
bring about equal proportional reductions in both A and B.^ 
Where the number of goods among which cross-effects can occur 
rises, it is not simply a matter of being a substitute or a complement 
but whether the complementarity effects outweigh the substitution 
effects, or vice versa. Later, we will have a closer look at a recent 
model by Mohring which incorporates various demand interdependencies. 
Rees also has included them in his general equilibrium model, and 
concludes that 
Price will now tend to be lower, relative to marginal 
cost the greater the positive sum of such cross-effects... 
[which case]... corresponds to the situation in which the 
complementarity relations between the good in question 
and other goods outweigh the substitution relations. 
[108.p.267] 
Conversely, if the substitution effects outweigh the complementarity 
effects then we will expect price to be higher relative to marginal 
cost. 
Such a rule requires knowledge of both own elasticities and cross-
elasticities and it would seem that we will run into problems of 
insufficient knowledge of demand. In the case of the general equilibrium 
analysis this is probably so, but looking at only one firm, the problems 
may not be as great because of the smaller number of commodities and 
their limited relationships, 
3. The Peak Load Pricing Model 
It is possible to illustrate the rules we have presented in terms 
of the elementary peak load pricing diagrams. For simplicity we will 
assume two demand periods of equal duration, peak demand (Dd) and 
off-peak demand (Dn). As in the peak load pricing model, we will also 
assume constant marginal costs. 
Our starting position will be after optimal prices have been set 
for the peak load pricing m o d e l , with plant of the optimum size and 
See Pigou [302.p.107], Mohring [314.p.267] and Rees [108.p.267]. 
Also see later in the chapter. 
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Pd + Pn = 2b + 3 . With constant costs and no indivisibilities this 
is a position of zero net revenue. We will further assume that at 
these prices the price elasticity of demand is the same for both the 
peak and the off-peak demands. Figure 3.1 illustrates this position. 
Figure 3.1 
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At the price ok the elasticity of demand for off-peak electricity is 
given by ; for peak demand, at price oz, the price elasticity is 
If ca and df are parallel, and if points e and b are both on a straight 
line drawn from the origin, then it follows that the price elasticity 
for both demands must be the same at the prevailing prices. Upon this 
basic position we will impose a budget constraint, not in the form of 
an absolute amount of revenue to be earned, but in the more general form 
of the rule seen earlier, a given proportional reduction in the quantity 
demanded in both periods. 
Our first example we will call CASE 1. Case 1 is a situation 
where there are no cross-effects between the two demands and only 
the relevant own price elasticities are important. Figure 3.2 
illustrates the various alternatives possible in Case 1. For 
illustration we have assumed a 20 per cent reduction in both demands 
after the optimum pricing rule has been imposed in the absence of a 
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constraint. It is an exceptionally large reduction and has been 
adopted simply to illustrate the principles involved. 
Our first alternative is where the price elasticity of demand 
for peak supplies is the same as that for off-peak supplies 
(EDd = EDn). This is given by our basic position where Dn is parallel 
Figure 3.2 
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to D d , given by D d l . The proportional reduction is given by the amounts 
mn and pq for off-peak and peak demands respectively. To achieve these 
reductions it is necessary to impose surcharges of ki on the off-peak 
price and zx on the peak price. Because the demand curves are parallel 
these surcharges will be equi-proportional. We noted this particular 
case in our summary of the literature earlier. 
We can illustrate our other alternatives, in the absence of cross-
effects, as departures from this equi-proportional case. Let us take 
the case where EDd<EDn, i.e. at the peak load optimal prices the demand 
for peak supplies is less elastic than that for off-peak supplies. 
Such a case is shown if we use Dd2 as the demand curve for peak 
supplies. From the same reasoning as before, if points e and b fall 
on a straight line from the origin, and if at point b Dd2 is steeper 
than Dn at e, then EDd2 at price oz is less than EDn at price ok. To 
achieve the same proportional reductions as before we now need a more 
than proportional surcharge on peak demand, the demand with the lower 
price elasticity. The third alternative, that of EDd>EDn, is given by 
Dd3. Both of these cases are in accordance with the results we would 
expect following our earlier discussion of these possible relationships 
between own price elasticities. 
The same principles could have been shown by altering the demand 
curve for off-peak electricity to provide the inequality of the price 
elasticities. The less elastic demand will have a price which is more 
than proportionally above the price which would prevail in the absence 
of the constraint relative to the other demand. 
All of the alternatives outlined here will lead to prices being 
above what they would otherwise have been, and in our Figure 3.2 all 
J 
of these higher prices will lead to an increase in revenue giving the 
undertaking a positive net revenue. We have drawn the diagrams so that 
all the relevant price elasticities are less than one, a situation in 
which an increase in price will lead to an increase in total revenue. 
If, for example, the distance ef was greater than the distance ed, 
EDn would be greater than 1 and the positive effect on total revenue 
of the increase in price would be less than the reduction in total 
revenue brought about by the reduced consumption of off-peak supplies. 
We avoid the problems introduced by such occurrences by assuming the 
relevant elasticities are less than one. 
51 
The next step is to introduce cross-effects into the analysis. 
CASE 2 will study the influence of these cross-effects in isolation 
by assuming that the own price elasticities are initially equal. The 
departures from the equi-proportional result will then be due solely 
to the cross-effects. 
Figure 3.3 illustrates the case where the two goods are 
substitutes. The increase in the price of peak supplies as a result 
of the imposition of the surcharge leads to an outward shift in the 
demand curve for its substitute, off-peak supplies. To satisfy the 
proportional reductions in demand (in the absence of any other 
influences) the off-peak price will have to increase more than 
proportionally, the surcharge increasing from ki to kj. Once again 
this accords with the intuitive result we postulated earlier that 
price will be larger relative to marginal cost where substitution 
effects are present. 
Figure 3.3 
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In one sense the case illustrated in Figure 3.3 is only partially 
complete. We might expect that if off-peak supplies are substitutes 
for peak supplies then the opposite would also be the case. We could 
illustrate this. All it would entail is an outward shift in Dd in 
response to the increase in the price of off-peak supplies. The outcome 
would be a larger surcharge on both demands. 
The case for complements could also be shown on Figure 3.3. If 
we assume that off-peak supplies are complements for peak supplies, 
then an increase in the price of peak supplies, consequent upon the 
imposition of a surcharge, will lead to a leftward shift in Dn, the 
price of off-peak supplies thereby attracting a less than proportional 
surcharge. 
We can extend the case for complements to illustrate the case 
mentioned briefly in the early part of the chapter, where it may be 
necessary to pay a subsidy on off-peak supplies to avoid a situation 
where price is less than marginal cost. This could arise if the 
leftward shift in Dn, as a result of the increase in Pd, was greater 
than the proportional reduction mn. To attain exactly this reduction 
price would need to be lower than marginal cost. Rees described such 
a situation. 
...in an extreme case of very high demand elasticity 
and a strong set of complementarity relations with 
the other goods, the price of a good might even be 
below marginal cost. [108.p.267] 
If the complementarity relations were strong enough it would not even 
be necessary to have a very high demand elasticity. However, the 
likelihood of such a combination of events would be rather small, 
particularly when more than two separate demands are included. 
Many combinations of Cases 1 and 2 are possible, one of which we 
have just mentioned. The relative results, however, would not differ 
from what we would expect from our examination of the own price 
elasticities and cross-elasticities in isolation. The final prices 
would be dependent upon which of the different effects was predominant. 
There is one more case which has special interest, because of its 
peculiar result. We will call this CASE 3 and it is illustrated in 
Figure 3.4. We use the same starting point as before but we add the 
following assumptions. 
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(a) peak demand is greater than off-peak demand but not 
by a very large margin; 
(b) EDd > EDn; 
(c) Dn is a strong substitute for Dd, and 
(d) Dd is unrelated to (or at least not a strong substitute for) 
Dn. 
Figure 3.4 
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Following the rise in price of peak demand we find a strong outward 
shift in Dn. The price for off-peak supplies is now greater than the 
price for peak supplies. What has happened is that the surcharge 
imposed on the off-peak demand is greater than the surcharge on the 
peak demand plus all of the capital costs which were previously 
allocated to the peak demand. 
The dominating feature which allows us to depict this position 
is the relative sizes of the various demands. If peak demand was much 
larger than the off-peak demand then such a situation is unlikely to 
occur. 
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We can now summarise the result of putting together the peak load 
pricing rules and the rules for the inclusion of a budget constraint 
based on sub-optimising welfare conditions. Price (or the difference 
between price and average variable cost) depends on three factors:-
(a) the relative magnitude of the separate demands; 
(b) the relative own price elasticities of the separate demands, 
and 
(c) the cross-elasticities among the separate demands. 
It is possible to extend our basic model into the more complicated 
peak load pricing constructions. For example, Figure 3.5 illustrates 
a three period (equal duration) demand case. The position depicted is 
the 'Case 1' starting position with no cross-effects, and EDl = ED2 = ED3. 
This results from being equal to ^ which is equal to — . From this ci ^ ^ bh ^ ag 
Figure 3.5 
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To be in a position of zero net return, o'b + o'c must equal 3ir. 
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1 
k 
position equal proportional reductions in quantity would lead to 
equi-proportional increases in price. 
As a starting position we could just as easily have chosen a 
position where the three demand curves were parallel, with D2 being 
in between D1 and D3. If EDI = ED3 then it could be shown that ED2 
would be less than the other two elasticities and an equal proportional 
reduction in all three demands would lead to a more than proportional 
increase in price being imposed upon D2. 
To introduce cross-effects into this situation would require 
account to be taken of the sum of the cross-effects among all of the 
goods. 
The introduction of demand periods of unequal duration does not 
pose any problems. The rule remains the same. Figure 3.6 shows 
Williamson's model which in basic outline is the same as the firm peak 
Figure 3.6 
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situation given, in Figure 2.15. The difference is that the elasticities 
of the two demands are equal at the prevailing peak load optimal prices. 
It is useful here to imagine that the peak period demand is the 
same as a number of identical equal duration sub-periods. For example, 
in this case the demand curve Dd can be imagined as two identical 
demand curves of eight hours each. This gives us three sub-periods 
of eight hours each, with equal elasticities. 
If we now assume that the quantities demanded are reduced 
proportionally in each of these three sub-periods then price will 
increase equi-proportionally. 
The introduction of demand periods of unequal duration then does 
not alter the rule we have outlined earlier. Regardless of the lengths 
of the sub-periods, the price per unit will be increased 
equi-proportionally when the price elasticities are equal. But there 
will be differences in the amount of extra revenue earned per period 
because of the different durations over which the higher prices operate. 
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A D D E N D U M TO CHAPTER THREE 
The two most comprehensive general equilibrium models which 
include a budget constraint are those by Rees [108] and Mohring [314]. 
In this addendum we outline Mohring's results and show how the results 
we have outlined diagrammatically in this chapter fit in with his 
conclusions. It would be possible to do the same with Rees' article 
but for a number of reasons Mohring's is more suitable. For example, 
he uses only two demands, and his method of presentation allows a clear 
distinction to be made between the three major variables we have 
outlined earlier - the relative magnitudes of the demands, the own 
price elasticities and the cross-elasticities. Because Mohring has 
used a general equilibrium analysis there is one conceptual change 
necessary and that is that the demand curves drawn in the diagrams 
are regarded as demand curves after income compensations have been 
made i.e. any change in price leaves the relevant consumers on their 
original level of indifference. 
For the two demand case Mohring's results are 
PI = Cll -
X+u 
P2 = C22 -
A+y 
where P I , P2 
C l l , C22 
S22X1 - S21X2 
S11S22- S12S21 
"S11X2 - S12XI " 
S11S22- S12S21 
prices of peak and off-peak demands respectively. 
the marginal cost in each demand period on the 
assumption of no deficit constraint. 
the lagrangian multipliers relating to the budget 
constraint and the resource base (capital size) 
respectively, which arise from the constrained 
maximization. 
Sll 
S22 
S12 
S21 
X I , X2 
the rate (summed over all consumers) at which 
consumption of peak supplies changes with respect 
to changes in the price of peak electricity, i.e. 
the own price elasticity of peak demand. 
the own price elasticity for off-peak demand. 
the rate (summed over all consumers) at which 
consumption of peak supplies changes with respect 
to changes in the price of off-peak supplies, i.e 
cross-elasticity dql . p2 
ql dp2 
= cross-elasticity 
dq2 
q2 dpi 
consumption of peak and off-peak supplies prior 
to the imposition of the restraint. 
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If we let k = ^ X+u 
r S22X1 - S21X2 and m = 
and n = 
S11S22- S12S21 
S11X2 - S12X1 
S11S22- S12S21 
we can express the prices as 
PI = Cll - km 
P2 = C22 - kn 
The signs of the various elements are: 
]j,X - positive 
k - o<k<l 
511 - negative 
S22 - negative 
XI - positive 
X2 - positive 
512 - can be either positive or negative 
22]^  _ " " " I' " " 
^ M M M M II II 
fl^  _ II II II II II II 
By giving different relative magnitudes and different signs to each of 
the variables we can illustrate how Mohring's solution gives the same 
result as the cases already illustrated. The same three basic 
variables exist in his solution, viz; the magnitude of the relative 
demands, the relative own elasticities and the cross-elasticities= 
We will assume that X1>X2 in all cases. 
CASE 1. In case 1 there are no cross-effects at all so 
S22X1 ^ _ S11X2 
"" = s T T ^ ^^^ " ^ sTTsII 
(a) Sll = S22. With both of the own elasticities negative both m and 
n will be negative and both prices will exceed their marginal costs by 
the same proportion given by the factor k. This is the equi-proportional 
case referred to before. 
1 
In the 3 demand (equal duration) period, m, for instance would be 
^ S22.S33.X1 
S11.S22.S33 ' 
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It is the same relative result as that given by Ddl in Figure 3.2. 
(b) S I K S22. Again both m and n are negative and the relative prices 
will exceed their marginal costs. However, this time the tax rate will 
be more than proportional on the peak period. This is the case 
illustrated by Dd2 in Figure 3.2. 
(c) S11>S22. Here the tax is more than proportional on the off-peak 
period as illustrated by Dd3 in Figure 3.2. 
CASE 2. In case 2 we allow the cross-elasticities to take on values 
other than zero. In this case the variables m and n take on their 
full expressions. Mohring illustrated this case with reference to 
substitutes. 
If the public utility service in peak and off-peak periods 
are substitute products, S12(=S21) will have a positive 
value and ... m and n will have negative values. Hence, 
optimization subject to a deficit constraint requires 
that a price greater than marginal cost be charged in 
both periods. [314.p.697] 
This general statement would be illustrated in our Figure 3.3 if both 
Dd and Dn were to shift to the right. This would be enough to 
demonstrate the case mentioned by Mohring. 
Mohring referred to the special case of a price lower than 
marginal cost. 
If S12 is negative, however, - i.e. if commodities 1 and 2 
are complements - nothing would appear to prevent the 
existence of a combination of values such that ...optimization 
subject to the deficit constraint would require a price below 
marginal cost during the off-peak period. [314,p.267] 
W e have already explained how this could be illustrated in Figure 3.3. 
Finally we can show how Mohring's model can illustrate the 
unusual result of an off-peak price greater than the peak price. The 
necessary assumptions for Case 3 are:-
- X1>X2, but not by a great amount. 
- C11>C22, but also not by very much. This follows in part from 
the assumption of the relative magnitudes of the 
demands. 
- S11>S22, 
- S12 = S21, and positive, i.e. peak and off-peak are substitutes 
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We can illustrate by giving numerical values to the variables in 
Mohring's equations. 
Cll = 1000 XI = 1000 Sll = -1.0 
C22 = 800 X2 = 900 S22 = -0.7 
k = 0.8 S12 = S21 = +0.4 
m = -0.7(1000) - 0.4(900) -0.7(-1.0) - 0.4(0.4) 
-700 -360 
0.7 - 0.16 = -1963 
n = -1.0(900) - 0.4(1000) -0.7(-1.0) - 0.4(0.4) 
-900 -400 
0.7 -0.16 = -2407 
PI = 1000 - 0.8(-1963) = 2570 
P2 = 800 - 0.8(-2407) = 2726 
The interest in case 3 is largely in the unusual result. However, 
it is a good illustration of our general statement that the major 
determinants of price under a budget constraint are the magnitude of 
the demands, the own elasticities and the cross-elasticities. 
There is one peculiarity in Mohring's model which does not appear 
to be correct when compared with our diagrammatic expression of the 
problem. We refer to the appearance of S21 in m and S12 in n. 
Intuitively one might expect S12 to appear in m and S21 to appear in n. 
The difference has not appeared in our presentation here because we have 
assumed S21 = S12, or at least that they are of the same sign. Under 
these circumstances we will get the same result as Mohring. It is 
doubtful that this would be the case though if we allowed one of the 
cross-elasticities to take on a value of zero. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE COST ASSUMPTIONS 
When we were looking at the Peak Load Pricing model in Chapter Two 
we outlined fairly briefly the cost assumptions for the model. Now we 
look a little more closely at these assumptions and the evidence which 
might support them from empirical studies. The assumptions, and most 
of the empirical studies, are framed within the traditional concepts 
of long-run and short-run time periods. However, this traditional view 
of costs has come under attack recently by Turvey and others^ on the 
grounds that it is not at all useful in the real world. This argument 
is particularly convincing if one is considering the dynamics of 
investment planning or the actual measurement of marginal costs within 
an electricity system but it is probably not so important if one is 
simply trying to discover the shape of the cost curves which is more 
our task here. However, we will return to this problem when we come to 
discuss the debate as to whether long-run or short-run marginal cost is 
the appropriate variable in our pricing model. 
1. Long-Run Costs 
(a) Peak Load Pricing Theorists and Returns to Scale 
We have stated in Chapter One that we can date the start of the 
Peak Load Pricing Theory with Boiteux's 1949 article [123]. In it he 
assumed long-run total expenditure curves (envelopes of single-plant 
system cost curves) which were upward sloping and increasing at an 
increasing rate. This implied that the long-run average cost curve 
2 
was of the normally assumed U-shape. 
1 
See Turvey [217], [147] and [150]. Also see Watts [223]. The 
debate has been carried on into recent editions of the Economic Journal 
with articles by S.C. Littlechild, in June 1970, and by J.A. Kay and 
R. Turvey in the June 1971 volume. 
2 
The analytical tool of a static, long-run envelope curve (or 
'planning' curve) should not be confused with the results of historical 
studies showing what has happened to electricity costs over time. In 
the next section we examine the results of some of the empirical studies 
made of electricity costs. 
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Later in the article he introduced a simplifying assumption which 
effectively meant that constant returns to scale existed and therefore 
there were constant costs. He said: 
It will be noted that the curve [LRMC] is nearly 
horizontal, so that rates [equal to LRMC] will vary 
little as the natural expansion of demand proceeds, 
[p.71] 
This assumption has received strong empirical support from Johnston. 
In a study of electricity costs, which we will examine presently, he 
concluded: 
Long-run average cost...falls quickly and steeply 
thereafter approximating a straight line. [190.p.73] 
This conclusion is supported by Davidson [129] and Houthakker [135] 
in their Peak Load Pricing articles.^ Boiteux's theoretical stand, 
seemingly supported by Davidson and Houthakker, was criticised by 
Meek [32] in his two articles in 1963. 
Boiteux could conceivably defend his procedure by 
arguing either that the long-run average cost curve 
was in fact more or less horizontal throughout, or 
at any rate that it has no falling stretch. But 
neither of these arguments would seem to be very 
plausible from an empirical point of view. [p.231] 
This is probably a good time to remind ourselves that Boiteux himself 
combined, very successfully, an academic position and his work with 
Electricite de France.^ His rigid theoretical exposition of the theory 
1 
Houthakker, however, tended to skirt the problem with his assertion 
that: 
...it is a well-known theorem that in the long run both 
decreasing marginal cost and the discrepancies between 
marginal and average cost are merely signs of market 
imperfection or bad planning. [135.p.10]. 
Davidson was more specific. After reviewing the problem he concluded 
that: 
Under present conditions with widespread interconnections 
between utilities and the multiplicity of production 
units, it seems likely that there is little or no difference 
between long-run marginal and average costs for most 
electric utilities; operation within the phase of decreasing 
long-run average costs may still exist with regard to 
distribution facilities...but the difference would appear 
to be small. [129.p.203] 
2 
His personal history is outlined in an Appendix at the back of 
Nelson's book [142]. 
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is, in fact, in contrast with what he wrote when he was speaking from 
the point of view of someone concerned about the practicalities of 
putting such academic proposals into practice. In these cases he 
leaves no doubt whatsoever that he believed that decreasing costs 
prevail. Other writers from Electricite de France also subscribe to 
this belief. Dessus, as early as 1949, said of increasing returns: 
This condition is probably relevant to the case of 
electricity supply. It would appear, nevertheless, 
that the margin between marginal and (re-estimated) 
average cost must be small on account of the 
multiplicity of installations and of their interconnections. 
[77.p.39] 
Boiteux and Stasi, in 1952, were even more definite on this point. 
It is known, in fact, that except for an unusual 
coincidence, sale at marginal cost produces receipts 
which cannot be expected to cover expenses exactly. 
A problem of 'tolls' is posed... [173.p.126] 
By 1960 Boiteux was even more certain about the matter. 
Of course, increasing returns are dominant in the operations 
of Electricite'' de France. Decreasing returns appear in 
hydro electricity as sites are exhausted. A tendency to 
decreasing returns appears in thermal electricity...On the 
other hand, increasing returns on a considerable scale 
appear in distribution. 
This strong tendency towards increasing returns in 
distribution more than compensates for decreasing 
returns in production. So Electricite de France, as 
a whole, is an enterprise clearly subject to increasing 
returns. [70.p.25] 
In 1952 Dessus said that the size of the deficit was about 4 per cent 
[173.p.126] although he did not state the percentage of what. In 1960, 
Boiteux said that it was 'of the order of 7 per cent', [70.p.26] 
Other Peak Load Pricing theorists, whose contributions were more 
towards the extension of the theory than the practical application of 
it, were fairly explicit in the way they 'assumed away' the problem of 
decreasing costs. Steiner (1957) made his position clear when he said: 
...we assume throughout that operating costs are a linear 
function of output, and that the cost of capacity is a 
linear function of the numberof units of capacity built. 
In fact, of course, the Peak Load problem may easily occur 
in combination with the problem of declining costs... [144.p.585] 
However, his whole analysis was conducted on the assumption of constant 
costs. Hirshleifer reminded him [133.p.462] that if this assumption 
was dropped his notion of 'allocating or recovering total commodity or 
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capacity cost' would be consistent with efficient marginalist pricing 
practices only under very special conditions. Steiner readily agreed 
in his reply [145.p.46], but challenged Hirshleifer to state a better 
set of assumptions for the cost conditions. As far as we can ascertain 
this challenge was not taken up publicly. Buchanan (1966) [125] and 
Gabor (1966) [132] both noted that increasing or decreasing costs could 
exist in the industry but for their purposes it was convenient to 
assume constant costs when making their additions to the theory. 
The general conclusion of the theorists appears to be that there 
are decreasing costs in the electricity industry and that 'internal 
financing' (as we described it in Chapter One) is the way to cover a 
possible deficit. The theoretical device of assuming constant or 
increasing costs appears to have been employed in the analyses to 
highlight the major points of the Peak Load Pricing theory and to avoid 
any arguments over the problem of a deficit. If Boiteux had made this 
obvious in his original article much possible confusion might have been 
avoided.^ 
(b) Empirical Studies of Long-Run Costs of Electricity Supply 
It would be useful for later parts of the thesis if we could 
conduct an actual investigation into the long-run cost characteristics 
of the State Electricity Commission of Victoria (SECV). Unfortunately, 
this would be a very time consuming task requiring a lot of information 
which is probably not available. On the other hand, in the overall 
pattern of the thesis, it may not be entirely necessary. 
The technology of thermal power generation is fairly standard 
throughout the world, although at different stages of progress. As a 
relatively simple substitute, we will look at the results of other 
studies conducted into the long-run cost characteristics of electricity 
1 
This statement highlights one of the problems of being obliged to 
work from translations of original works. Without access to the 
originals the temptation is to accept all translations as good 
translations. It therefore puts doubt in one's mind to find later, 
a writer such as Meek, describing the translation as 'unimpressive' 
[201.p.54], and pointing out omissions from the original translation 
[p.59]. See also Westfield [151.p.73] on this point. 
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supply. This approach is nowhere near conclusive^ but it will probably 
allow us to make some estimates of the likely cost characteristics of 
the SECV. 
Most of the studies have been made of individual plants or 
stations, and very few deal with the characteristics of total system 
costs. Obviously, for tariff purposes, it is these costs which are 
the most important. 
A condition of decreasing cost is typified by a negatively 
inclined average cost curve at the margin of equilibrium output, i.e. 
where demand is equal to supply. So it is important to realise that 
even with a U-shaped cost curve (which is generally assumed to be the 
'normal' situation) a condition of decreasing costs can be brought 
about by a deficiency of demand, such that the firm is operating at a 
level of production less than that of minimum average cost. But it is 
the other case which attracts our attention here, i.e. the case where 
the average cost function is decreasing over practically all of its 
range. 
Costs may decrease with output because of economies which accrue 
from increasing the scale of production, such as decreasing capital 
costs per unit of output produced, or the increased specialization of 
labour or capital that it allows. Costs may also decrease because of 
technological change which alters the relative inputs of man and machine 
as plant size increases. ' 
Most of the recent empirical work takes both of these factors 
into account. The earlier empirical work used rather simple regression 
techniques as a method of estimating cost functions. The more recent 
work has used advanced econometric techniques to investigate the 
properties of assumed production functions in the industry. 
Two possible reasons seem to exist as to why the studies were 
undertaken. The first reason, which generally applied to the earlier 
1 
In his book Bonbright says this of the electricity industry: 
The current [1961] literature... in Great Britain and 
France reveals no such general tendency as one finds 
in the American literature to take for granted long-run 
trends of decreasing costs with increasing rates of 
output. [72.p.16] 
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work, was that the studies were made in an attempt to gain an 
understanding of how the industry operated. The second reason is that 
they were done because there was an abundance of information available 
about the industry,^ which allowed it to be used as an experimental 
ground for many new econometric techniques. This is not to deny that 
the results so gained are not of use to the industry, but it is a 
caution to be kept in mind when attempting to interpret the results 
of all of the work done. 
The earlier studies attempted to measure the cost functions of 
steam power stations. In some cases it was attempted only for single 
plants. The contributors were Jones, 1942 [191], Nordin, 1947 [205], 
Lansing, 1951 [195], Lomax, 1952 [197], and Johnston, 1960 [190]. 
The later, and more sophisticated analyses, were done by Ling, 1962 
[196], Komiya, 1962 [194], Nerlove [204], Dhrymes and Kurz, 1964 [182], 
Barzel, 1964 [170] and Galatin, 1968 [184]. 
The common conclusion of the earlier studies was that for plants 
of different sizes there was a range of decreasing average costs, but 
that costs fell at a decreasing rate. This meant that after a certain 
point there was a tendency towards constant costs, Johnston [Chpt. 4] 
offered the most sophisticated of these cost analyses and came to two 
separate sets of conclusions, one for the short-run and one for the 
long-run. He was not very confident of his results for the long-run 
but he offered this conclusion: 
The estimation of long-run average costs is much more 
dubious...After an initial fall, average working costs 
are approximately constant over the rest of the output 
range, and capital cost data tend to support a similar 
thesis with regard to AFC. Long-run average cost, 
therefore, falls quickly and steeply, thereafter 
approximating to a horizontal straight line. [p.73] 
These results show similarity to the assumptions which Boiteux made 
in his theoretical analysis and offer quite substantial backing to the 
validity of these assumptions. 
From the time of Komiya's article, in 1962, the empirical studies 
took on a much more sophisticated econometric appearance. The first 
part of the empirical work made no attempt to show the different 
effect of economies of scale within a given technology and changes in 
Particularly that put out by the Federal Power Commission in the U.S.A 
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the technology itself. With Komiya's article, the emphasis changed 
from cost functions to production functions. Returns to scale were 
seen as movements along a given production function, while changes 
in technology were seen as shifts of the function itself. 
This new approach, and the emphasis given to discussing the 
econometric techniques themselves, lessened the importance of the 
cost function, but basically the same results were discovered. Komiya 
found increasing returns to scale; Dhrymes and Kurz said: 'We find 
that increasing returns prevail throughout' [p.287]; and Barzel found: 
'...that there are substantial economies of scale in the industry...' 
[p.148]. 
These three authors did not investigate the rate at which the 
increasing returns take place, but implied uniformly increasing returns 
to scale. This is an important omission for our purposes. Some of 
the authors did look at this matter. Nerlove found that there were 
increasing returns to scale '...but the degree of returns to scale 
varies inversely with output' [p.186]. Galatin also found that: 
If machines...are compared...we have seen that the fuel 
input per unit of output decreases the larger is the machine, 
but this fuel saving diminishes as machines of successively 
larger scale are compared. [184.p.120] 
Up to this point a general summary would be that for a given plant, 
or station, there are economies to be derived from increasing the 
scale of production which would lead to decreasing costs, but this 
would take place at a decreasing rate. 
Virtually all of the analyses undertaken were concerned with 
either a single plant or station. Only Nerlove framed his analysis 
using the firm as the basic unit, and as a result, he added a proviso 
to the general result mentioned above. 
It is shown...however, that because of transmission losses 
and the expense of maintaining and operating a number of 
plants at outputs in the range of increasing returns to 
scale...[the firm may] ...yet be in the region of decreasing 
returns when considered as a unit. [p.169] 
Lomax, who had earlier attempted to estimate cost functions, added a 
similar qualification to his conclusion. 
On the other hand, there is the danger in integration 
of transmission losses and diseconomies of distribution, 
[p.197] 
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None of the other authors felt the need to mention this fact preferring 
to investigate only at the plant or station level. This can no doubt 
be attributed to the fact that it was only this information which was 
readily available. 
Obviously the form an analysis takes is dependent on the reasons 
for which the analysis is undertaken. If the existence of decreasing 
costs was being investigated from the point of view of a pricing policy, 
it would be imperative that all costs of production, transmission and 
distribution be taken into account. 
Before concluding this section on long-run costs one apparent 
conflict in the studies mentioned should be examined. It is between 
Boiteux and Davidson on one hand, and Lomax and Nerlove on the other, 
and concerns their different opinions on whether the distribution of 
electricity is, or is not, subject to decreasing returns. 
Boiteux (1960) [70.p.25] and Davidson [129.p.203] were of the 
opinion that decreasing costs prevailed in distribution. Lomax 
[197.p.197] and Nerlove [204.p.169], in their empirical studies, 
offered the view that the opposite was true, although neither of them 
gave any proof of this. 
No empirical evidence is available to allow us to solve this 
conflict. The technology and existing state of distribution networks 
in different places is far more variable than that of generating 
stations. The manner in which a network develops will play a large 
part in the long-run cost characteristics of that network. Intensive 
development of a given area might be expected to lead to more 
favourable returns to scale than widespread extensive development. In 
the same way, the development of a network may go through periods of 
increasing and decreasing returns depending upon the form of development 
being undertaken at that time. Therefore, it is quite possible that 
transmission and distribution cost characteristics are immensely 
variable and that each author was correct at the time, and for the 
particular system of which he spoke. 
Without knowledge of the cost characteristics of transmission and 
distribution it is difficult to form any overall conclusions of the 
total system cost characteristics in the long-run. Probably the best 
we can say is that different assumptions and different methods have 
been used to show that decreasing costs exist in production, but they 
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take place at a diminishing rate. Some authors seem to believe that 
increasing costs may exist in transmission and distribution, but it 
should be emphasised that this has not been proven. The ultimate 
effect on costs of an increase in production and a shift to a larger 
plant and system is therefore dependent on both these factors and is 
very difficult to assess empirically.^ 
2. Short-Run Costs 
(a) Rigid Capacity Plant 
Boiteux assumed that in the short-run a plant's capacity was 
rigidly limited and up to this maximum output total expenditure rose 
linearly and marginal cost remained constant. 
Johnston concluded that: 
Marginal and average variable cost are constant over 
the observed range of output...while the capacity of 
the existing plant sets an absolute limit to the output 
range. AC at first falls steeply and then flattens 
out, tending towards a constant MC line as an asymptote. 
[190.p.73] 
Boiteux, in formulating his theory, assumed that; 
...for a rigid capacity plant working slightly under 
its maximum rating, the differential cost [SRMC] is 
approximately equal to the partial cost [AVC] and is 
always less than the total average cost. [123.p.66] 
and he felt that this assumption was '...more or less true 
of ordinary industrial plant'. 
Of those who investigated the cost situation empirically Johnston 
was the only one to do so for the short-run so no other evidence is 
available. Nowhere in his study does he indicate that he was familiar 
with Boiteux's statement and his result stands as a surprisingly accurate 
substantiation of Boiteux's assumptions. 
1 
Two partly conflicting statements by Australian authors illustrate 
the lack of clarity on this matter. In 1968, Kolsen wrote: 
...there is as yet no case on record of a generating 
unit so large that further increases will not reduce 
unit costs still more. [96.p.32] 
While in 1966, Maguire wrote of the position in NSW: 
The economies of scale in generator size fall away for 
machines bigger than those now being installed...[As well] 
Most of the energy now supplied is generated outside the 
metropolitan area and relatively little scope exists for 
further savings in coal freights. [235.pp.22,23] 
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In 1949 Troxel used a very similar construction in an article on 
price discrimination.^ In describing his assumed cost curves he wrote; 
The marginal cost curve, MC, is approximately constant 
until the limit of plant capacity is approached. And 
the sharp upturning of the AC and MC curves indicates 
the low adaptability of the plant [in the short-run]. 
[113.p.288] 
He illustrated this in a diagram which is very similar to that which 
was later to be the standard shape for the Peak Load Pricing theorists. 
It is reproduced here as Figure 4.1. 
Figure 4.1 
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MC 
Quantity 
(b) Short-run System Costs versus Short-run Plant Costs 
Up to this point the geometric presentation has been based on the 
assumption that only one plant, of rigid capacity, operated for the 
system. In reality there will be a number of plants making up the 
system, each with different characteristics of age, location, cost, 
etc. As a result, a system SRMC curve can be made up of these 
individual plant SRl^ lC curves. A general picture of a system SRMC curve 
is shown in Figure 4.2. 
1 
Galatin, in a more recent investigation of scale economies of thermal 
power generation, postulated a model such that '...generally the 
relevant level of operation of such a machine will be at full capacity' 
[184.p.119] which is really the same assumption of rigid capacity plant 
made by Boiteux. 
Figure 4.2 
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Each successive plant is costlier than those already in operation 
before it and the result is a stepped SRMC curve as shown. (An 
approximation to such a curve for the SECV, with a number of 
qualifications, can be found in Chapter Eleven.) 
Two results of interest follow from this introduction of a system 
cost curve. The first is that if price is to be equated with marginal 
cost at all times, the resultant array of prices would be very large 
and complex. There is an obvious limit to the number of different 
prices which are economically feasible. It would be necessary to 
introduce some form of averaging and even with a basic marginal cost 
form of pricing it would still be necessary to retain some of the class 
system of pricing as well. This in itself necessitates some averaging 
of costs.^ 
The second matter, which we also considered earlier, is that when 
a new base load plant is introduced to the system it will normally be 
a technologically superior, larger and more efficient unit than those 
In his book in 1947, Troxel saw that averaging of costs in one form 
or another would be necessary. What he advocated was 
...a sort of average marginal cost. A marginal cost is 
not computed for each separate unit of output. Instead, 
a lump of cost change is divided by a lump of output 
change; the result is an average cost increment for 
several or many additional units of output. [115.p.449] 
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already in operation. It will therefore be cheaper to run and it will 
be used to produce over many hours of the day rather than only at the 
peak. 
3. Long-run or Short-run Marginal Cost? 
For many years controversy has existed as to which is the 
appropriate concept to use for pricing purposes, long-run marginal cost 
or short-run marginal cost. Many different reasons have been given at 
one time or another for supporting either of these concepts.^ Beckwith, 
for instance, felt that the short-run concept should be used because 
...in our opinion, long-run marginal cost is a self-
contradictory concept. The term long-run contradicts 
the term marginal. [2.p.14] 
On the other hand, Davidson was one who believed in the long-run 
concept because he felt that a firm could only cover its total costs 
if it priced at long-run marginal cost. [129.p.72] 
These two examples are typical of the degree of confused thinking 
which surrounded the problem. Other authorities came down on one side 
or the other. Hirshleifer favoured SRMC because 
...at any point the relevant costs are the short-run 
costs of meeting such demands. [133.p.461] 
while Houthakker appeared to lean towards the use of the LRMC [135.p.461] 
although his reasons for doing so are not clear. 
Boiteux, and those who followed his analysis, including Turvey, 
largely avoided the problem by making the assumption that plant is 
always of optimal size, in which case LRMC is equal to SRMC. But such 
a definition is of little practical use and as the subject progressed 
it became necessary to develop a more practical definition of marginal 
cost, something, said Turvey, which '...needs to be defined and 
measured as a tool in decisionmaking'. [150.p.282]. The definition 
which he suggested describes marginal cost as the present value of 
system costs with the increment in output, less the present value of 
system costs without the increment, discounted back to whatever point 
in time is specified. Fundamentally, it is the present value of 
incremental system costs for a given permanent increase in output at 
some specified point of time in the future. [150.p.289] 
1 
Bonbright [72.Chpt.17] has a history of the debate. 
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This type of definition relates to the practical problem of 
measuring marginal costs in the running of the undertaking. It lies 
outside of the traditional definition of long-run and short-run costs 
but could safely be described as being more akin to long-run marginal 
cost than to the short-run concept. One commonly recommended advantage 
in using LRMC was that by doing so one would avoid having to change 
the resultant prices as often as would be the case if SRMC was used, 
to which view Turvey also subscribed. 
The real problem with such definitions of marginal cost though lie 
in the fact that the level of prices which you end up with are going to 
depend to a large extent on the definition you choose for marginal cost. 
The application of linear programming models to the optimal pricing 
problem has partly overcome this objection. 
Turvey [147] introduced the notion of programming in his book and 
it was later taken up by Littlechild [319] and by Kay [315]. Kay feels 
quite strongly that the relevant notion of marginal cost, if you need 
one at all, is one which relates to the short run. 
...the claim that SRMC pricing would necessitate more 
frequent readjustments to the tariff schedule is an 
empirical question...But even if it were true it would 
lend no support to the case for LRMC pricing: the 
optimal price calculations should merely be subjected 
to the constraint that prices should remain stable for 
the relevant period. [p.368] 
Such a claim seems obvious now that the problem can be framed within 
the programming context and the same model can be used to derive 
optimal prices. 
The concept of marginal cost relevant to tariff policy 
is essentially a short run one. But the most suitable 
method of deriving optimal prices is as the solution 
to some specified maximisation problem in which the 
relevant constraints and assumptions are made explicit, 
not as the by-product of some arbitrary definition of 
marginal cost. [315.p.368] 
(emphasis not in the original) 
In this sense then the need to define marginal cost is not necessary 
so long as you have sufficient information to specify a programming 
problem. However, where it is not necessary or possible to completely 
specify all of the dimensions of the whole undertaking some definition, 
possibly like the one Turvey suggested, might be an adequate workable 
concept for investment and pricing purposes. 
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4 . 'C'est magnifique, mais ce n'est pas la tarification au cout 
marginal' 
It was in these terms that Meek expressed his doubt as to how far 
Peak Load Pricing could be regarded as marginal cost pricing (1963) 
[32.p.236]. There certainly is an element of discriminatory pricing 
(or 'charging what the traffic will bear'), particularly in the 
shifting peak case where capacity cost is allocated so as to equate 
demand to the available supply of peak capacity. 
In a later article (1968) [201.p.58], Meek opts out of the argument 
by pointing out that marginal cost pricing 'is a means to an end', and 
anyway, the 'question is no doubt essentially a semantic one'. Of 
course he is right. But the question, semantic or otherwise, was 
posed by practically all of the writers on the subject, including Meek 
himself. 
Davidson, in his book in 1955 [129.Chpt.10], set out to devise a 
non-discriminatory price structure for electricity. Steiner criticised 
this attempt and emphasised that he felt that discrimination was a basic 
part of the optimum form of pricing in a peak situation. This, however, 
prompted Hirshleifer to offer what he felt to be the answer to this 
charge of discrimination. 
By marginal cost [he said] I m e a n , ultimately, the marginal 
opportunity cost...[133.p.451] 
That is, it is not cost in the cash outlay sense, but cost in terms of 
the value placed on the most valuable alternative passed up, that is 
being reflected in the prices that result from Peak Load Pricing. 
The debate rested there until M e e k , perhaps a little harshly, described 
this answer as 'incredibly gnomic' and let the matter rest. 
There is possibly one more comment which can be made before we do 
likewise. It is possible that Peak Load Pricing is neither marginal 
cost pricing nor discrimination as it is generally known. It is 
obviously not marginal cost pricing in its strictest sense because at 
the maximum output marginal cost is indeterminate, but neither is it 
correct to say that in this situation the price is simply 'charging 
what the traffic will bear'. 
This approach received a measure of support from Bonbright. 
[72.p.393] 
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The general problem, which will be discussed in the next section, 
is that of the allocation of capacity cost where there are competing 
demands for peak capacity. Under the constant cost assumptions of the 
m o d e l , capacity costs are fully recovered. However, no attempt is 
made to fix the allocation of capacity cost to arrive at this goal. 
The allocation that results is price determined rather than price 
determining, which is not the normal case in 'charging what the traffic 
will bear'. In any case, output is only restricted to the point where 
supply is equal to available capacity and no further, as might be 
expected from the discriminating monopolist who has profit maximisation 
in m i n d . 
Until the introduction of Peak Load Pricing, economists had quite 
specific notions as to what constituted marginal cost pricing and what 
constituted price discrimination in its various forms. Peak Load 
Pricing was developed as a solution to a specific problem. The answer 
does not fit comfortably into either of the pre-defined notions of 
marginal cost pricing or price discrimination. Of course, there is 
no reason why it should. Meek has been right in turning attention to 
studying the outcome of the application of the rules rather than a 
labelling of the rules themselves. 
5. Allocation of Capacity Costs 
It is the particular form of allocation of capacity cost in the 
theory which makes Peak Load Pricing unique. However, the importance 
of the problem of finding a correct theoretical method for the 
2 
allocation of capacity costs has been recognised for some time. Over 
a period of many years the electricity industry, and interested 
observers, have made numerous suggestions as to the best way to 3 
allocate capacity costs among consumers or classes of consumers. One 
1 
This argument is borrowed from Troxel who originally presented it 
in 1943. The details of his contribution to the problem can be found 
in Appendix Two, 
2 
See for instance Norris [39,p.59], Steiner [144,p,585], Boiteux and 
Stasi [142.p.92] and Houthakker [135,p.11], 
3 
Summaries of these methods can be found in Davidson [129,Chpt,8], 
Barnes [65 .Chpt, 10] , and Garfield and Lovejoy [ 8 5 , C h p t a O ] , See also 
references [156-169] in the bibliography. 
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of the outcomes of the theory of Peak Load Pricing has been the 
suggestion of yet another way to allocate capacity costs.^ 
Peak Load Pricing suggests that capacity costs should be allocated 
entirely to the peak consumers. In the case of a firm peak (non-
shifting) all capacity costs go directly to the consumers at the peak 
with the capacity charge per unit consumed being the same for all 
consumers at the peak. 
The reasoning behind this argument is that because there is no 
extra cost of producing an extra unit in an off-peak period it is 
impossible to charge those who consume in these periods any more than 
short-run marginal running costs. Therefore all capacity costs must 
2 
be allocated to those who consume at the peak. 
The case of the shifting peak is not very different. No capacity 
charges are charged to consumers in entirely off-peak times, but they 
are charged for those consumers in competing peak times on the basis 
of the intensities, or magnitude, of their demand. (Where necessary 
they should be weighted the probability of the demand occurring at 
that time.) This will restrict their demand to the available supply. 
The total capacity costs charged should not be greater than the 
capacity costs of the system. If they are, then under our cost 
assumptions, there is reason for more investment because the sum of 
the prices (equal to SRMC's) will be greater than LRMC, the investment 
rule explained earlier. In both the firm and shifting peak case the 
result comes from the assumption that it is better to ration peak 
electricity by the use of prices rather than by other means. 
1 
It had been suggested by Lewis in 1941. 
If there is a good demand for both commodities [competing 
peaks] it is impossible to allocate cost between them; 
demand alone will decide which part is to be contributed 
by each. [137.p.251] 
In 1951, Houthakker had concluded: 
The exact solution presumably depends on the price 
elasticities of demand in each period...[135.p.16] 
An interesting communication from R.L. Weil [169] can be found in 
the 1968 American Economic Review. In it the author claims 
that 'Most economists who mention allocating joint costs maintain 
that it cannot be done in any rational way'. He then contends that 
'...joint costs can be 'allocated' to facilitate rational decision 
making.' He offers a proof using a constrained optimization model. 
His conclusion that: '...the allocation is very much dependent 
upon the demand equations' is, as we have seen, not very original. 
2 
See Houthakker [135.p.15], Davidson [129.p.182] and Meek [201.p.56]. 
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Turvey appears to be of the opinion that as a result of the 
implications of Peak Load Pricing, the problem of the allocation of 
capacity cost has been solved. In 1968 he wrote: 
The theoretical 'solutions' to the peak load problem 
are a beginning, not an end, serving to dispose of ' 
past confusion about the principles of allocating 
cost. [148.p.113] 
One who might disagree with this is Meek. Speaking of his o^m addition 
to the theory of Peak Load Pricing in 1968, he said: 
Our analysis does not solve the problem of allocation 
of overheads in the case of joint products! Nor, of 
course, does the original Boiteux-Steiner analysis. 
[201.p.63] 
It is possible that both of these attitudes are correct. Certainly the 
general problem of the allocation of overhead costs in all industries 
has not been solved by Peak Load Pricing. On the other hand, the 
absolute confusion concerning the allocation of capacity costs in the 
electricity industry has been neatly bypassed by the new theory. 
An appraisal of the suggested solution has two parts, one relating 
to economic efficiency and the other to equity. Where equity is 
concerned it is impossible to say if one particular allocation (and the 
resultant redistribution of income) is any better than any other 
suggestion until it is decided what 'better' means in this context. 
For the time being, if it is accepted that it is a good thing to reflect 
costs accurately in prices, this allocation is certainly better than one 
which is based on an averaging of capacity costs over consumption at all 
times of the day, or year. The latter policy can only lead to 
discrimination against consumers of off-peak electricity who cannot be 
expected to pay more than short-run marginal operating costs; unless 
of course, some other financial constraints are imposed upon the 
undertaking. 
The argument for the economic efficiency of Peak Load Pricing has 
been presented earlier and if we can assume that prices are required to 
restrict demand to supply during the peak hours, there is only one 
method of allocation of capacity costs which will do this, and this is 
in accordance with the intensities of the respective consumers' 
demands. 
Given these assumptions the allocation of capacity cost which 
results from Peak Load Pricing is economically efficient. But until 
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specific notions of equity are set out there is nothing to say that 
this allocation of capacity costs among peak consumers is any more or 
less equitable than some other allocations which might be suggested.^ 
1 
See Westfield: '...one must emphasise that the prices generated 
by these rules are not automatically "fair" or "just" [151,p.69] 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
PEAK LOAD PRICING THEORY - CONCLUSION 
In the absence of a budget constraint Peak Load Pricing aims to 
relate prices and marginal costs as accurately as possible. It does 
this where capacity costs at the margin are allocated to those consumers 
who are responsible for them - the peak consumers. In the presence of 
a budget constraint prices will diverge from marginal cost but in such 
a fashion as to minimise the distorting effect on the allocation of 
resources. 
Before we advance to the practical applications of our analysis 
we need to specify two problems which arise from the simplicity of the 
analysis. We will be dealing with them again in Chapter Twelve in 
relation to the practical problems of the SECV so we will limit our 
discussion here. 
1. Complexity of the Tariff Structure 
In an electricity undertaking costs vary daily, seasonally and 
geographically so in a strict, but impractical sense our analysis tells 
us that we should have a separate price for every hour of the day and 
every point in space. 
It is clear that we will have to lump together times of the year 
as well as groups of consumers and assume that costs are constant 
within each group. This will involve a degree of averaging of costs -
the fewer the time periods and classes of consumers the greater will 
be the aggregation of costs. On the other hand the more complex the 
structure the more costly it will be in its implementation and 
maintenance. We have to set a limit on the number of tariffs we can 
use. 
Houthakker [135] suggested that two basic time periods would be 
sufficient. Turvey [148] has recommended four divisions in the tariff 
as a maximum with the proviso that it can be exceeded in the case of 
very large consumers who are capable of carrying the extra cost 
associated with a more complex tariff. The actual number used will 
depend on many practical features and it is probably not possible to 
specify any particular number of divisions without regard to the 
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undertaking in question. In our case of the SECV we choose 12 basic 
periods, three times of the year hy four times of the day. (See Chapter 
Twelve)^ 
Whatever the actual number chosen the very existence of classes and 
divisions which aggregate consumers means that the ideal outcome 
anticipated from our theory will only be approximated. Fortunately, 
we feel that with adequate investigation the approximation can be 
reasonably close, 
2. Definition of the Peak 
Every electricity system has an annual system peak. Normally it 
is the highest recorded demand for electricity over a relatively short 
time. In Victoria the time period used is 1/4 of an hour. It is 
obvious that this length of time is totally impractical as a demand 
period for pricing purposes. If prices were known in advance the 'peak', 
so defined, would indeed be 'shifting'. Over that range of time 
consumers can easily alter their demand. 
Bearing in mind that there is a limit to the feasible number of 
tariffs, the peak will have to be defined more generously than the 
annual system maximum demand. Both the French and the British have 
used a system of a peak 'plateau'. Meek described the British demand 
periods as follows. 
...the three periods relevant for tariff-making purposes 
are conveniently isolated. First, there is the peak 
period proper,...during which system demand is at its 
maximum. Second, there is the period of the winter 
plateau of demand,...during which system demand is about 
907o of peak demand. Third, there is the off-peak 
proper,... during which system demand is at its minimum. 
[201 . p . 53 ] 
He illustrated these concepts with a diagram which is reproduced as 
Figure 5.1. The only difference is that the months in which the 
periods occur have been changed to suit the winter (peak time) season 
for Victoria. 
1 
For a further discussion of the role of classes in the analysis see 
Bonbright [72.p.297] and Turvey [147.pp.99,106] 
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If a similar tariff were to be suggested for an Australian 
undertaking a comparable investigation and definition of the 'peak' 
would have to be undertaken. The actual system peak would be expected 
to fall somewhere in the peak demand period. The division of the 
periods would be, to a large extent, an exercise in determining the 
probability of the estimated demand occurring at various times. 
Davidson suggested such a method in his analysis in 1955. 
...on practical grounds it would appear best to assign 
equal probability to all the estimated peak hours and 
charge the same rate for all. [129.p.192] 
If it were possible to build a programming model to determine the 
optimal prices it would not be too difficult to specify constraints 
which would include the number of tariffs and the particular 
definition of the peak. 
One important practical consideration which we have not mentioned 
yet is the social and political role played by the undertaking within 
society. It is quite possible that decisions made on the basis of this 
role will run contrary to what might be expected of an economically 
efficient undertaking. 
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Part B of this thesis is devoted to an examination of the socio-
political role played by the SECV. But before we do this we conclude 
Part A with a summary of the likely effect on the allocation of 
resources and the distribution of income of implementing a policy based 
on the rules drawn from Peak Load Pricing. For convenience we leave 
until last the effects which would follow if the pricing rules were to 
include a budget constraint. 
3. Allocation of Resources 
The effect on the overall allocation of resources in the economy 
would be small due to the imperfections in the application of the 
theory in its fullest form. If we assume that all of the close 
competitors in the fuel and power sector were using some form of 
marginal cost pricing then the result may be (at least) a better 
allocation of consumers' expenditures and resources within that sector 
itself. To the extent that energy is often an intermediate good in a 
productive process, changes in energy prices will be reflected in the 
costs and prices of other goods as well. 
If we also assumed that price differentials were made to allow 
for the difficult-to-measure externalities, which might exist in some 
sectors of the economy, there would be further reallocations of 
expenditures and resources, but it is impossible to predict what these 
would be. 
Another possible result is that within the power sector itself 
2 
some saving in capital expenditure may take place. It would be wrong 
to think that this saving is the sole aim of Peak Load Pricing. The 
theoretical welfare aim is to improve the ultimate allocation of 
resources to as great an extent as possible. 
One of the probable results of this form of pricing would be to 
reduce the peak, which would in turn create some saving in the investment 
programme, but the aim from the theoretical welfare point of view is to 
1 
See the Introduction to Little's The Price of Fuel [140]. 
2 
Savings in the investment programme will occur if the peak is reduced. 
This would probably mean a flattening of the load curve (an improvement 
in Load Factor). While the load curve can be flattened (i.e. capacity 
more fully utilized) by increasing off-peak consumption, this in 
itself may not result in any savings in capital expenditure, such 
savings only being associated with the peak. 
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set price equal to marginal cost and thereby efficiently allocate 
resources through consumers' expenditures. The aim of the industry 
in undertaking this form of pricing may well be only to save capital. 
These two aims are not incompatible but some of their differences 
should be noted. We saw earlier that the pricing rule was to set price 
equal to marginal cost and if this led to demands greater than supply 
thenthe price should be raised to a level to equate demand to capacity, 
allowing for any reserve. This last section of the rule is the 
result of an implicit assumption that it is better to ration peak 
capacity with price rather than with some form of quantitative 
rationing. Such a decision has no direct support from welfare theory, 
but reasons for supporting it can be stated within a welfare context. 
The extent to which the peak is reduced by pricing will depend on 
how elastic demand is at the peak. Steiner felt that: 
...if the demands were perfectly inelastic, there would 
be no effect on output of any changes in prices and thus 
one scheme of prices would be equivalent to any other 
as far as the impact on resource use is concerned. [144.p.588] 
Certainly there would be no effect on the use of resources by the 
industry and there would be no capital saving to the industry. It 
would not mean though, that one set of prices would be equivalent to 
any other set in its effect on the overall allocation of resources in 
the economy. The general allocation of expenditures and resources 
depends on the relative prices of all goods. 
If peak demand was perfectly inelastic, Peak Load Pricing should 
still be used to price the peak, thereby obtaining the appropriate 
relative prices of all goods so as to achieve the allocative result 
required. But in this case, no capital saving would be made by the 
industry. 
On the other side is the possibility of capital saving within the 
industry by means other than price. Some of these methods are already 
in use, or have been used in the past. They include interconnections 
between different systems to allow peak-swapping arrangements, daylight 
saving, staggering working hours to alter the time pattern of 
. . 1 
consumption, and of course direct usage restrictions. 
In an unpublished M.Ec. thesis at Monash University, Robin Pope 
investigated the likely effects of a reallocation of demand between 
electricity and gas for specific purposes, viz., water heating, space 
heating, and domestic cooking. This theoretical reallocation was 
achieved by increasing the sales tax on electric appliances operating 
within these markets. We discuss her work more fully in Chapter Twelve, 
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If capital were saved in the electricity industry by these means 
there is nothing in the overall structure of prices in the economy to 
guarantee that these saved resources would be efficiently reallocated 
amongst other uses. It would therefore be more efficient to reallocate 
these savings by the use of a set of prices equal to their respective 
marginal costs. 
The fact that an economically efficient allocation can be achieved 
without any capital saving (for example, where the peak demand is 
inelastic), and that capital may be saved (by institutional means) 
without any resultant efficient redistribution of resources, makes it 
necessary to clarify this point. The aim of Peak Load Pricing is to 
achieve a better allocation of resources through expenditures. In fact, 
of course, such a policy would probably lead to both of these effects 
at the same time and thereby making it a desirable change. 
What effect on top of what we have already outlined does the 
imposition of the budget constraint in our pricing model have? We saw 
that it necessarily leads to a sub-optimum and therefore a welfare loss 
somewhere. In terms of the allocation of resources the alterations 
which need to be made to what we have already said depend largely on 
the size of the budget constraint and the elasticity of the demands 
which receive the higher prices. If the constraint is not large and 
if there are some very inelastic demands it is quite possible that 
sales will be little affected. When we come to Chapter Twelve we will 
see that the price elasticity of demand in the SECV is quite low with 
the result that the introduction of the budget constraint has little 
effect on the allocation of resources. 
4 . Distribution o"f Income 
All forms of pricing have an effect on the distribution of income 
within the community. Turvey has stated the opinion that if the existing 
distribution of wealth and income is not acceptable it is not the task 
of the electricity industry to make it more acceptable [147.p.87]. 
Subject to certain limitations we disagree with this in our study. 
One of the value judgments included in this thesis, and which will 
be developed later, is that if a pricing system makes the existing 
distribution of income more acceptable (i.e. more equitable), all other 
things being equal, it is to be preferred to a pricing system that does 
not do this. In Chapter Twelve we argue that the introduction of some 
85 
form of Peak Load Pricing would lead to a more equitable distribution 
of income in the community. This is felt to be so because of the 
existing pattern of ownership of electrical appliances in Australia and 
the existing price structure for electricity. 
It appears that the larger the income of the user the more likely 
he is to own a larger number of peak consuming appliances such as those 
used for cooking, heating and lighting. This fact, coupled with the 
fact that electricity is relatively under-priced at the peak, is the 
basis for our assertion. 
In summary, the aim of some form of Peak Load Pricing is primarily 
one of obtaining a more rational allocation of resources. The more 
sectors using some form of marginalist pricing the more economically 
efficient is the allocation likely to be. It would probably also 
result in some saving of capital if the peak in electricity consumption 
was reduced. These two favourable effects are further enhanced by the 
possibility of a redistribution of income in a favourable direction. 
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PART B 
CHAPTER SIX 
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND TARIFFS 
Part B, the next five chapters, are concerned with a group of 
constraints which we will call the social and political considerations 
which confront an electricity undertaking. These considerations form 
the social and political environment within which the industry operates. 
At some time or other practically all of the industry's operations 
will be affected by this environment and the most common expression of 
this will be found in the budgetary and pricing policies of the 
undertaking. 
Our chief concern is with the operations of the SECV^ but we have 
also devoted some time to a discussion of other undertakings which 
will help illuminate certain points. In particular, we have used 
information relating to the electricity industries of NSW, France and 
Great Britain. It will be seen that the manner in which the Victorian 
and New South Wales undertakings approach the problem of social and 
political constraints differs markedly. In fact, they seem to represent 
virtually the two extremes of action available. 
As an aid to an understanding of these two different approaches 
this chapter outlines the different organizational structures of the 
Victorian and NSW undertakings. We also point out some of the parallels 
between the structures in these two Australian States and the structures 
which have grown up in France and Britain. In the most general terms 
Victoria can be likened to France, having a centralized decision making 
process, while NSW and Britain are similar in their decentralized 
structure. 
Centralization and decentralization in this context are defined 
in terms of whether the same command is responsible for both the 
generation and the distribution of the electricity and for the making 
1 
At this stage it might be instructive to give some idea of the size 
of the SECV. It is Australia's largest electricity supplier and 
largest coal producer. It has over $l,200m worth of capital assets, 
and an annual revenue of over $200m from approximately 1.2 million 
consumers. Its employees number over 21,000 and from a generating 
capacity of over 3,332 MW it produced 12,881 million kWh in 1968/69. 
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of decisions concerning these functions. In France and Victoria the 
two functions are carried out by the same organization, much like a 
vertically integrated industrial or manufacturing firm. In Britain and 
New South Wales the two functions are clearly divided. 
Not only does a study of the organizational structure of the 
industry help us to explain the different approaches of each industry 
to its role in society, but it might also suggest the most likely 
avenue through which change can occur. By studying the process of 
important changes in the pricing structure in France and Britain, and 
relating them to organizational structures, certain lines of development 
emerge which can be of assistance to us when we suggest changes in the 
pricing policies of the undertakings in Australia. 
1. France 
Up until the time that the industry was nationalized by the 'laws 
of April 8th and May 17th, 1946', electricity supply was in the hands 
of private companies. While it was initially intended that distribution 
/ f 
be the prerogative of regional offices, and the central body, Electricite 
de France (EDF) only exercise responsibility for overall planning, 
production and transmission,^ this type of organization did not develop. 
Boiteux was able to report in 1960 that: 
Nearly 97 per cent of the energy distributed - that is, 
not consumed by energy producers - is distributed by 
Electricite de France. [70.p.4] 
Centralization of functions, and in particular the setting of prices, 
is well advanced in E D F . 
But how did this centralization come about? Einaudi, when speaking 
of the French nationalizations, said: 
In France, it was the war, and the war alone, with its 
dual experience of Vichy and Nazi occupation, which 
brought about...an extraordinary measure of national 
agreement on certain fundamental economic policies. 
[183.p.33] 
EDF is well known for its fostering of theoretical work on marginal cost 
pricing and the introduction of its 'Tariff Vert', the first large scale 
attempt to use marginalist theory as a basis for a pricing policy. 
1 
See Bye [183.p.97] 
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It would seem that the introduction of this tariff was made 
possible through the centralized nature of the organization in 
conjunction with the possibility of making radical reforms in a new 
organization. In this case, the sufficient impetus for change was 
imparted via the war and the nationalization of electricity and many 
other public services at its conclusion.^ With sufficient political 
inclination centralization makes the task of radical change easier. 
2. Britain 
On the other hand, Britain also had the war and its own wave of 
nationalization following it, yet it chose, in a less radical manner, 
to follow the path of decentralization of distribution and generation 
and transmission. Because it decided on this form of organization the 
process of change in the pricing system has been much slower, the task 
of altering the system being more difficult where the distributing 
authorities have control over their own pricing policies. However, 
while this process is slower than the radical change in a centralized 
organization with sufficient impetus, it is probably much faster than 
would be the change in a large centralized organization, without such 
an impetus. 
The wave of nationalization, which took place in Britain following 
the Second World War was of a more reasoned form than that in France. 
The change to a Labor government, with a completely different political 
philosophy to that of the previous government, gave a more stable 
2 appearance to the radical changes which were taking place. The 
1 
Nelson tends to support this view in the foreword to his book. 
The specific occasion, if not the basic reason, for French 
interest in marginal cost pricing was the wave of nationalization 
of public utility concerns which reached its peak just after 
World War Two„..[For one thing]...nationalization concentrated 
able personnel from numerous predecessor enterprises into one 
organization. [142.p,viii] 
Accounts of the interest in marginal cost pricing shown by French 
economists working in the nationalised industries can be found in 
Einaudi, Bye" and Rossi [ 183 .pp. 123-34] and Dreze [78]. 
2 
Discussions of the nationalization of the electricity industry in 
Britain in 1947 can be found in: 
- Institute of Public Administration. Efficiency in the 
Nationalised Industries (A Symposium), Allen and Unwin, London, 
1952 [Chapter 4. 'Electricity Supply' by Lord Citrine]. 
- Kelf-Cohen R. Twenty Years after Nationalisation, Macmillan, 
London, 1969. 
- And references [183,186,187,192,211,213,214]. 
89 
transfer of all of the functions of electricity generation, transmission, 
and distribution, from literally hundreds of private undertakings to 
public ownership took place in 1947. But the basic form of the 
organization which resulted, the separation of generation (and transmission) 
and distribution, had its origins much earlier than this. 
Prior to the Electricity Supply Act of 1919 which established a 
body of Electricity Commissioners to 'promote, regulate and supervise' 
electricity supply, supply was undertaken by local authorities and 
companies with little central direction. A Central Electricity Board 
was set up under the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1926, to further this 
control. The Board had the responsibility of erecting and supervising 
a national grid system and it was at this point that the notion of a 
centralized wholesaler of electricity was first established. 
In 1936 the Report of the McGowan Committee on Electricity 
Distribution recommended a general reorganization of the conditions of 
electricity supply. Under the Electricity Act, 1947, the British 
Electricity Authority was set up as the central generating and 
transmitting body, along with 14 publicly owned, legally autonomous 
Area Boards responsible for the distribution of the electricity. 
In 1954 the two Area Boards serving the south of Scotland were 
abolished and the British Electricity Authority became the Central 
Electricity Authority. The final step to the present situation came 
as a result of the Herbert Committee's Recommendations in 1956 [211]. 
The Electricity Act of 1957 broke up the CEA into the Electricity 
Council, a central advisory board, and the Central Electricity 
Generating Board (CEGB) responsible for the generation and transmission 
of electricity in England and Wales. 
The CEGB sells to the Area Boards under an agreed Bulk Supply 
Tariff. The financial autonomy of the Area Boards was strengthened 
by the same Act, and as it now stands (1968) there is one central 
generating body, 12 distributing authorities and one central body, the 
Electricity Council, as the co-ordinator and go-between for both these 
bodies and the Ministers. 
The Herbert Committee explained the philosophy of this type of 
organization in their report in 1956. 
There is...one working rule that we believe is as valid 
here as elsewhere. No organization should be larger than 
is necessary to achieve the major economies of scale. The 
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larger an organization is the greater the problems in 
running it; these problems have to be faced if there are 
substantial gains from size, but otherwise they should 
be avoided. In the electricity supply industry the Area 
Boards appear to us to be individually large enough to 
exhaust the economies of scale in distribution... and 
there are no obvious further economies to be secured from 
amalgamating generation and distribution. [211.p.64] 
This line of thinking was supported by the Select Committee on 
Nationalised Industries in 1963 which reported that the Chairman of 
the CEGB, 
Sir Christopher Hinton, expressed himself satisfied that 
the decision to set up a separate Generating Board, and 
thus to divide the manufacturers and wholesalers of 
electricity from the retailers, was right. [212.p.16] 
It can be seen that at the time of nationalization the type of 
organization which finally developed had long been in the making. It 
should not be assumed that with this type of decentralization of 
decision-making the introduction of a radical change in pricing 
policy affecting the final consumer is easy. 
The history of the bulk-supply tariff dates from 1926 when the 
Central Electricity Board assumed responsibility for the selling of 
all generated power.^ The basic form of the tariff since then has 
been a two-part tariff. However, since nationalization, changes have 
taken place which have progressively brought the bulk-supply tariff 
2 
closer to what economic theory suggests. The most recent changes 
were made in 1967/68 with the aim of 'achieving a smooth transition 
from average to marginal costing by about 1970-1'. 
Compared with the French experience progress in the British 
tariff changes has been relatively slow, but with this form of 
organizational structure, slow transition is the most likely way of 
3 
achieving the goals in mind. In France, the conditions were right for 
swift and radical change. In Britain, change has been accomplished, 
but in a more sustained manner. 
For earlier pricing policies see the Herbert Committee [211.Para,45, 
106] . 
2 
For a summary of these changes see R.L. Meek [201]. 
3 
These goals were outlined by the Chairman of the Electricity Council, 
Professor Sir Ronald Edwards. See the Report of the Select Committee 
[212.p.63] in 1963. The chief goal is to accurately reflect cost in the 
tariff structure, even at the cost of simplicity, which.had hitherto been 
regarded amongst the most important aims. 
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The implications of these experiences for Australian conditions 
are these. Without conditions for radical change (such as in France 
after the war) it is likely that adjustment will be easier in the 
decentralized undertakings, e.g. New South Wales. The problems 
associated with a radical change in a centralized undertaking, such 
as in Victoria, are of such a magnitude that it is difficult to 
imagine them being undertaken without a very large external stimulus 
being applied to the undertaking. No such stimulus can be envisaged 
at present. 
The differences between the organizations of the Victorian and 
New South Wales undertakings are very much the same as those between 
France and Britain. New South Wales now has a structure rather similar 
to the British structure. Generation and transmission is the 
responsibility of the Electricity Commission of New South Wales (ECNSW) 
which sells in bulk to forty-three supply authorities, mainly County 
Councils, who are responsible for electricity distribution. Some power 
is sold directly by the ECNSW to large consumers. Victoria, on the 
other hand, is a centralized undertaking, generating and transmitting 
practically all power produced in the state and retailing all but 25 per 
cent (in 1968/69) of this power. Most of this 25 per cent is supplied 
in bulk to 11 Municipal undertakings all of which operate in the 
Melbourne metropolitan area. Both the New South Wales and Victorian 
supply organizations were formed from amalgamations of many small 
municipal undertakings, and some private undertakings.^ 
It was natural that electricity supply should first be 
associated with municipal government because its first 
public use was for street lighting which municipal 
authorities control. 
1 
E.A, Boehm has ^^ rritten a rather brief account of the development of 
the various electricity undertakings in Australia (1956) [226]. In 
this account he has outlined the progress made in the coordination 
of the large number of private undertakings that originally existed, 
and the corresponding growth of public ownership. He has contrasted 
this process of development with the development of private ownership 
of the electricity industry in the USA. 
2 
'The Development of Electricity Supply in New South Wales - an 
outline for students' by the ECNSW. Sydney, 1960, p.3. 
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3. New South Wales 
In the case of New South Wales the municipalities received their 
powers under the Municipalities Electric Light Act 1904. This authority-
was extended by the Local Government Act of 1919 which allowed the 
formation of County Councils. These were to be larger organizations 
than the original smaller municipal councils. 
Because of the rapid growth of the use of electricity, electricity 
supply soon became the main function of many of the councils and it 
began to appear obvious that some form of State-wide coordination was 
essential. The Gas and Electricity Act of 1935 set up the 'Electricity 
Advisory Committee' to advise the Government (and only advise) on the 
coordination and development of electricity supply within the state. 
Interconnections between the various independent networks took place 
during this period but it was still obvious that more effective overall 
control was needed. So in 1945 the Electricity Authority of New South 
Wales (EANSW) was set up by the Electricity Development Act of 1945. 
Broadly, its function was to promote, regulate and coordinate the 
development, expansion and extension of electricity supply throughout 
the State. 
One of its means of fulfilling these tasks was to foster the 
consolidation of many of the small undertakings into larger units. 
The EANSW has described its aim in this regard as: 
...the creation of efficient electricity undertakings 
by the merging of a number of small undertakings when 
this can be appropriately done, having regard to the 
technical, economic, geographical and administrative 
features involved with a view to providing the best 
possible service to consumers.^ 
The lower limit to the size of the consolidated units was set by 
the conditions that it must be big enough to have a reasonable diversity 
of demand, and large enough to be able to obtain its own financial 
resources for development. The upper limit was determined by the same 
consideration as reported by the Herbert Committee in Britain in 1956. 
The EANSW stated that it was: 
1 
Report on the Organization of Electricity Supply, EANSW. April 3, 
1957, p.17. 
2 
Op. cit.p.9. 
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...inclined to agree with the conclusion of the Herbert 
Report that 'No organization should be larger than is 
necessary to achieve the major economies of scale. The 
larger an organization is the greater the problem in 
running it: these problems have to be faced if there 
are substantial gains from size, but otherwise they 
should be avoided.' 
Even though these consolidations were being planned, and 
interconnections were taking place between vital parts of the existing 
systems, a crisis occurred. In 1949 acute shortages of capacity, 
coupled with a large coal strike, led to the appointment of an 
Emergency Electricity Commissioner. 
As a result of this experience, and the obvious need for 
coordinated action in the future, the Electricity Commission of New 
South Wales (ECNSW) was set up in May 1950 by the Electricity Commission 
Act, 1950. The ECNSW was to take over all responsibility for generation 
and mains transmission in the State. Initially, this meant the transfer 
of generating facilities from the four main producers then operating 
2 
who supplied approximately 95 per cent of the State's requirements. 
The programme of acquisition was completed in 1957. 
With the establishment of the ECNSW, the EANSW saw its new functions, 
with regard to coordination and development, as: 
.o.now confined mainly to the carrying out of certain 
hydro-electric investigations, the co-ordination and 
approval of plans for the development of power stations 
and main transmission and rationalization of distribution 
areas throughout the State, and the encouragement of 
rural electrification by means of subsidies and advice 
to the local supply bodies.^ 
The programme of rationalization has been quite successful as the 
following figures show. 
1 
Op. cit. p.12 
2 
The producers were The Sydney County Council (which had been 
constituted under the Gas and Electricity Act of 1935), The Electric 
Light and Power Supply Corporation Limited (The Balmain Company), 
The Southern Electricity Supply Section of Public Works, and the 
Department of Railways. 
3 
EANSW Annual Report 1950-51. p.5. 
Table 6.1 
Number of Electricity Suppliers Generating 
and/or Supplying Electricity to the Public 
in New South Wales 
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June 1947 June 1967 
State Departments 3 1 (ECNSW) 
County Councils 11 34 
Municipal and City Councils 82 4 
Shire Councils 45 1 
Franchise Holders 47 5 
Total 188 45 
These developments have led to the present organization which 
comprises one producer (ECNSW), one co-ordinator (EANSW), and separate 
retailers mainly under the control of local government undertakings. In 
its Report on the Organization of Electricity Supply in 1957, the EANSW 
said: 
In New South Wales, the Electricity Authority is fully 
appreciative of the good work of local government in the 
field of electricity supply, and believes that there is 
no reason why distribution should not remain in local 
government hands. In fact, the Authority sees considerable 
merit in this system of control, for properly organized 
local control can provide daring and initiative and an 
intimacy in service, difficult for central government for 
obvious reasons. [p.8] 
In 1965 it confirmed this faith in its organizational structure. 
Arising from [past changes] there has evolved the separation 
of generation and distribution functions which is the basis ^ 
on which the industry now operates and plans for the future. 
Tariffs 
The local authorities have the responsibility of setting their own 
tariffs, but the EANSW has the duty of informing and guiding local 
2 
undertakings as to the type of tariffs which might best be applicable. 
EANSW Annual Report 1965, p.8. 
2 
The EANSW has issued a publication 'The Selection of Tariffs by 
Electricity Supply Authorities' 2nd Edition, 1965. Part 1 - Costing; 
Part 2 - Tariff Framing. I understand a Part 3 is in preparation and 
is to be known as - Incremental or Marginal Costing. 
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The ECNSW supplies electricity in bulk at charges determined by-
its bulk-supply tariff.^ The original basis of the tariff was described 
in the 2nd Annual Report of the ECNSW for the year ended June, 1953. 
The ECNSW reported that itself, in conjunction with the Local Government 
Electricity Advisory Committee, had recommended to the Annual Conference 
of Council^ and they had resolved that: 
(i) ...with power stations situated and operated with 
regard to the overall economy of generation and 
transmission it is virtually impossible to relate costs 
for individual areas to the source of power when service 
is given at various points from a grid system on such 
an extensive scale as is the case in New South Wales. 
(ii) ...a uniform system of charging for bulk supply 
is the only practicable method which could be applied. 
(iii) ...the tariff structure should be uniform for all 
areas and there would appear to be no warrant for departing 
from the well-established two-part form of tariff. [p.8] 
The basic form of the tariff is still a two-part tariff. Since 
its institution the energy component has comprised a base rate with 
adjustments for variations in the cost of fuel delivered to the ECNSW's 
power stations in the previous quarter, and a basic wage adjustment 
for variations in the State Male Hourly Basic Wage Rate. The Demand 
charge has varied somewhat over time but is currently determined by a 
charge per kW of maximum demand in each month, with a monthly reset 
of the measuring instruments. This tariff is not in accordance with 
marginalist principles as they have been explained in earlier chapters. 
Up to the present time there appears to have been no attempt to 
introduce this form of pricing into the New South Wales undertakings. 
It would seem that the resolution of 1953 to institute a simple two-
part tariff still strongly persists. 
But it is our contention that if it were decided to implement a 
time of day (or year) tariff then the style of organization in New 
South Wales would be quite suitable for such a change. No great impetus 
would be needed, only the conviction on the part of the ECNSW that such 
a pricing form would be desirable. Once the bulk-supply tariff was 
established on these grounds, the incentives would then exist for the 
local authorities to attempt to reduce loads at the system peak, which 
is the time of the highest system costs, by either institutional or 
financial means. 
1 
The actual details of the tariff can be found in Appendix Four. 
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The other, more centralized, form of control of functions, and 
therefore of pricing policy, can be seen in the case of the SECV. 
4. Victoria 
As with most electricity supply organizations in developed 
countries, the Victorian development was originally one of individual 
municipal and private undertakings.^ In contrast to what happened in 
New S outh Wales the SECV, under the chairmanship of Sir John Monash, 
actively discouraged municipal authorities to continue their activities 
in the field of electricity supply. Where, as we have seen, the EANSW 
bespoke confidence and trust in the local government authorities, right 
from the start the SECV showed no faith at all in the ability of local 
government to run such affairs. Its arguments for centralized control 
included the inability of small bodies to obtain sufficient capital 
and maintain a sufficiently high level of efficiency; their operating 
costs were higher; and they lacked flexibility and incentive. As a 
final consideration they suggested that: 
Municipal councillors (especially in country districts) 
and to a lesser degree most municipal officers, are 
unfamiliar with electric economics and with principles 
underlying the framing of tariffs for the sale of 
energy... Inexperienced overhead management in such 
matters leads inevitably to a retarded development of 
the use of electricity. 
This attitude was in contrast to the spirit and law of the Electric 
Light and Power Act of 1915 which gave municipalities the right, 
under Orders-in-Council, to generate and distribute electricity as 
part of their municipal business. 
The Electricity Commission Act of 1918 established three 
Commissioners who were to 
...inquire into and report...as to - the steps which 
in their opinion should be taken to secure the 
ultimate co-ordination OR unification of all State 
Good summaries of the early development of the State Electricity 
Commission of Victoria can be found in the SECV Annual Report 1928/29 
and the Supplement to the SECV Annual Report 1943/44 entitled 'The State 
Electricity Commission of Victoria. Its inauguration and development' 
compiled by W.R. Armstrong, Publicity Officer, SECV. 
2 
This quotation is taken from a letter written by the SECV in 1922 to 
a Select Committee inquiring into electricity supply and reprinted in 
the Report of the Select Committee [p.15], 
See 'Victoria: Votes and Proceedings of the Legislative Assembly 
Session I 1922' pp.761-75. 
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or other electrical undertakings in Victoria... and 
to secure the amalgamation ^ concentration of such 
undertakings.1 [Emphasis not in original] 
The emphasis we have made in the above quotations is important because 
the SECV has often invoked its duties under the Act in retaliation 
against criticism of its acquisition of various undertakings. 
Currently it wishes to acquire the 11 Metropolitan Bulk Supply 
undertakings which are the sole survivors of the original Council 
undertakings. The SECV has met with strong opposition but it is 
adamant that under the Act it is required to acquire these undertakings. 
As can be seen from the above quotation the SECV is not obligated to 
unify the whole State, and thereby end up with only one body in charge 
of all the electrical functions of the State. The Act required the 
SECV to co-ordinate o£ unify. It does not commit the SECV singularly 
to unification. 
Over the years the SECV seems to have changed its views on just 
what are its obligations under the Act. In 1938 it reported: 
In pursuance of its duties to secure the co-ordination, 
amalgamation and inter-connexion of all State and other 
electrical undertakings in Victoria, it has been necessary 
from time to time for the Commission to arrange for the ^ 
merging of various local undertakings in the State system. 
However, in more recent years, its interpretation has taken on a more 
demanding tone. In 1964, for example, it said: 
The State Electricity Commission Act has placed on the 
the Commission the responsibility of taking measures 
to secure the ultimate co-ordination AND unification of 
the electrical undertakings of the State.^ [Emphasis not in original] 
And in 1965: 
Parliament placed on the Commission at its inception, 
powers and duties related to the ultimate co-ordination 
AND unification of all electrical undertakings in the 
S t a t e . [ E m p h a s i s not in original] 
1 
Part of Section 2(a)(i) Electricity Commissioners Act 1918 No.2996 
2 
SECV Annual Report 1937/38 p.12. 
3 
SECV Annual Report 1963/64 p.16. 
4 
SECV Annual Report 1965/66 p.12. Another similar statement exists 
in the Electricity Supply Association of Australia's publication, 
'The Electricity Supply Industry in Australia 1967-68', on p.38. 
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There can be no doubt, however, that under the original charter 
there is room for the existence of individual electricity retailing 
organizations within the State of Victoria. The SECV would be, of 
course, responsible for the coordination of these undertakings in much 
the same way as it conducts its present relations with the Metropolitan 
Bulk Supply Undertakings. It is false for the SECV to give the 
impression that it is required by its original charter to take over all 
of the electrical undertakings of the State. 
However, one thing is certain. The original Act and subsequent 
Acts did give the SECV wide powers to acquire, virtually compulsorily, 
practically all of the undertakings in the State, even if it did not 
give it the obligation to do so. In effect, the pattern for future 
development was firmly established when the SECV was set up by the State 
Electricity Commission Act of 1920, Section 17 of this Act empowered 
the Commission to acquire undertakings, even where an Order-in-Council 
existed under the 1915 Act. Section 18 firmly established the basis 
of its ultimate monopoly power by prohibiting extensions to, or 
erections of, new power houses without the consent of the SECV. 
Discontent arose in many quarters concerning the SECV's powers 
and a Select Committee of the Victorian Parliament was appointed to 
inquire into some aspects of its activities. Its Progress Report, 
made in 1922, dealt in part with the SECV's powers concerning the 
retailing of electricity. The Committee reported that: 
Nearly all of the representatives of municipal bodies 
expressed the fear that the rights claimed by municipalities 
to distribute electricity within their borders would be 
invaded if the powers and orbit of the State Electricity 
Commission were developed in the way in which they seemed 
to be tending. The anxiety was, therefore, freely expressed 
that the Electricity Commission might impair their efficiency 
to perform the functions for their constituents which were 
contemplated in the original Electric Lighting and Power 
Acts, and which, these witnesses considered, would be better 
performed by municipalities than by the Commission itself. 
[p.3] 
1 
'Notwithstanding anything in any Act or in any order in force at the 
commencement of this Act it shall not be lawful for any undertaker to 
establish any new or to extend any existing generating station or main 
transmission line without the consent of the Commission.' [Section 18 
State Electricity Commission Act No.3004, 24 December 1920.J 
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The fear of the SECV developing into a monopoly was also mentioned 
by those opposing its stand. On this matter the Committee reported: 
Your committee...does not consider that this objection 
has any weight. But even if it is necessary to constitute 
a monopoly of the generation and supply of electricity or 
of the control of electrical undertakings, it by no means 
follows that there should necessarily be a monopoly of 
distribution. It is quite feasible that the Commission 
should supply other authorities in bulk, and leave those 
other authorities to distribute the energy in retail, 
and collect the charges from the consumers, [p.5] 
This statement seems to be in some conflict with the interpretation 
placed on the Select Committee's Report by the SECV. In considering a 
take-over of the Metropolitan Bulk Supply Undertakings, it stated: 
The Commission has called attention to the endorsement 
of the policy of State ownership of these metropolitan 
undertakings J first by a select committee of Parliament 
in 1922 ^ 
This statement is only one of the many interpretations which can be 
placed on the recommendations of the Select Committee. An opposite 
view could be held quite easily. 
As an addition to its Progress Report, the Select Committee (1922) 
appended two letters forwarded to it, one by Sir John Monash, the 
Chairman of the SECV, and the other by the SECV itself. The letter from 
the Chairman correctly argued that, for greater efficiency, centralized 
generation and control of generation was necessary in the future. On 
the other hand, the SECV's letter showed an unyielding desire to 
ultimately control all of the functions of electricity supply. 
It is, however, not logical or practicable to divorce 
entirely the function of generation from the function 
of retail distribution. With the exception of a few 
of the Niagara private power companies, it is doubtful 
if there is any other precedent in the world for 
entirely separating 'generation' from 'retail distribution'. 
There is, therefore, no historical or logical basis 
whatsoever for the doctrine that the State Electricity 
Commission, which is destined to become the only important 
generating authority within the State, shall be totally 
excluded from the function of retail distribution. Not 
only does the existing law contemplate no such general 
exclusion, but no ground of efficiency or expediency 
or economic advantage can support such a doctrine, 
[p.16] 
1 
SECV Annual Report 1965/66 p.12. 
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This statement could not have been made 15 years later when both the 
N e w South Wales and British industries were moving towards a 
decentralization of their functions. 
There w a s , however, another clause in the SECV's letter which 
put forward an alternative proposition. 
In the event, however, of it being thought by Parliament 
that the Commission should be altogether excluded from 
the function of retail distribution, the Commission 
strongly recommends that such a function should, even 
under such circumstances, cease to be regarded as a local 
concern. It would still be imperative to treat each 
separate transmission scheme as a single scheme requiring 
a unified control centred in some local authority created 
for the purpose. In other words, there would have to be 
local power, boards or trusts, either nominated by the 
State or elected by the districts, which would be given 
borrowing powers and would have independent control of 
the electrical affairs of the district so far as relates 
to low-tension distribution. 
It must be made clear, however, that even under such an 
arrangement, the whole of all the systems of high-tension 
reticulation throughout the State must remain, as at 
present, under the sole control of the State Electricity 
Commission. 
But Parliament agreed to the SECV's initial suggestion of a path 
which would ultimately lead to practically complete control of all the 
functions of electricity supply. In 1922, 'An Act to amend the State 
Electricity Commission Acts' was passed which strengthened its 
retailing powers. 
In a supplement to its 25th Annual Report the SECV recorded the 
matter thus: 
After full endorsement by the Select Committee all 
...proposals were ratified by Parliament. Thus retail 
distribution by the Commission of State generated 
electricity was established as a policy, and the 
Commission was given a mandate to go ahead with its 
vast distribution schemes for the whole of the State, 
[p.46] 
But the argument was far from over. In 1926, as a result of 
further public agitation, a Report from Willits H . Sawyer, Royal 
Commissioner, was presented to Parliament. One of the matters to be 
investigated by the Royal Commission into electricity supply was the 
subject of retailing. After reviewing many of the arguments already 
m e n t i o n e d , he admitted that: 
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...the point is made that the Commission is supreme, with 
broad monopolistic powers, and... [could possess]... a 
human tendency not to view a complaint with the same 
judicial atmosphere as would be the case if the regulatory-
Commission and the operator were not one and the same. [p.28] 
He concluded: 
It is, however, my best judgment that the taking over of 
retail distribution by the State Electricity Commission 
was a progressive step, and to the best interests of all 
concerned. [p.30] 
It was there_ that the public argument rested until 1950 when a 
Board of Inquiry into electricity supply set up by the Victorian 
Government reported to the Victorian Parliament. It had been asked to 
consider the most suitable form of organization for the industry. It 
reported that it had 
...especially considered the problems associated with the 
administration and management of public monopolies, the 
advantages and disadvantages of big undertakings, and, 
in particular, the form of organization which could best 
follow a sound financial policy for the rural electrification 
of this State. [p.18] 
The Boardfe findings on this matter were quite the reverse of all 
the previous official inquiries. 
The most suitable form of organization to effect the best 
means of making electricity supply available by an 
economical and expeditious method, in all areas of 
Victoria, to all sections of the community, can be achieved 
by -
(a) fuel mining, briquetting, generation and 
main transmission centralized under one 
organization for the State, namely, the 
State Electricity Commission; 
(b) the distribution of electricity decentralized 
under separate autonomous organizations, namely 
District Electricity Boards, which would 
purchase electricity in bulk from the State 
Electricity Commission. [p.28] 
Three main arguments were advanced in support of this conclusion: 
(i) it is only in a decentralized organization 
that efficient contact can be made with 
individual consumers [para. 103] ; 
This is made all the more surprising by the knowledge that one of 
the members of the three man Board was a Mr R. Liddelow who was 
Secretary of the SECV in 1922, later Manager, and retired on April 30, 
1951, after serving on the Board of Inquiry I 
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(ii) that in its then present form the SECV was 
too 'big', and while it is difficult to 
know how big an organization should be, 
there was a size 'beyond which problems of 
administration and organization of management 
arise to undermine economic values' [para. 106]; [and] 
(iii) the decision as to what should be the method 
of sharing the costs of rural electrical 
development should be made 'by a body of 
people as close as practicable to the 
community to be served and answerable 
to the community for the financial outcome 
of the work it undertakes'. [para. 108]^ 
But these arguments have carried no weight. Right up to the present 
the SECV has not deviated from its original course. 
The only remaining major retailing bodies, the eleven Metropolitan 
Councils are currently under attack. While the opposition to the SECV's 
policy on this matter is not as vocal as it once was it is still not 
insignificant. A report in the Melbourne Age, on 13/7/65, stated that: 
The eleven Councils who have formed themselves into 
a body called The Association of Municipal 
Electricity Authorities say the SEC should 
retire from the field of electricity retailing. 
Because of the delicacy of the negotiations currently taking place 
on this matter the Association is not prepared to make a public 
statement on its attitude. However, it is certain that opposition 
to the SECV's policy of centralization of all functions is still in 
2 existence. 
1 
It is interesting to note that it was this same Board that was not 
in favour of a uniform tariff in Victoria. This matter is discussed 
in the next chapter but for the moment it is sufficient to say that 
this recommendation of the Board also received scant attention from 
the Government and the SECV. 
2 
The SECV's latest Annual Report, 1968/69, indicates a new direction 
in the SECV's policy on this matter. They state: 
In presenting the 1962/63 State Budget to Parliament, 
the Premier stated that the Government would look 
favourably upon the transfer of the municipal 
distribution systems to the Commission by amicable 
negotiation. 
However, the reaction of the councils since has proved 
this approach to be quite fruitless. Accordingly, the 
Commission has in hand a comprehensive review of its 
proposals for legislative action. [p.20] 
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The process of standardising tariffs as the SECV acquired various 
undertakings throughout the State played a great part in the 
rationalization of the retail supply of electricity. But, as the next 
chapter endeavours to show, the arguments for standardising tariffs, 
and the duty of the 'unification of the State's supplies', reached its 
extreme with the introduction of a standard uniform tariff - uniform 
all over the State (including the eleven Metropolitan Bulk Supply areas) 
Conclusion 
How an industry goes about making substantial changes in its 
policies will depend partly on its organizational structure. In the 
case of the SECV, where a decision to alter the tariff structure has 
a large and immediate impact on the whole State, the decision is 
largely a political decision. A good example of this is the change 
to a uniform tariff. 
Changes in the pricing system for reasons of efficiency or economy, 
however, are not very common. A good example of the SECV's tardiness 
in such matters is the quite recent change in the form of the Domestic 
tariff. In 1925, a two-part domestic tariff was introduced which 
related the fixed charge to the number of rated rooms in the consumer's 
premises. Supposedly, this was related in some way to the demand 
characteristics of the consumer. In 1941, Lewis [137.p.54] pointed 
out how outdated and how obviously inefficient was this form of 
charging. But it was not until 1967 that the SECV took the appropriate 
steps to replace this tariff. One possible reason for the tardiness 
is the inflexibility in such things as tariffs that exist in such a 
monolithic monopoly. 
In a decentralized system such as that in NSW, it is possible to 
introduce changes in a slower, less drastic form avoiding many of the 
potential political problems. Under these circumstances there is a 
greater likelihood that economic factors on their own may be the 
reason for change taking place. 
A knowledge of the organizational structure of the SECV is 
important to our understanding of how a new pricing policy might be 
implemented. It is also an aid to understanding how each organization 
approaches problems which are basically non-economic. In the next 
three chapters we see how an understanding of their different 
organizational structures is important in comprehending the completely 
different ways in which each undertaking deals with these 'non-economic' 
considerations. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE SOCIO-POLITICAL^ CONSIDERATIONS OF A 
PRICING POLICY FOR A PUBLIC UTILITY 
What attitude then can the industry adopt in the face of the 
various demands placed upon it by the State? In the last 
resort it will have to submit, but before it does it should 
indicate the probable consequences of the proposed measures.. 
A public debate should, in fact, be conducted, in which 
the industry defends its conception of the public interest... 
while it falls to the State to present considerations of a 
more general character, directed towards objectives of a 
broader or, at least, different nature, 
Dessus [77.p.38] 
In this thesis we support Dessus' view on how a public utility 
should react when faced with a demand by the State to undertake an 
activity which it would not normally undertake. How the utility 
should react in the face of new demands is more Utopian than our 
needs here. The more pressing problem for us is what to do with 
past demands which have been made, met and incorporated into the 
utility's present pricing system. Our examination of these past 
demands will be for the purpose of gaining an understanding of what 
brought them about, and in some cases hinting at their inevitability 
within the contemporary environment. 
We choose this course because we believe that any suggestion as 
to how a utility's pricing system should be changed must incorporate 
practically all of the existing extraneous requirements. We are not saying 
1 
Most of the time it is difficult to decide just where the social 
implications leave off and the political ones take over. In 
practically all cases we can expect an element of both to be 
present. Bonbright remarked that: 
A study...would reveal many deliberate departures from 
cost-price standards based on considerations often called 
'social', although critics might be unkind enough to call 
them 'political'. [72.p.110] 
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that continual questioning of these demands should not be made, not 
least of all by the utility itself. On the contrary, we live in a 
dynamic, and often too slowly changing society. What was acceptable 
ten years ago, and embodied in a Parliamentary Act at that time, may 
not be acceptable today. Whether an Act of Parliament ever reflects 
the 'will of the people' must also be in doubt. 
This particular chapter is devoted to constructing a framework 
upon which we can examine and explain the multiplicity of past and 
present social and political influences which are reflected in the 
pricing policies of the electricity industry in Victoria and New South 
Wales. Chapters Eight, Nine and Ten are devoted to this examination. 
Because most of the constraints involve redistributions of income 
either amongst consumers, or between consumers and non-consumers, 
each particular consideration will have to be taken into account 
individually. This approach allows us to see who it is intended 
should benefit and who, if anyone in particular, should pay. 
The overall problem is part of a much wider field in which the 
deliberations of economists over the years have been directed to two 
questions. The first is the correct allocation of resources between 
the public and the private sector. Discussion of this topic can be 
traced back to Wicksell and Pigou, In 1954, Samuelson made his first 
attempt at deriving rigorous rules for the Pure Theory of Public 
Expenditure. He assumed that the government had two general duties 
to fulfil - it was to provide public goods, and it had to establish 
and maintain a mechanism whereby transfer payments, in accordance 
with some desired and specified social objectives, could be made inde-
pendently of the exchange and production mechanism. 
It was recognised that this was indeed an ideal case. In 1955, 
Samuelson agreed that redistributions could, and sometimes should, be 
made through the use of public expenditure. One implicit assumption 
of the ideal system was that the transfer mechanism was costless and 
100 per cent efficient. Invariably this is not true and so, in some 
cases, it might well be better (cheaper and/or more efficient) to 
carry out some of the social objectives through public bodies. 
1 
Boiteux adopted this same attitude in an article in 1960. 
If fiscal methods of redistribution are insufficient, other 
means have to be found - the fire must be fed with the wood 
at hand. One of these other possible methods is to request 
Electricite de France, a national service, to offer specially 
reduced prices for small consumers. [142.p.27] 
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The second question which is relevant is the extent to which 
economists should indulge in normative economics or value judgments. 
The question has been posed many times and will certainly remain 
unresolved at the end of this thesis. However, it does seem clear that 
the economist cannot completely avoid such questions, either in his 
results or in the formulation of his assumptions. Practical economics 
is sterile without them. At the same time, it is essential that the 
distinction between economic analysis and practical value judgments 
should be clearly stated in any particular instance. 
By the end of this part of the thesis we will have formed the 
conclusion that the Government of the State of Victoria, to a large 
extent, uses the SECV as an integral part of its general fiscal structure. 
The case which will be made out is that there may well be good reasons 
for using State instrumentalities for these purposes. On the other 
hand, there can be no suggestion that in so doing the Government of the 
day should be allowed to camouflage the transfer payments which are 
involved. 
The case for openness in transfer payments has been put by 
Ramanadhan [45] in an article in which he suggests that a particular 
price, p, for the output of a public utility, should be capable of 
dissection into two parts, x, representing the production and distri-
bution costs of the good or service involved, and y, being positive or 
negative, showing the transfer component involved. This allows direct 
assessment of y on two accounts. It allows queries to be made as to 
its size, basis, impact, regressiveness and need, while the second 
makes it possible to determine which consumers are contributing or 
receiving what proportion of the total. If they are measurable there 
is no reason why these two assessments should not be available to the 
general public. 
How is it possible for a utility to be able to play this taxing 
and subsidising role? Three possibilities can be seen in the case of 
the SECV. 
(a) By Statute no other body is allowed to compete directly with the 
SECV in the production and sale of electricity. As a result there can 
be no threat of entry into the Industry or direct competition. This 
monopolistic situation allows the use of a very flexible price structure, 
which can encompass much more than the simple reflection of cost. 
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(b) There appears to be very little interest in matters of this sort 
by the general public. Many things may account for this inertia. The 
complexity of the electricity tariffs offered by the SECV could easily 
deter the layman from pursuing any investigation he may wish to m a k e . 
On the other hand, but probably less likely, the public may have so 
m u c h confidence in the utility as to accept the structure even if not 
the level of particular prices. 
(c) The third is as much conjecture as the second. Such a system of 
'hidden' taxes and subsidies may well be accepted as part of a modern 
western capitalistic system. People may see alternative systems which 
involve specific subsidies and taxes dispensed openly by the government, 
as moves away from capitalism towards a more socialistic system of 
government. The value judgment implied here is that this would not be 
generally acceptable to the Victorian public. 
If these three assertions are correct, and certainly the first one 
is, the question which follows is - if the utility can do these things, 
why should it wish to do them? Two possible answers present themselves. 
The utility m a y itself have a social conscience. Its charter gives it 
semi-autonomous status so the possibility is not entirely without the 
utility's realm. On the other hand, there may be deliberate attempts 
by the Government to incorporate the SECV into a general fiscal 
structure. The motives in this second case may be of two kinds, or a 
combination of both. It may in fact be cheaper, or a matter of 
expediency, to use such utilities rather than the general tax mechanism. 
There is certainly some cause to believe that the expediency argument 
has some truth. The other motivation, which would be much harder to 
prove, is that this form of making transfer payments is a convenient 
way for the Government to avoid being asked the exact questions which 
Ramanadhan said should be asked - those relating to the transfer payment 
part of the price paid. 
If we now assume that the SECV is capable of redistributing income, 
and for one reason or another it desires to, how can it achieve the 
redistribution? Three general methods can be cited. 
1. It can earn a profit (over and above its profit applied to capital 
financing) and directly transfer these profits to the government. 
2. It can transfer some or all of this profit to its employees, in 
the form of welfare or other benefits, or it can transfer some of these 
108 
profits to the general public in the form of extra services, over and 
above that for which the consumer is paying directly. 
3. A third possibility, even when the utility is not making a profit, 
is that cross-subsidization can take place among its own subgroups of 
consumers. Losses incurred in supplying one group can be recouped from 
the profits earned from sales to another group.^ The subgroups can be 
of many types. The more common are based on demand characteristics or 
their geographical position. We will see in the next chapter that the 
SECV is involved in practices which fall into all three of these 
categories. 
Apart from the difficulties in analysis due to the interaction of 
a number of these processes there is also the problem of measurement 
of the amount of the tax or subsidy involved, A tax or subsidy is 
present when there is a difference between price and cost for the 
product. 
There are measurement difficulties on the price side because the 
price quoted is rarely a unitary one. Electricity prices are notoriously 
complex, and as such are very difficult to handle in any form of 
quantitative analysis. The difficulties on the cost side are even 
greater. The correct costs upon which this sort of judgment should be 
made are the marginal costs of supply, including a share of the capacity 
costs where it is warranted. However, this information is not available. 
For that matter, the SECV will not make available any other information 
on costs as a substitute. 
One final reminder before we move on to the next chapter. Where 
the term redistribution of income is used during the next few chapters 
it applies only to the redistribution which results from policies 
formulated for social or political reasons. The redistribution which 
results from the practice of class price discrimination, and the 
underpricing of consumption at the peak will be dealt with later in 
the thesis. 
William G. Shepherd has published one of the few economic appraisals 
of cross-subsidization. His study is of the British National Coal 
Board. See Shepherd, W.G. 'Cross-subsidizing and Allocation in Public 
Firms', Oxford Economic'Papers, NS, 16, 1964.pp.132-159. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
SOCIO-POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN THE 
SECV'S PRICING POLICY 
From the personal point of view the experience was one of only 
partially successful resistance to intense political pressure 
from interested sections of the community, with practically 
no support from any political section or from the public. The 
lack of public support was due to ignorance, not only of the 
principles which should guide public administration, but also 
of the technical problems. Nobody was interested but the 
'Interests'. 
[F.W. Eggleston (formerly Attorney-General, Minister of Railways 
and Minister of Water Supply, State of Victoria). State Socialism 
in Victoria. 1932] 
Our intention in this chapter is to describe the social and 
political constraints which have an affect on the pricing policies of 
the SECV. By giving a detailed explanation of each influence and 
showing the inevitability of each in the development of the SECV, it is 
hoped that their important role will thereby be demonstrated. Chapter 
Six introduced the idea that because of the degree of centralization 
of functions achieved in Victoria, the SECV is in a position where it 
can be used more readily for political purposes than the industry in 
New South Wales. In effect, the SECV is an integral part of the 
government budgeting process. 
1 
It is intended in the chapter to deal only with those social and 
political influences which have a direct effect upon pricing policies. 
An example of another kind of alleged political interference in the 
workings of the SECV, which is not directly related to pricing, arose 
recently. The details can be found in most of the Melbourne daily 
papers for September 18 and 19, 1969. 
Some of the unions, who have members employed by the SECV, have 
repeatedly made claims that the SECV has been 'restricted' and 
'hamstrung' in negotiating wage claims because of the 'ultimate over-
riding authority of the Premier'. As a result, Arbitration Commissioner 
Horan took the unprecedented step of directing the compulsory attendance, 
at a negotiating session of the SECV and unions, of both the Premier and 
the Minister of Fuel and Power, thereby implicitly supporting the unions' 
claim of interference. 
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It is impossible to quantify the effects of all of the influences 
because of the paucity of data but the pattern of behaviour becomes 
clear even with a simple listing of the individual practices. 
1. Direct Transfers to Government Funds 
In his budget speech of the 9th September, 1964, the Premier-
Treasurer of Victoria announced the levying of a royalty on all brown 
coal mined by the SECV. He said: 
The New South Wales budget benefits substantially from royalties 
on minerals, including coal. We do not have a comparable field 
in minerals but it is proposed that as from 1 July 1964, a 
royalty of 3d. a ton will be levied on all brown coal mined by 
the State Electricity Commission. This proposed royalty is 
broadly equivalent on a comparative B.T.U. basis with the charges 
levied in New South Wales. 
In introducing the State Electricity Commission (Contributions) Bill, 
in which this royalty became law, the then Minister for Electrical 
Undertakings, Mr G.O. Reid, said: 'By 1970... the pajrment will reach 
approximately £320,000 per annum.' [26 November, 1964] 
The introduction of this tax did not cause much discussion as it 
was overshadowed by two other events at the time which received more 
political attention. The Bill just cited also made provision for the 
SECV to take over the responsibility for losses on its briquette 
operations for which the Government had been previously responsible. 
We shall be examining this in more detail later. Of even more 
importance at that time was the suggestion that the State of Victoria 
would institute its o\m income tax to overcome the impasse in Federal-
State financial relations. This provoked much controversial discussion 
throughout the whole country and the 3d. a ton royalty slipped in almost 
unnoticed. When the Premier-Treasurer was informed that the Federal 
Government would not be party to the collection of the State income tax 
it was reported in the Australian [3 October, 1964] that "... he had 
planned to raise £5 million from the income tax in the next financial 
year'. 
The State income tax never came into existence but the attempt to 
implement it was brought up again two years later when the Premier-
Treasurer, in his 1966 Budget Speech, announced a 3 per cent tax on the 
total revenue of two public authorities - the SECV and the Gas and Fuel 
Corporation of Victoria. The relevant section of the speech is 
presented here because it contains his motives for the introduction of 
the tax which we will be examining shortly. 
Ill 
A number of state corporations of a trading nature operate under 
the privilege of State legislation and are not subject to the 
general range of taxation laws which would apply to them if they 
were privately owned public utilities. Not only does this lead 
to a distortion of the true costs of the services they provide 
but it also means that the revenue which could normally be 
expected to flow to government from their operations has to be 
made good in some other way. With the extreme limits on revenue 
fields available to the State, we are no longer in a position 
to ignore the consequences of this in the overall problem of how 
the community finances the unavoidable increasing costs of 
education. Accordingly, we have decided that these bodies should 
make a contribution to consolidated revenue in recognition of 
their freedom from the various forms of taxation from which they 
are now exempt.^ 
There appear to be three reasons cited in the speech as justifications 
for this tax. 
(a) It is to pay for an increasingly costly education 
service. 
(b) It is to compensate for the freedom from other taxes 
experienced by these authorities. 
(c) It is to correct a distortion of the 'true costs' of 
the service they provide. 
The Bill became the centre of a bitter political battle which ended 
in the tax becoming law in the Public Authorities (Contributions) Bill 
on 11 October, 1966. Opposition to the Bill came from many quarters 
(with little from the general public) and numerous reasons were given 
for opposing the bill. The major ones are listed below with a brief 
explanation of their argument. 
(i) It is a regressive tax 
Mr Galbally, Leader of the Opposition in the Legislative Council, 
linked this tax with the Premier-Treasurer's earlier attempts to 
introduce a State income tax. He said: 
the proposed tax on these undertakings is a State income tax 
under another name.^ 
1 
Budget Speech. Victorian Legislative Assembly. 14 September, 1966 
2 
Victorian Legislative Council. 28 September, 1966. 
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This in itself appeared quite obvious, the amounts to be raised were 
roughly equivalent, and both of the taxes had strong growth prospects 
for the future.^ 
The then economist for the Melbourne Herald, Mr John Eddy, reported; 
One objection to using the gas stove and the light switch as 
taxing instruments is that it does not follow the principle of 
ability-to-pay. The household with a large family uses more 
light than a childless c o u p l e . ^ 
The same charge of regressiveness in the effects of the tax was echoed 
3 
by many other critics. But before the tax could be counted as 
obviously regressive there had to be some price increases. 
(ii) The tax will necessarily lead to price increases 
In fact, there was a price increase in the SECV. The 1966/67 
Annual Report announced a price increase, supposedly to raise funds for 
'capital development' [p.8]. In another section of the same report it 
was also announced that the reserves which had been set aside for 
capital development were depleted because of the introduction of the 
tax [p.5]. It appears that this camouflage was an attempt to dissociate 
This seems adequately borne out by a look at the Premier-Treasurer's 
Budget Speech on 9 September, 1964, when he announced the proposed 
State income tax, which was never called into being. He said: 
some way must be found to provide a permanent increase in 
our annual revenues to meet the growing cost of education and 
social services, and plans must be made to cover the further 
expansion and improvement called for by the people. 
When the 'public utilities tax' came'into being many critics recognised 
it as a general tax measure. The Business and Finance section of the 
Bulletin wrote: . , 
i^matter what else it may be called, Victoria's new education 
tax on the gross revenues of the two State instrumentalities is 
a flat-rate tax on gas, electricity and briquette users. 
[24 October, 1966] 
2 
Melbourne Herald. 24 September, 1966. 
3 
The Financial Editor of the Sydney Morning Herald wrote: 
All of Sir Henry Bolte's latest measures have been regressive 
in impact. That applied to his 'mystery tax' which turns out to 
be not a tax on payrolls or general turnovers but on electricity 
and metropolitan gas sales. [15 September, 1966] 
Mr Galbally said: The tax is harsher than accepted forms of income tax, because 
being an indirect tax, it takes no account of the 
and Llls on rich and poor alike. [Legislative Council. 28 September, 
1966] 
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the price increase and the tax. We will be dealing with this matter 
further in Chapter Ten when we discuss the role of self-financing in 
public utilities. 
Mr Chadwick, the Chairman of the Gas and Fuel Corporation of 
Victoria, was quoted as saying that it was obvious that '...any extra 
tax must be recovered from the customers'.^ Others were also of the 
opinion that the tax would have to be passed on to the consumers.^ 
Neither of these two lines of criticism were specifically related 
to the reasons given for the imposition of the tax in the Budget Speech. 
What can be said of these reasons? 
(iii) It is a tax to pay for education 
This was seen by some observers to be a political red herring and 
was not widely accepted. The emotive tone of the Premier-Treasurer's 
argument was obvious. In speaking to the second reading of the Public 
Authorities (Contributions) Bill, he said: 
There are some 900,000 domestic consumers, and the average 
increase in the electricity bill to each household would be 
less than $2 a year, or 4 cents a week. Is this a high price 
to pay for education?^ 
Even if the revenue raised did go to education the Government's 
statements completely ignored the question of where and how the burden 
would fall. The implicit assumption is that it is acceptable for 
electricity and metropolitan gas consumers (the tax applies to the 
publicly owned Gas and Fuel Corporation which operates primarily in the 
1 
Melbourne A g e . 24 September, 1966. 
2 
Mr Moss, Leader of the Country Party in the Legislative Assembly, 
said in debate: 
The Premier has said all sorts of things: he has contended 
that there will not necessarily be an increase in charges and 
so on. But who is going to pay this amount? Of course the 
consumer will pay it. [Legislative Assembly, 4 October, 1966] 
The Age gave quite an interesting report of the Premier-Treasurer's 
view of this matter. 
Yesterday Sir Henry said that he did not expect any immediate 
increases in gas and electricity prices as a result of his new 
tax. 
In any case the increases xvould be very small, he added. 
[Melbourne A g e . 16 September, 1966] 
3 
Victorian Legislative Assembly. 4 October, 1966. 
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metropolitan area) to contribute towards education throughout the State. 
The transfer payments between city and country, and from childless 
consumers to those with children is obvious. 
(iv) The tax compensates for the freedom these authorities have from 
other State taxes 
The implication of this statement is that if private companies pay 
tax so should public authorities. It was not detailed at any stage 
just how much money was involved in taxation exemptions for these bodies3 
but it is certain that the tax on total revenue as proposed would have 
more than covered any possible exemptions. The Financial Editor of the 
Sydney Morning Herald was quite correct in pointing out that: 
In fact,... Sir Henry's 3 per cent tax on the sales of these 
two bodies is much heavier than a company tax of 42% per cent 
on their profits would be. In each case, the tax on turnover 
would more than eliminate their profits entirely. [15 September, 
1966] 
In terms of the tax imposed on the organizations the argument of 
equal treatment carried little weight. The proposal appeared to be 
much harsher than the alternatives. But what about the last reason 
attributed to the Premier-Treasurer for the introduction of the tax? 
(v) Without some form of income tax there is a distortion of the 
'true costs' of these authorities' services to the community 
It is probably fortunate that this argument received little 
attention because any attempt to define 'true cost' would necessarily 
end up in vague value judgments in the political and ethical sphere. 
However, it is difficult to see how the imposition of an arbitrary tax 
of this sort could make up the difference between the reflection of 
the 'true' and 'false' costs of the services. 
Of the three basic arguments put forward in the Budget Speech, not 
one was capable of complete substantiation as an accepted reason for the 
imposition of the tax. How then can we explain it? The simplest answer, 
and one which is in accordance with the possible reasons given earlier 
in the chapter, is that it was a matter of political expediency in the 
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face of the Federal-State financial arrangements at that time.^ This 
might be supported by the Premier-Treasurer's often repeated query to 
his critics: 'Where else could the money come from?' 
Assuming the expediency argument is correct, is the tax a good or 
bad thing? It is impossible to say. Prices must increase or expansion 
slow down as a result of it. The nature of the tax is regressive, and 
if the benefits are spent solely on education it will be directly 
redistributive. But to make an assessment would first require a 
statement of the value judgments involved. To give an answer from an 
economic viewpoint would require information as to how the money was 
raised to pay the tax, and how the burden was shared among the consumers 
of the gas and electricity services. This is not an impossible task 
but it is certainly outside our scope here. 
For our purposes we can be sure of one thing. To anyone suggesting 
changes in the pricing structure of the SEGV there is the simple fact 
that in the future, large amounts of money have to be paid to the 
Consolidated Revenue of the State. This is an extra constraint to bear 
in mind when attempting to implement an economically efficient pricing 
system. 
If it is accepted that these taxes form part of the general tax 
structure of the State, there is also the possibility that the bases 
2 
of the taxes themselves are open to change in future budgets. 
1 
It should be noted that while this is the first tax of this particular 
kind, the transfer of profits to State Consolidated Revenue has precedents 
in the State Insurance Office and the Melbourne Harbour Trust. But neither 
of these have the same implications for the redistribution of income 
within the community. 
2 
The tax was increased from 3 per cent to 4 per cent in mid 1971 adding an 
estimated $3.5 million to the existing taxation payments. 
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Table 8.1 
Revenue of Victoria by the SECV 
Sm. 
Financial Year ended Brown Coal Royalty 37, Tax Total 
1965 0.475 _ 0.475 
1966 0.526 - 0.526 
1967 0.549 5.0 5.549 
1968 0.563 5.7 6.603* 
1969 0.562 6.3 6.982** 
Source: SECV Annual Reports 
The shortfall is $0.34m. owing from the previous year, 
** The shortfall is SO.lZin. owing from the previous year, 
2. Transfer of Profits to Employees or the General Public 
The second major way a public utility can indulge in indirect 
taxing or subsidising is by offering benefits to its employees (e.g. 
profit sharing) or to the general public, paid for out of the profits 
of the undertaking. These types of payments to employees are of little 
consequence in the case of the SECV, although it should be noted that 
it conducts quite valuable training facilities in the commercial, 
technical and managerial fields. 
In the case of transfers to the public, the SECV is much more active 
because its designated functions go further than simply the generation 
and distribution of electricity. It is also the body which registers 
electrical contractors throughout the State and approves standards for 
manufactured electrical goods. However, these functions are not very 
costly either. 
But there are three other activities which it undertakes on behalf 
of the general public which, in-total, are quite costly. These are the 
manufacture and sale of briquettes; the provision of public lighting; 
1 
This total is the amount paid to the Victorian Government. Payments 
are also made to other government agencies. 'The amount paid annually 
to Commonwealth, State and Municipal funds now exceeds $8.2m.' [1967/68 
Annual Report, p.8] In its 1965/66 Annual Report the SECV commented on 
the fact that the 11 Metropolitan Bulk Supply Councils were making a 
profit and transferring it to their Municipal Accounts. The SECV 
commented: '...these direct and indirect benefits to municipal funds 
now amount to nearly $1,500,000 annually.' [p.12] But the Commission 
cannot claim that such an amount is a subsidy. We have already pointed 
out in Chapter 6 that the SECV has no right to assume that it should 
'take over' these und'ertakings, 
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and the provision of special rates for hospitals and charitable 
institutions. We will look briefly at each of these in turn. 
Without knowing the details of the costs involved, particularly 
in the latter two, it is impossible to say if a subsidy is being paid, 
i.e. whether price is lower than the cost of providing the service. 
But it does seem that prices for these services are lower than the 
prices for ordinary commercial services and we will investigate the 
subjects on this basis. 
(a) Briquettes 
As well as electricity, the SECV produces a solid fuel known as 
briquettes. In their manufacture brown coal is dried (reducing the 
moisture content from approximately 60 per cent to around 15 per cent), 
and moulded, thereby making a solid fuel which is easily transported 
and stored, and on a weight-for-weight basis has a much higher heating 
value than brown coal. 
The SECV's first commercial venture into briquettes^ commenced in 
1925 in response to a feeling that it was desirable, and necessary, to 
create an enlarged source of solid fuel. This was felt to be particularly 
necessary for the needs of industry, to safeguard the State against 
shortages of imported black coal. Specifically, this meant shortages of 
black coal from New South Wales caused by industrial unrest in that State. 
Since then the venture has mostly operated at a loss. Table 8.2 
shows the losses on briquette manufacture which have been incurred since 
2 
that time. 
Good summaries of the colourful history of the Victorian briquette 
industry can be found in the following places: 
- the Report of the SECV on 'Further Development of the Briquette 
Industry based on the Brown Coal Resources in the Latrobe Valley'. 1947. 
- A Progress Report from the Committee of Public Accounts on the State 
Electricity Commission, 29 November, 1962. 
- The SECV Annual Report. 1961/62.pp.13-4. 
- Bruce McFarlane, Economic Policy in Australia [234.pp.100-4]. 
2 
Briquettes are sold commercially and are also used in the manufacture 
of electricity in metropolitan peak load thermal power stations. The 
'revenue' received by the briquette business from the latter use is 
dependent upon the particular costing practice used by the SECV. As well, 
exchanges of by-product steam between the two businesses at the coal 
fields also requires costing. In recent years changes in the costing 
method to favour the briquette industry (at the expense of the electricity 
industry) have been made. [See McFarlane.234.p.100]. As a result it is 
very difficult to gauge the 'true' annual loss made on the manufacture of 
briquettes. 
One of the rare estimates of the '...additional costs borne by the 
Commission because of the briquetting enterprise...' can be found in the 
(Continued p.118) 
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Table 8,2 
Financial Results of the Victorian Briquetting Industry 
Financial Sales, (Incl. Net Result Accumulated 
Year Electricity Profit or Loss at end of 
Generation) Loss Financial Year 
Tons $ $ 
1924-25 35,373 L 72,514 L 72,514 
1925-26 82,000 L 80,664 L 153,178 
1926-27 89,281 L 66,698 L 219,876 
1927-28 124,203 L 63,700 L 283,576 
1928-29 157,753 L 51,408 L 334,984 
1929-30 165,514 L 7,828 L 342,812 
1930-31 216,723 L 42,072 L 384,884 
1931-32 280,524 L 27,506 L 412,390 
1932-33 302,484 L 37,684 L 450,074 
1933-34 328,658 L 30,896 L 480,970 
1934-35 312,488 L 22,536 L 503,506 
1935-36 336,487 L 20,362 L 523,868 
1936-37 374,035 L 1-2,942 L 536,810 
1937-38 400,647 P 3,002 L 533,808 
1938-39 416,091 L 14,474 L 548,282 
1939-40 425,850 P 502 L 547,780 
1940-41 438,068 P 6,818 L 540,962 
1941-42 402,162 L 51,578 L 592,540 
1942-43 407,428 L 21,162 L 613,702 
1943-44 427,937 L121,740 L 735,442 
1944-45 442,580 L 94,374 L 829,816 
1945-46 491,441 L 47,988 L 877,804 
1946-47 459,322 L 86,866 L 964,670 
1947-48 536,802 L 36,182 LI,000,852 
1948-49 583,363 L 21,080 LI ,021,932 
1949-50 580,173 L 37,092 LI ,059,024 
1950-51 503,613 L118,260 LI ,177,284 
1951-52 537,540 L 69,736 LI,247,020 
1952-53 554,658 P 26,482 LI ,220,538 
1953-54 612,394 P121,136 LI ,099,402 
1954-55 581,594 P 39,870 LI ,059,532 
1955-56 632,263 P 19-, 08 2 LI ,040,450 
1956-57 597,732 P 34,746 LI ,005,704 
1957-58 645,254 P 48,640 L 957,064 
1958-59 624,933 P124,200 L 832,864 
1959-60 931,820 L214,948 LI ,047,812 
1960-61 1,743,425 L901,318 LI,949,130 
1961-62 - L826,288* L2 ,775,418 
* In its Annual Report for 1962/63 the SECV reported: 
For the financial year under review, the Commission's overall 
accounts include a loss of £413,000 in respect of briquette sales, 
after introducing a more favourable costing practice (at the expense 
of the electricity business) for by-product steam ex the Morwell 
Power Station. 
Since that time the SECV has been extremely reluctant to publish 
financial details concerning the briquetting industry. Its Annual 
Report now contents itself with supplying only tonnage details. 
2 (continued from page 117) 
Report from the Committee of Public Accounts [op.cit.p.49]. All things 
being taken into account, the estimated additional costs for 1961/62, to 
the SECV were $5 million. Of this figure, the loss on sales of briquettes 
as shown in Table 8.2, amounted to a rather minimal $826,000 
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A report by the SECV, in 1947, stated that: 
In 1943, the State declared, as a post-war objective, its 
intention to accept the responsibility involved in providing 
the State's fuel supply from local sources. [p.6] 
This 1947 Report was in response to a request by the Government as 
to what would be involved in: 
...enabling Victoria to achieve complete independence from 
N.S.W. black coal for general industrial use within, say 15 
years, and thereafter maintain that independence.^ 
On the basis of the SECVs report the Morwell Briquette project 
was authorised and the manufacture of briquettes was increased. In its 
report the SECV also made some suggestions concerning the financial 
arrangements which should operate in the future. In the past losses on 
briquette operations had necessarily been borne by electricity consumers. 
But now, they stated: 
...the Commission considers that, in view of the State's 
changed outlook, the time has arrived when the briquette 
industry should be financially independent of the electricity 
side of the Commission's business, especially as any further 
expansion of the industry is based on the fundamental need 
for a secure and reliable supply of fuel, from which the whole 
community, and not electricity consumers only, would benefit. [p.14] 
The SECV suggested that its overall financial position should be safe-
guarded from losses incurred on briquettes, and one of the suggestions 
it made was that if competition required the sale of briquettes at below 
cost price, such losses should be met out of Consolidated Revenue of the 
2 
State, and not from the SECV's own revenue. The Government agreed to 
this and the provision was included in the State Electricity Commission 3 
Act (No. 5272) of 1948, as Section 7 (1). 
At this point the stage was set for a situation where all the State 
would benefit and all of the State would pay. However, this was not what 
happened in practice. After seeking, and gaining, this concession the 
SECV continued to meet its losses on briquetting from electricity sales 
income. In fact, they did a complete about-face, and their 1961/62 
Annual Report stated that they had recommended, and the Government had 
approved, 
1 
Committee of Public Accounts.op.cit,p,8. 
2 
Ibid. p.10. 
3 
This was later incorporated into the State Electricity Commission Act 
(No. 6377) of 1958, as Section 16(5)(a). 
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(1) That the briquette business be treated as a financial 
subsidiary of the electricity business. 
(2) That losses on the briquette business should be met from 
the funds of the Commission and not recouped from 
Consolidated Revenue, as was envisaged in the legislation 
of 1948 establishing the Morwell Project. Unlike the 
situation in 1948, the State's electricity business is 
of such dimensions that in the future it can sustain the 
briquette business. [p.14] 
This appears to be contrary to the earlier argument in 1947. At that 
stage it appeared that their reasoning was that they should not be 
required to recoup losses themselves because it was not their duty to 
do so. It is difficult to understand just how such a change in their 
thinking could have taken place. 
The formal Government enactment reversing the decision made in 1948, 
was made in 'The State Electricity Commission (Contributions) Act' of 
1964. (This Act included the introduction of the royalty on brown coal 
to which we have previously referred.) As the Committee of Public 
Accounts, in 1962, recorded it: 
Your Committee are informed that since the Morwell briquetting 
plants commenced operations, any losses have been met from the 
funds of the Commission and not from Consolidated Revenue. [p.48] 
Such an action is difficult to explain, but it is not so much the reason 
which interests us here. Rather it is the fact that the SECV chose to 
subsidise the 'general public' from its electricity profits. What 
advantages does the 'general public' gain from this transfer? The 
Committee of Public Accounts attempted an evaluation of the advantages, 
and 'supposed advantages' [p.48], of the existence of the briquetting 
industry to Victoria. The important ones are listed below. 
(i) Economies of scale gained in coal winning and 
handling 
This was one of the 'supposed' advantages. On the basis of 
information supplied by the SECV, the Committee concluded that: 
At present it appears that there are dis-economies in the 
association of briquetting and electricity generation in the 
Latrobe Valley. These are to the financial detriment of 
electricity generation; furthermore, it is clear that these 
dis-economies are substantial. [p.50] 
1 
This rather peculiar conclusion is the result of some unique organizational 
problems in the coal winning sections of both enterprises. 
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(ii) Effect upon the fuel market 
The Committee concluded that if briquettes were withdrawn from 
the Victorian fuel market, the prices of the remaining fuels, mainly 
fuel oil (and black coal until the introduction of natural gas) would 
tend to rise. It also felt that the advantage of lower prices gained 
by producing briquettes, '...while it no doubt exists, is incapable of 
precise measurement'. 
(iii) Independent source of fuel 
We have already mentioned that this was the major reason for the 
introduction, and the later expansion, of the industry. 
In the 1940's there was a clear desire for an independent source 
of fuel to free Victoria from its dependence on New South Wales black 
coal, but the fuel market changed. Initially there had been little 
competition, and irregular and inadequate supplies of poor quality fuel. 
With the introduction of large scale oil refining (1955), and, later on, 
increased marketing activity by other fuels attempting to pre-empt 
natural gas, the market has become highly competitive. The result can 
be seen in the not inconsiderable losses on briquette production.^ 
The Committee concluded that briquettes were still an advantage 
to Victoria in that their production wuld give the State an alternative 
fuel if an 'emergency' were to occur in the State's fuel supply. It 
even felt that maybe the existence of the industry might be an 
'insurance' against the occurrence of such an emergency. 
In a broad sense, its value to the State must be regarded as 
immeasurably great. [p.51] 
(iv) Other advantages 
Other advantages to the State have been claimed as a result of 
having a briquette industry. These include:-
1 
Competition was not the only reason for the briquette industry being 
in a losing position. Shortage of loan monies delayed the date of 
production from 1955 to 1959, and the rapid conclusion of the Snowy 
Mountains hydro project made some of the estimates of demand for briquettes 
for peak load power generation quite unrealistic. 
122 
the increased employment which is created;^ 
through this, the inducement it offers to decentralization; and 
- the amount of freight which is paid to the not very profitable 
Victorian Railways for carrying briquettes,^ which exceeded 
$6m. in 1964/65.3 
All of the se advantages accrued to the citizens of Victoria, As a 
result of operating the briquette industry which gives these benefits, 
the SECV has incurred losses which it has met out of its own profits^ 
This must have resulted in extra charges being levied on the electricity 
4 
consumers throughout the State, 
(b) Public Lighting 
The sale of energy for public lighting purposes accounts for 
approximately 1 per cent of total energy sold and approximately 1 per 
cent of total revenue from electricity sales by the SECV. 1 
In a pamphlet entitled Victoria's Electricity Supply: Review of Future 
Development, by the Hon. G.O. Reid, M.L.A., Minister for Fuel and Power 
(issued by the SECV in September, 1966) the Minister said that 1400 SECV 
personnel were employed full-time in the briquette industry, and over 
5000, full or part-time, in the distributing trade or manufacture of 
briquette appliances [p.15]. But it should be remembered that in a 
situation of full, or near full, emplojTnent an increased demand for 
labour would be a rather dubious 'advantage'. 
2 
Cf. McFarlane [234.p.103]. 
3 
G.O. Reid, op. cit, p.15. 
The Minister said: 
The briquette industry makes a considerable contribution, 
now totalling over $6m. a year, to the Victorian Railways' 
freight revenue. This contribution, in 1964/65, was nearly 
10 per cent of the total revenue from goods traffic of all 
kinds and, as the average freight on briquettes was 3.56 cents 
per ton mile compared with 3.16 cents per ton mile for the 
total traffic, it is evident that briquette freight is a 
relatively lucrative part of the Railway business. 
In response to a letter requesting information, the Victorian Railways 
made the following information available. 
Revenue Received from the Carriage of Briquettes by the Victorian Railways 
Sm $m $m 
1960/61 6.3 1963/64 5.6 1966/67 5.8 
1961/62 6.1 1964/65 5.9 1967/68 5.2 
1962/63 5.4 1965/66 5.9 
4 
Some slight change in the economic position of the briquetting industry 
might result from some recent experiments in the sale of briquettes to 
Japan for manufacture into briquette char. These sales, however, were 
very small - less than 1 per cent of production in 1967/68. Plans are 
afoot for the establishment of a hard char and soft char manufacturing 
plant in Australia. 
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Since its inception the SECV has offered price inducements for the 
introduction of lighting facilities in parks and along walkways and 
roads. The supposed benefits offered to consumers providing public 
lighting have been in two forms. The first is through reduced tariffs, 
while the second is in the form of better and more efficient lighting 
for the same price. 
The rates offered are quoted per lamp per annum and include not 
only the energy cost but also the provision of the subsidiary equipment -
poles, brackets and lamp renewals and maintenance. This would make any 
cost dissections very complex. 
In 1961 a programme was initiated to replace all lOOW incandescent 
lamps with 2-20W fluorescent lamps, held to be superior in lighting 
ability, but the lOOW lamp rate was retained for them. The 1967/68 
Annual Report carried the announcement that a programme to replace all 
200W filament lamps with 3-20W fluorescent lamps was nearly completed. 
This changeover also did not entail any price increase. 
It is difficult to know if these changes represent a subsidy in 
any way. While lighting efficiency has increased and the price has 
remained the same, it is probably also true that costs have decreased 
as well due to the lower wattage of the new lamps. The probable case 
is that the public lighting tariffs, while not less than actual cost, 
are not required to contribute anything towards the cost of meeting the 
other social and political constraints. 
(c) Community Service Supply 
In 1932, the SECV announced 
A discount of 10 per cent to public hospitals subsidised by 
the State Government as shown in the annual reports of the 
Charities Board.1 
This was extended in 1963 to other charitable bodies subsidised by the 
Hospitals and Charities Commission, the Health Department and the Mental 
Hygiene Branch of the Health Department. 
In July, 1965, a new 'Community Service Tariff' was introduced to 
replace the 10 per cent discount scheme. At the same time the list of 
those eligible was extended to include practically all registered 
1 
SECV Annual Report 1931/32. p.27. 
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charitable institutions (the emphasis being on registration with some 
governmental body), Bush Nursing Hospitals, Churches and Church Halls. 
The details of the tariffs involved can be found in Appendix Five. 
Because of the diverse nature of the tariffs offered under this supply 
(five in all), it is nigh impossible to make any valid comparison of 
this service and other tariffs offered for other, more commercial, 
services. 
It is, nevertheless, not unlikely that the overall structure is 
based on the same 10 per cent discount on the Commercial tariff as was 
previously the case. 
3. Cross-Subsidization as a Form of Social or Political Activity 
The third, and last, way in which a public utility can assume a 
taxing or subsidising role, and thereby affect the distribution of 
income within the State, is cross-subsidization between groups of its 
consumers. 
This can be done among groups distinguishable by many different 
characteristics. For example, there may be reasons for wanting to 
subsidise industrial consumers at the expense of commercial consumers. 
This type of cross-subsidization, between classes of consumers, and 
the reasons for doing it are discussed in later chapters. 
In this chapter we are concerned mainly with the use of cross-
subsidization between consumers on a geographical basis. Two examples 
will be put forward. The first is the incongruous situation where the 
SECV is responsible for providing tramway services in Bendigo and 
Ballarat, two country areas of the State. The second is the 
implementation of uniform tariffs throughout the State. Both are tied 
up with aspects of the nature of the SECV which can best be seen in 
relation to its history and growth. 
(a) Tramways 
From a general point of view it is not relevant to say very much 
on this matter because its nature is so incongruous that it is difficult 
to imagine the problem in any other than its own specific context. 
However, the situation does lead to a redistribution of income within 
the State. 
When the SECV 'acquired' the electricity undertakings which were 
operating independently in Bendigo and Ballarat, the terms of the 
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acquisition included the acceptance of responsibility for the existing 
electric tramways operating there. Virtually since this time the SECV 
has attempted to divest itself of this responsibility on the grounds 
that it should not be responsible for the provision of transport 
facilities. 
As well, it has continually pointed out that these operations are 
run at a considerable loss which is being borne by electricity consumers 
throughout the State. The SECV has published the following figures 
showing the losses incurred on these operations. 
Table 8.3 
Year ended Loss 
30th June $ 
1964 361,400 
1965 431,828 
1966 453,937 
1967 472,243 
1968 487,035 
1969 478,152 
Source: Annual Report 1968/69 p.29. 
In the same report it stated: 'Since 1935 losses on the two systems have 
exceeded $7.5 million.' 
Opposition to the Government allowing the SECV to cease these 
operations is based primarily on the effect that such an action would 
have on the tramway employees (of the SECV) who are involved. To a 
smaller extent the argument of the tourist value of the 'antique' trams 
has also been considered.^ 
Regardless of the rights or wrongs of the situation the fact remains 
that to the extent of nearly half a million dollars a year the rest of 
the electricity consumers of the State bear some burden which enables 
two country centres to support a particular source of local transport and 
employment. This is done contrary to the wishes of the SECV and political 
2 
direction is the sole reason for its continuance. 
More information on the pros and cons of the situation can be found in 
a report by the SECV to the Government in June, 1967. The most recent 
date for the cessation of operations by the tramways is March, 1972. 
2 
'On 2 October, 1968, a motion that the proposed abandonment of the 
tramways at Ballarat and Bendigo be not allowed was passed by the 
Legislative Council. Thus the proposal to abandon the tramway services 
cannot proceed at present, but the Commission believes that it has become 
generally accepted that some form of transport must replace the trams 
very soon.' [SECV Annual Report 1967/68. p.27] 
(b) Uniform Tariffs 
126 
1 
The provision of tariffs which are uniform for each class throughout 
the State is closely linked with the provision of rural electrical 
facilities and the SECVs acceptance of the task of electrifying the 
State, even to remote areas. It would seem that it accepted this task 
along with the task of 'co-ordinating' and (or) 'unifying' the State's 
electrical network. 
2 
Uniform tariffs were introduced in January, 1965. The SECV's 
attitude towards uniform tariffs has not always been one of full support 
nor has the policy had the full support of all who have investigated the 
subject, 
The value judgment involved is that metropolitan dwellers should 
subsidise the living expenses of country dwellers. In this case it is 
not to be achieved by charging metropolitan dwellers a higher price than 
country consumers, but by charging a uniform price for both when the 
costs of supply are lower in the metropolitan area. (This cost difference 
is due to the generally higher density of consumers in the metropolitan 
area and their relatively close proximity to the major source of supply.) 
Two factors are involved in this subsidy. Firstly, the capital 
costs of extending supply to country areas are generally higher than in 
the city area. However, this aspect is not really part of the problem 
of uniform tariffs. It is more akin to the problems of capital raising 
which are dealt with in Chapter Ten, The second factor, and the one 
which will be discussed here, is the manner in which uniform tariffs 
subsidise the cost of consumption - the operating costs (particularly 
the extra costs of transmission losses and maintenance) - which are much 
higher in the country. 
As mentioned earlier, the SECV did not always publicly subscribe 
to the principle of uniform tariffs. Not long after the SECV's inception, 
public demands for uniform tariffs were voiced in country areas. In 
1922, in response to these demands, the SECV produced an eight page 
1 
A map of Victoria can be found in Appendix Six. 
2 
In an announcement on 3 September, 1964, the Premier-Treasurer of 
Victoria, Sir Henry Bolte, stated: 
Non-metropolitan SEC and Gas and Fuel Corporation rates will 
be reduced to the level of metropolitan ones to introduce 
uniform tariffs throughout the State. [From a report in the 
Melbourne Age, 4 September, 1964] 
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'Report on Charges for Electricity' which argued that such a scheme was 
impossible.^ It is obvious from the report that, at that time, they did 
not subscribe to the view that metropolitan consumers should subsidise 
country consumers. Their attitude was that such subsidies should be paid 
by the State and should not be a transfer payment between electricity 
users [p .8] . 
There are, of course, alternative ways, other than an internal 
transfer of funds, to accomplish the desired objective. The SECV stated 
some of them in a letter to a 'Board of Inquiry into Electricity Supply' 
in 1949. On page 40 of the Board's report is a copy of the letter, 
dated December 16, 1946, and below is an extract. 
The financial problem inherent in the future of Victorian 
rural electricity supply seems to involve a choice between 
the fixing of appropriate rural tariffs, the provision of 
a direct subsidy to the Commission by the State, or the 
adjustment of metropolitan tariffs, in particular, so that 
consumers will continue to be carried by the more densely 
populated areas of supply. 
Ultimately, the SECV has accepted the latter course mentioned, but 
other sources have either approved of, or openly advocated, one or other 
of the first two suggestions. The Board of Inquiry, just mentioned, 
concluded: 
In the Board's opinion, the proposed financial aid for 
extending supply in rural areas by an expeditious method 
should be a charge on Consolidated Revenue and not a tax 
on electricity consumers. [p.17]^ 
1 
The SECV made its attitude obvious on the very first page of this Report. 
We propose to show that however well-meaning such a propaganda, 
the principle of a flat-rate uniform rate is impossible of 
realization, and, even if it were possible, that it would 
speedily lead to the entire ruin of the State Electricity 
Scheme, that the net result would be a set-back to instead 
of an assistance to the industries of the State, that it is 
false in principle, that it really involves an attempt to 
secure benefits to a few at the expense of many, and that it 
is, from a business point of view fundamentally unsound. 
2 
There was a suggestion at that time that the Government pay a subsidy 
to the SECV to avoid an increase in country tariffs which appeared 
inevitable. The Board of Inquiry recommended against an action to 
subsidise consumption and the temporary subsidy, which would have 
amounted to approximately £120,000, was withdrawn. In its 1949/50 
Annual Report the SECV noted: 
...up to 30 June 1950, when the subsidy was withdrawn, £62,000 
had been credited to these consumers, but, as the Commission has 
not so far been reimbursed by the State, the sum is included 
as a sundry debtor item in the Balance Sheet. [p.18] 
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While this was in line with the SECV's earlier policy, this statement 
was in fact an opinion on the cost of capital extensions in country-
areas. As far as the energy cost per unit to country consumers already 
connected was concerned, the Board agreed that the SECV should 
...charge appropriate amounts for the services it renders... 
and that consumers should not be subsidised... all of whom 
should pay their proportionate share of costs even when 
tariffs are adjusted to meet rises... [p.39] 
These views were in direct conflict with the principle of uniform 
tariffs. 
The initial value judgment is that rural dwellers should be assisted 
financially. Two reasons might be given as to why this should be the 
case. The first is an economic argument for decentralization of industry, 
and the second a more emotional one of 'equitable' treatment for country 
consumers. Both, at one time or another, have been referred to by the 
SECV. It seems that they have held both of these views at different 
t ime s. 
Decentralization 
In its 1922 'Report on Electricity Charges', the SECV wrote: 
...the factors which determine the location of most industries 
depend far more upon proximity to raw materials, or labour 
supply, or markets, or ports, than upon the cost of power, [p.8] 
This argument is just as true today. The percentage of specified costs 
of production to value of output of factories in Victoria for 1964/65, 
are sho^ <rn below. 
Table 8.4 
Specified Costs -of Production 7o 
Materials used 55.0 
Fuel, Light and Power Used 2.2 
Salaries and Wages Paid 23.1 
Balance representing overheads, 19.7 
taxes, depreciation etc. 
100.0 
Source: 1967 Victorian Year Book p.405 
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If we assume that this 2,2 per cent represents all Fuel, Light and 
Power used in factories in Victoria in 1964/65, the major components of 
this item are: 
% 
Brown Coal 13.3 
Brown Coal Briquettes 10,8 
Fuel Oil 20,4 
Electricity 45.1 
Others 10.4 
100.0 
Source: 1967 Victorian Year Book p.401. 
It is obvious that the cost of electricity is only a very small 
part of the actual cost of production in the State.^ Admittedly, these 
figures are aggregated for the whole State and for all industries, but 
there is no reason to believe that the differences between country and 
city in these matters is so great as to change the basic conclusion. 
The very first step the SECV took towards uniform tariffs was made 
with decentralization in mind. This was in 1940 with the introduction 
2 
of the 'Special Industrial All-Purpose' tariff. 
This tariff was extended in 1946 when all industrial tariffs 
3 
throughout the State became uniform. In 1948, a uniform tariff for 
farms (excluding the Metropolitan area) was instituted. This, the SECV 
said; 
...represents a further measure of preferential treatment 
to those consumers in the country who are engaged in 
primary production.'^ 
1 
Similar figures for the United States, which show the same result, 
can be found in Vennard [222.p.168], 
2 
'Since the close of the year a Special All-Purposes tariff for industry 
has been introduced, having regard to the policy of establishing secondary 
industries in the country as part of war planning and post-war development. 
This special tariff applies to large industrial consumers wherever located 
within the boundaries of the State electricity system, and it is 
anticipated will be of marked advantage to those industrialists who 
contemplate large new or branch establishments outside the metropolitan 
area.' [SECV Annual Report 1939/40]. 
^ The SECV reported at the time that: 'By this decision no less than 
1,250 electricity consumers benefited to the extent of £23,000 per annum. 
[SECV Annual Report 1946/47, p.11]. 
4 
SECV Annual Report 1947/48, p,14. 
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These statements appear to be direct arguments for the support of 
decentralization through the use of subsidised electricity tariffs.^ 
But, as suggested earlier, because of cost factors, uniform tariffs 
would not be any great incentive to the creation of new industry in 
rural areas. 
When trying to understand the role of uniform tariffs it is 
probably more useful to look, at the part played by equity, or maybe we 
could call them political considerations. Particularly in the case of 
uniform Commercial and Domestic tariffs this will turn out to be more 
fruitful in finding reasons for their introduction. 
Equit;; 
The SECV seems to have placed a great deal of emphasis on its 
responsibility to 'co-ordinate and(or) unify' electrical activities 
throughout the State whenever it has made statements concerning uniform 
tariffs. Its more recent statements have implied that the ultimate 
discharge of this responsibility was the introduction of uniform tariffs 
No explicit statement seems to exist as to why this should be so. It 
is always there implicitly though, as in this statement in the SECV's 
1962/63 Annual Report. 
In reaching the objective of greater uniformity' in tariffs 
throughout the State, it is basic and equitable that the 
higher losses which inevitably will be incurred in rural 
areas be shared by all consumers in the metropolis. 
[Emphasis not in original] 
Practically all of the official statements appear to make this same 
judgment and one can only assume that there is a well accepted belief 
that rural dwellers should be subsidised; that uniform tariffs for 
electricity are a good way of doing this; and that the resultant 
redistribution of income and resources is acceptable. 
One other possible explanation needs to be mentioned. This is the 
possibility that the introduction of uniform tariffs had political 
origins. Such an explanation is in line with our view that the 
centralized nature of the organizational structure of the SECV leaves 
1 
In its 1962/63 Annual Report the SECV said: 'As an aid to 
decentralization of industry, the Commission introduced uniform 
industrial tariffs as far back as 1940'. 
See also the Report of the Board of Inquiry, 1949 p.11. 
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it more susceptible to political pressure than those that would exist 
in a more decentralized undertaking. 
This view has not been openly suggested by any authorities but it 
was argued by a lone letter writer, writing to the editor of the 
Melbourne Age, shortly after the announcement of the introduction of 
uniform tariffs. 
If the government is determined to buy votes in the country 
by supplying electricity below cost, it should at least show 
a pretence of honesty and grant a subsidy for the purpose. 
The present procedure will constitute the S.E.C. into a 
taxing authority so that the metropolitan consumer may be 
taxed to subsidise those in remote areas. Such a provision 
is neither sound nor honest. 
Of course it is impossible to say how much, if any, pressure was brought 
to bear by the Government. The decision, however, did have its political 
overtones. 
On 5 September, 1964, after the announcement of uniform tariffs, 
Mr Moss, the State Leader of the Country Party, was reported in the 
Melbourne Age as saying: 
[the]...decision is in line with the demands of the 
Country Party. Country people would welcome the decision. 
To follow this line of argument through to a conclusion would require 
an explanation of how party politics in Victoria is able to influence 
a semi-autonomous State Authority. This would be difficult to demonstrate 
and is also outside of the scope of our work. 
We have decided that uniform tariffs cannot be explained completely 
by economic arguments for decentralization, although this was the 
original argument suggested. Political influence may have been involved, 
and certainly there is an implicit value judgment that uniform tariffs 
are equitable. Probably all these elements are involved. 
Regardless of the motives, the final result means that the SECV is 
required to include a premium on the cost of consumption to metropolitan 
consumers to help alleviate the real cost to country consumers. And the 
cross-subsidization is not a little one. In reply to a question in the 
Legislative Assembly on 27 September, 1966, the then Minister for 
Electrical Undertakings, Mr. G.O. Reid, said: 
As a result, [of uniform tariffs] domestic and commercial 
consumers outside the metropolitan area benefited to the 
extent of $1,800,000 a year, based on consumption at that 
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time. On the other hand, the resultant increase in charges 
for domestic and commercial consumers in the metropolitan 
area and industrial consumption in all areas provided 
$11,200,000 of additional revenue to offset reductions in 
country tariffs and provide additional funds required by the 
Commission from the tariff review. 
The problem of raising capital through tariff increases will be dealt 
with in Chapter Ten, but it cannot be assumed that the difference 
between the two figures quoted above is solely for this purpose. The 
SECV was, in fact, subsidising rural consumption long before the 
introduction of uniform tariffs. Even when tariffs were higher in the 
country than in city areas, country costs were being alleviated through 
the use of a costing system which 'pooled' generation and transmission 
costs, so that the charge for electricity was the same for all branches 
regardless of the actual cost of making supply. In a Report in 1951, 
the SECV stated that: 
...for many years it [the SECV] has adopted the practice of 
pooling main generation and transmission costs, to the extent 
that each of its ten supply branches obtains electricity 
from the 'pool' at the same price. This practice has meant ^ 
a considerable advantage to consumers in the rural branches. 
It also reported that the losses sustained by country branches, which 
had been subsidised by revenue from the Metropolitan Branch, was 
£130,000 in 1948/49 and £138,000 in 1949/50 [p.8]. 
Before uniform tariffs were introduced the SECV did distinguish 
between different areas in its tariff schedules. As it acquired 
undertakings it set about simplifying the many different tariffs which 
were operating throughout the State. In 1944, apart from the Metropolitan 
tariff schedule. 
All country consumers [fell] within one or other of two main 
basic tariff groups. Ten years ago, there were 75 different 
tariffs in operation throughout the Commission's areas of 
supply: now there are only 17 standard tariffs. [p.11]^ 
The Royal Commission of 1947 reported that: 
...the cause of the difference between tariffs is the fact 
of differences of costs of supply to the several classes 
of consumers. [p.25] 
1 
Report on the Final Phase of the Rural Electrification of the State, 
by the SECV 31 August, 1951. p.7. 
2 
SECV Annual Report 1943/44. 
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In 1951 the SECV reported that: 
...through its tariff structure [it] is able to relieve 
and aid considerably the rural consumer.^ 
This statement is more akin to a statement of equity towards rural 
dwellers than an economic argument. And in 1958, when the SECV announced 
that in future there would be only two main tariff structures -
Metropolitan and Extra-metropolitan - this attitude appeared to be foremost, 
But some reservation as to the final programme was expressed in its 
1962/63 Annual Report. 
The Commission has reviewed periodically the possibility of 
applying metropolitan tariffs also to domestic and commercial 
consumers in extra-metropolit an areas, but so far it has been 
unable t o take this step... 
The application of uniform electricity tariffs would result 
in an immediate loss of revenue of over £2 million per annum.,. 
Rural supplies are already subsidised considerably from revenues 
received from consumers in the metropolitan area. 
It appears that this reservation was withdrawn, because in an announcement 
about a year later, 3 September, 1964, (less than a week before his 
budget speech, and less than a month before a South-East Province 
By-election) the Premier-Treasurer of Victoria announced that Non-
Metropolitan SECV, and Gas and Fuel Corporation rates were to be reduced 
to the level of Metropolitan rates to introduce uniform tariffs throughout 
the State. At the same time the SECV increased all prices to raise extra 
revenue. In its Annual Report dated 29 October, 1964, the SECV reported 
that: 
As such an increase in tariffs involved a major review of 
tariffs for all consumers, the Commission concluded that 
this was the time to adopt a single standard schedule of 
tariffs for each consumer class now served from the State 
system. [p . 15] . 
This does appear to be in some conflict with the statement expressed in 
the previous Annual Report. However, on 1 January, 1965, uniform 
tariffs came into operation. 
At the start of this chapter it was suggested that a public utility 
might have a social conscience which would lead it to undertake 
redistributions of income within the community. The introduction of 
1 
SECV's report on The Final Phase of the Rural Electrification of the 
State, p.8. 
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uniform tariffs might well be an example of this. As well, the 
possibility of political considerations being involved is also present. 
Even if they were, we saw earlier that there may be good cause to use 
a public utility to carry out political aims if, in fact, the use of 
the public utility leads to a more efficient, cheaper and easier way 
of achieving the social goal in mind - subject to full disclosure, of 
course. 
The long history of the move to uniform tariffs makes it clear that 
within the present environment, they must be accepted as part of the 
problem of devising a pricing system. 
4. Summary 
As well as costs, the SECV's pricing policy is required to take 
other considerations into account. Some of these considerations have 
been the subject of investigation in this chapter. We have not discussed 
the cost element in the prices, nor, apart from Section 3 on 'cross-
subsidization', have we touched on the methods used, such as price 
discrimination, to raise the extra revenue necessary to carry out these 
'social obligations'. 'Social' being interpreted here in its broadest 
possible sense. Rather, this chapter has listed, and attempted to 
explain, the quite diverse activities in which the SECV is involved. 
As far as cross-subsidization between groups of its own consumers 
is concerned, the SECV need not earn any profit overall. In this case, 
surpluses and deficits from different parts of the same business may 
simply cancel one another out. 
Direct information is not available from published records to show 
the actual extent of these cross-subsidizations. Nor has the SECV been 
very helpful in making information available.^ The following table is 
an extremely crude attempt to put together some estimate of the actual 
amounts involved. The figures are taken from different places and 
published at different times. 
1 
One possible reason for their reluctance to supply information on 
these matters is that they themselves do not have the information. It 
is possible that the present costing system used is unsuitable for 
calculating this sort of information. 
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Practice 
T r amway s 
Uniform 
Tariffs 
Table 8.5 
Cross-Subsidization Between Consumers 
Redistribution of income 
From 
all 
electricity 
consumers 
metropolis 
12. 
users of 
trams in 
Bendigo 
and 
Ballarat 
country 
Amount 
478,152 
Dom. and 
Commerc. 
Assistance 
2,000,000 
From 
' pooling' 
376,000 
Farm and 
Industry 
46,000 
Year 
1968/69 
1966 
1950 
1947 
The redistribution of income involved is from metropolitan consumers 
to country dwellers. The figures are taken from various SECV references 
which have presumably taken cost considerations into account, so the 
figures shown actually represent a redistribution. As can be seen from 
the table, a figure of $3 million per annum would be an extremely 
conservative one for the amount by which urban consumers alleviate the 
electricity costs of those consumers living in the country. 
To fulfil its other 'social obligations' it is necessary for the 
SECV to make a profit from its operations to pay the cost of the extra 
benefits it bestows upon the citizens of Victoria. Once again, the 
figures must be expected to be inaccurate in the finer detail, although 
the larger amounts have been taken from quite recent sources. The 
basic income redistribution in this case is from the electricity 
consumers to all the citizens of the State who partake of the benefits 
provided by the SECV in these ways. No attempt has been made to 
investigate how the burden is shared among the electricity consumers 
themselves but it will be pursued in a later chapter. 
Table 8.6 shows, very roughly, the extra revenue which has to be 
earned by the SECV so that the general public may benefit from the 
activities shown. The briquette figure is probably a very conservative 
one as we pointed out in the footnote on page 117. 
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Table 8.6 
Extra Revenue Requirements by SECV 
$m 
Direct Transfer to Government 
Royalty on Brown Coal 
3 per cent Tax 
Transfer to General Public 
Briquettes loss 
Public Lighting 
Community Service 
0.562 
6.3 
1 . 0 
Year ended 
June 
1969 
1969 
1963 
It should be noted that in the above table no amounts have been 
included for Public Lighting and Community Service. As was mentioned 
in the text there is some reason to believe that no subsidy is made to 
these groups. They have been included as transfers because their prices 
appear to be lovjer than for other equivalent classes. But it is 
probably only to the extent that they do not contribute towards the cost 
of covering the losses on the other activities. In effect, they are 
probably priced fairly close to cost. 
CONCLUSION 
If we assume that the value judgments behind the considerations 
mentioned in this chapter continue into the future, and that these 
'social' activities will continue to be carried out by the SECV, rather 
than by some other, more obvious government agency, then these 
considerations must become constraints in any attempt to impose an 
optimal pricing policy on the SECV. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
SOCIO-POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN THE ELECTRICITY 
INDUSTRY IN NEW SOUTH WALES 
In the previous chapter we noted that, to a certain degree, the 
SECV could be viewed as an integral part of the overall economic and 
socio-political structure of the State of Victoria. We offered the 
explanation that with a large, centralized undertaking, such as the 
SECV, it was easier, and possibly more efficient, for the Government to 
use the electricity as an avenue for redistribution of State funds to 
achieve some desired social or political goals. We did not deny that 
such a method may, in fact, be a realistic approach to the problem. 
However, the warning was given that this approach carried the danger of 
'hiding' certain taxes and subsidies. 
This chapter is intended to demonstrate how the approach of the 
industry in New South Wales is different to that in Victoria with regard 
to this sort of consideration. In Chapter Six we noted that the 
industry in New South Wales has three levels of organization. The 
generating body is the Electricity Commission of New South Wales (ECNSW); 
the coordinating body is the Electricity Authority of New South Wales 
(EANSW); and the retailing bodies are the local government County Councils. 
Some difficulties in the analysis are caused by this division of functions. 
Most of the finance to support any redistributions comes from the 
ECNSW and is distributed by the EANSW. In the past, they have been in 
the form of clearly defined subsidies, approved by Parliament, from 
especially ear-marked funds. This is in marked contrast to the situation 
in Victoria. There is, however, one author who feels that the extent of 
prior approval of policies in New South Wales is nowhere near as extensive 
as it should be. F. Maguire, in 1966, wrote: 
When making its recommendations for reforms in political and 
administrative control, the Herbert Committee, as it is 
known, emphasised the importance of the electricity supply 
industry by pointing out that it could be used as a device 
'for transferring income from one section of the community 
to another without the burden of these policies being 
properly weighed in Parliament or by the Minister.' 
This is precisely the manner in which the industry is being 
used here [in New South Wales] and with such serious 
consequences. [235.p.25] 
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H o w e v e r , as we will see, when this aspect of the New South Wales system 
is compared with the situation in Victoria, the New South Wales system 
does not appear to be as bad as Maguire makes out. Certainly this is 
so at the broad level of the operations of the ECNSW and the EANSW. At 
the local level though, it is much harder to get a clear picture of 
what is happening. With about 40 different organizations, each with 
different tariffs and outlooks, it is nigh impossible to recognise a 
common policy on most tariff issues. 
1. D irect Transfers to Government Funds 
(a) Royalties 
A royalty is paid on all coal mined in New South Wales. The ECNSW 
owns three subsidiary mining companies which produce roughly half of the 
coal requirements of the ECNSW. These companies operate as independent 
companies, paying taxes and royalties in the same manner as any 
privately owned mining organization. 
A request for information concerning royalties from the ECNSW 
brought a reply, part of which read: 
The Commission does not publish the production figures for 
these Colliery Companies and I am unable to provide you with 
details as of the annual amounts paid in the way of royalties. 
However, as a guide to your study, the total royalties 
paid by the three companies concerned have increased from 
about $130,000 p.a. in 1958-59 to about $275,000 p.a. in 
1967-68, 
From the Annual Reports of ECNSW it is possible to ascertain that these 
companies supply about half of the coal requirements of the ECNSW. 
These figures would lead us to believe that the royalties paid on 
coal used by the ECNSW would be about twice the amount quoted above, 
or about $%m. This belief is supported by a further indication from 
the ECNSW in the letter referred to above. 
The consumption of coal by the Commission is shown in our 
annual reports, and it would be a reasonable assumption 
that an amount of 10 cents per ton of coal produced is 
paid in respect of all coal supplied to the Commission 
by mining companies, whether owned by the Commission or 
not. 
In 1966/67 the consumption of coal in the power stations of the ECNSW 
was 5,563,090 tons. At 10c. per ton royalties would amount to 
approximately It seems fairly certain then that this figure is 
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a realistic one. Unlike the SECV, the ECNSW does not pay any royalties 
directly to the government. However, it does pay them indirectly through 
the collieries. 
(b) Local Government Assistance Fund 
This fund was established on 12th November 1963, and is 
credited with amounts equal to rates which but for exemptions 
would have been payable to local councils on land of certain 
State undertakings...The purpose of the fund is to assist 
Councils with essential works and to augment the Traffic 
Route Lighting Subsidy Account...Contributors to the fund 
are the State Brickworks, State Dockyards and the Electricity 
Commission of New South Wales.^ 
Table 9.1 shows the operations of the Local Government Assistance 
Fund since its inception. 
Table 9.1 
Year ended June, 1964 1965 1966 1967 
Receipts 
$ $ $ $ 
Balance b/fwd 153,570 260,944 404,432 
Contributions 
ECNSW 200,000 200,000 211,271 245,175 
State Dockyards 13,682 14,594 12,571 13,692 
State Brickworks 11,200 17,318 17,318 18,050 
224,882 385,482 502,104 681,349 
Pavments 
Transfers 
Traffic Route 
Lighting. Subsidy 
Account 71,312 90,654 95,672 99,598 
Grants to Councils - 33,884 2,000 32,000 
Balance 153,570 260,944 404,432 549,751 
Source: Reports of the Auditor-General of New South Wales to Parliament 
The ECNSW is the major contributor so the result is a transfer of funds 
from the electricity industry to the local government authorities for 
essential works and the improvement of traffic lighting throughout the 
State. This transfer can be seen to be currently running at about a 
quarter of a million dollars per annum. 
1 
Report of the New South Wales Auditor-General for the year ended 
June, 1964.p.87. 
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2. Transfers of Profits to Employees or the General Public 
There is no substantial transfer to employees made in the 
electricity industry in New South Wales. The industry is similar to 
that in Victoria in that it fulfils the role of watch-dog over electrical 
standards and the licencing of electrical operators, etc., but this does 
not take up a substantial part of the funds of the industry. There is 
one scheme, however, that fits into this category in which the 
electricity industry plays a major part. It concerns the operation of 
the Traffic Route Lighting Subsidy Scheme. 
Traffic Route Lighting Subsidy Scheme (TRLSS) 
The necessary authority to provide public lighting was originally 
vested in city, municipal and shire councils by the Local Government 
Act, 1919 (see Chapter Six ) and each local authority struck its own 
rate to suit its own costs and conditions of supply. This situation 
still exists today and many different rates apply throughout the State. 
In 1958 the EANSW set up a 'Street Lighting Committee' to 
investigate the subject of street lighting in New South Wales. The 
Committee recommended that assistance be given to local councils to 
improve the quality of public lighting on traffic routes throughout 
the State. In 1963, the Government established the Local Government 
Assistance Fund, part of which was to be used for the financing of the 
TRLSS. 
The basic purpose of the scheme [was] to achieve a reduction 
in the number and severity of night road accidents by 
improved traffic route lighting.^ 
The Scheme was implemented in May 1964 following the passing of the 
Electricity Development (Amendment) Act, 1964. This Act gave the EANSW 
the powers and duties of 
...promotion, extension and improvement of lighting of 
public roads, and the granting of subsidies to city, 
municipal and shire councils for the lighting of traffic 
routes to a standard approved by the Authority. 
The Scheme envisages a ten year programme costing in the vicinity of 
$14m.^ The funds for the programme came equally from the Commissioner 
1 
EANSW Annual Report 1963/64,p.48. 
2 
EANSW Annual Report 1963/64.p,48. 
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for Main Roads, the ECNSW, the New South Wales Treasury (Consolidated 
Revenue) and the Local Government Assistance Fund. Table 9.2 shows 
the extent of the operations of the scheme up to 1968. 
Table 9.2 
Traffic Route Lighting Subsidy Scheme 
Year ended June, 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 
S $ S $ $ 
Balance b/fwd - 285,250 647,585 1,019,774 1,362,864 
INCOME 
Commissioner of Main 
Roads 71,312 90,654 95,672 99,598 103,844 
ECNSW 71,312 90,654 95,672 99,598 103,844 
Consolidated Revenue 71,314 90,654 95,672 99,598 103,844 
Local Government 
Assistance Fund 71,312 90,653 95,672 99,598 103,844 
285,250 647,865 1,030,273 1,418,166 1,778,240 
PAYMENTS - 280 10,499 55,302 125,916 
Balance 285,250 647,585 1,019,774 1,362,864 1,652,324 
Source: EANSW Annual Reports 
We have already pointed out that most of the funds for the Local Government 
Assistance Fund come from the ECNSW. As a result we can say that nearly 
half of the contributions to the TRLSS come from the ECNSW. 
Naturally, payments under the scheme will take a few years to build 
up because of the need for quite detailed assessments of the projects 
for which applications for subsidies have been lodged. However, the 
principle is clearly established. Traffic route lighting improvements 
are to be carried out and the cost of this to be borne by the Department 
of Main Roads, Consolidated Revenue and the Electricity industry, with 
the latter bearing about half of the estimated total cost of $14m. 
In the individual local authorities there is little evidence that 
subsidies are being offered for public lighting via the rates charged. 
Assessments of costs and charges are not possible here, but the 
reasoning appears to be that costs should be covered and that within 
each undertaking the local government body responsible for public 
lighting should be charged the costs of providing the service. In other 
words, it seems that there is little other subsidy for public lighting, 
and the running costs of public lighting are being borne proportionately 
by those receiving the benefits within each local area. 
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It also appears that any equivalent of the Community Service Tariff 
(in Victoria) is on the same basis. Any benefits derived from such 
tariffs, wherever they operate, are paid for by the consumers in that 
particular region. 
This basic feature, that those who benefit pay, is due primarily 
to the overall organization of the industry in New South Wales. Views 
will differ as to whether it is a good or bad feature but it is 
certainly true that it prevents any large scale geographical 
redistributions of income taking place without them being noticed. 
3. Cross-Subsidization as a Form of Social or Political Activity 
Subsidization of rural electrical development in 
New South Wales 
Because of the division of the functions of generation and 
distribution in New South Wales, the burden of rural electrical 
development seems to have fallen more on the country areas themselves 
than it has in Victoria. The underlying principle in New South Wales 
is that rural areas should be self-supporting. However, costs to 
country dwellers are reduced in two ways. 
As in Victoria, the actual purchase price to the Council is 
subsidised by the use of 'pooling' arrangements to calculate the bulk-
supply price to each local authority. Regardless of how far away the 
supply point is from the generators, the same price, based on the 
average cost of supply to all points, is charged. This practice assists 
stability in bulk supply tariffs and all retail tariffs in the State. 
It is also recognised that it 'represents a substantial subsidy to 
consumers in locations remote from the load centres'. 
As well as this pooling arrangement there is a direct government 
subsidy for country electrical development. The idea of a rural 
subsidy was part of the Electrical Development Act, 1945 (Section 13). 
This Act was the one which set up the EANSW,^ There had been an 
earlier subsidy under the Local Government (Further Amendment) Act, 
1935, but it was not until August 1946 that the Rural Electricity 
Subsidy Scheme (RESS) was implemented. The EANSW, who were to 
administer the RESS, had a clear view of its aims. 
1 
The early history of Parliamentary action on a rural subsidy for 
electricity can be found in the 2nd Annual Report of the EANSW. 
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In its 2nd Annual Report it stated: 
The Authority is assisting the government to give effect to 
the latters policy of encouraging the establishment and 
expansion of secondary industries in country districts and 
of continuing to foster the decentralization of the 
population. [p.6] 
The initial scheme allowed for a maximum subsidy, to be paid over ten 
years, on schemes not costing more than $500 per consumer to be served. 
In 1952, 1956 and 1959 the terms became more generous, both with regard 
to the length of time of payment, now 15 years, and the upper limit per 
consumer, now $1600 per consumer to be served by each scheme. The 
increases to the limit of the subsidy have been brought about by the 
increasing cost of extensions as supply goes to more remote consumers. 
The EANSW gets its general funds from Consolidated Revenue. These 
funds are to cover the cost of administration, etc. The funds to finance 
the RESS, in recent years, have come equally from the ECNSW and 
Consolidated Revenue, and are disbursed by the EANSW. Table 9.3, which 
shows the amount of subsidy actually paid under the RESS, also shows the 
revenue received by the EANSW to cover both the RESS subsidy and the 
administrative costs of the EANSW. 
Up to 1958 the contributions from the electricity supply authorities 
came from the original suppliers. In 1958 the last of these suppliers 
was acquired by the ECNSW (see Chapter Six) and a new system of payment 
(half the RESS requirement) was instituted. In the past the Government's 
direct contribution to the RESS was included in its total grant to the 
EANSW, which included a payment for administration expenses as well. In 
1967 the administration payment came directly from Consolidated Revenue 
but the payment for the RESS came from the General Loan Account. As far 
as the RESS is concerned the funds come equally from the Government and 
the ECNSW. 
There is an additional scheme to help country electrical development 
in New South Wales. It is known as the '$6 Million Special Assistance 
Scheme'. This Scheme is complementary to the RESS and became operative 
in the year 1967/68. Through this Scheme it is intended to distribute 
$6m. over a period of five years to Councils engaged in rural 
electricity development. 
Table 9.3 
Rural Subsidy and Total Income - EANSW 
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Subsidy $'000 Income $'000 
Year 
ended 
June 
R.E.S.S. 
Paid Progressive^ 
Consolidated 
Revenue 
Contributions 
from 
Electricity 
Total^ 
Income 
Supply 
Authorities 
1947 20.3 124.0 68.3 198.3 
1948 85.1 105.4 37.0 169,0 217.3 
1949 202.7 308.1 25.6 270,4 311.4 
1950 298.3 606.5 55.8 338,0 411.6 
1951 378.6 985.1 131.6 338,0 489.4 
1952 485.3 1,470.5 240.6 338,0 602.6 
1953 510.1 1,980.5 271.0 338,0 634.5 
1954 734.3 2,714.8 600.0 338,0 965.1' 
1955 905.2 3,620.0 650,0 338,0 1,086.8 
1956 1,165.8 4,785.8 730.0 338.0 1,095.6 
1957 1,080.0 5,865.8 730.0 540,0 1,292.7 
1958 1,301.8 7,167.6 835.9 650.9 1,509.6 
1959 1,236.0 8,403.6 780.0 618,0 1,444.8 
1960 1,276.3 9,680.0 844.2 638.2 1,545.2 
1961 1,308.4 10,970.3 912.0 645,2 1,610.9 
1962 1,304.2 12,274.5 850.0 652,1 1,559.8 
1963 1,341.1 13,615.5 944.0 670,5 1,681.1 
1964 1,380.0 14,995.5 1,001.5 690,0 1,758.3 
1965 1,460.0 16,455.5 1,104.0 730,0 1,905.9 
1966 1,569.9 18,025.4 1,183.9 784,9 2,044.3 
1967 1,640.0 19,665.4 416.2; 820,0 2,161.1 
1968 1,720.0 21,385.4 474.5^ 860,0 2,277.5 
Source: EANSW Annual Reports 
Some arithmetical accuracy has been lost in the rounding off, 
2 
Contribution for administration only. A further $820,000, to match 
the ECNSW (RESS) contribution, came from the General Loan Account. 
Similarly, $860,000 was received in 1967/68. 
3 
The extra income to make up the total income comprises Fees and 
Miscellaneous Income. 
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While the RESS is developmental in its objective 
The purpose of the Special Assistance Scheme... is different 
in that it is designed to assist in reducing the financial 
burden of councils which have undertaken rural developmental 
work.1 
The money to finance the Scheme comes from the ECNSW, and the Scheme 
requires SI. 2 million per year for the next five years. It is obvious 
that these funds will have to come out of the surplus earned by the 
ECNSW and are therefore quite relevant when setting a bulk-supply price 
However, while the Government is openly subsidising the cost of 
capital development in rural areas, and subsidising running costs 
through the 'pooling' arrangement, neither it nor the EANSW have ever 
contended that equality of retail prices should prevail over the whole 
state. 
The important flows of finances are illustrated in Figure 9.4, 
The 'bulk-supply tariff pooling arrangement' results in a flow of 
assistance from metropolitan councils to country councils. 
Figure 9.4 
TRLSS 
Electricity Development Account (mainly RESS) 
Other flows 
EANSW Annual Report 1967/68.p.25. 
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Table 9.5 gives some idea of the actual amounts involved. It 
outlines the pajrments made by the ECNSW. 
Table 9.5 
$ 
The ECNSW pays - RESS 860,000 (1967/68) 
TRLSS 103,844 (1967/68) 
Local Govt. Asst. Fund 245,175 (1966/67) 
Royalties 500,000 (approx.) 
1,709,019 
This figure represents only that part of the policies of the Government 
for which the electricity industry is responsible. Figure 9.4 
illustrates that there is a substantial amount contributed by other 
agencies as well. In contrast to the Victorian situation the amounts 
shown above are readily available from published reports and are, in 
the m a i n , determined by specific Parliamentary action. 
Is it possible to see which sections of the community bear the 
burden of the subsidies that are paid? By its method of implementation 
the Government has decided that the general public at large should bear 
about half the burden while the other half is borne by the electricity 
consumers of the State through the bulk-supply tariff and the individual 
local tariffs. This second half of the burden is very hard to quantify. 
However, in contrast to Victoria, it is clear that a large part of the 
burden of rural electricity development is borne directly by those who 
receive the benefits. 
The SECV uses the more indirect method of uniform tariffs in its 
subsidy to rural dwellers. We saw in the last chapter that there was 
no definite statement of the ethical valuation behind this action in 
Victoria. In New South Wales there is such a statement. It supports 
the EANSW's opposition to uniform tariffs. 
[There will be] costs associated with construction and 
maintenance of the more expensive rural distribution lines 
which will make the total cost of rural supply higher than 
that of town supply. The Government's rural electricity 
subsidy scheme was introduced primarily because of this 
fact and the subsidy...helps considerably to meet the 
higher costs of supply in rural areas. Nevertheless, it 
is impossible to bridge the gap between the costs of supply 
in to\m and country areas entirely so...tariffs applied 
in rural areas are nearly always somewhat higher than those 
in town areas. That is to say, common costs...are equitably 
shared and the other costs directly attributable to 
particular classes of consumers are allocated accordingly. 
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It is reasonable to expect that a county council 
consisting of representatives of shires and municipalities 
would adopt a tariff policy in accordance with these 
generally accepted principles.^ 
A large part of the contrast between this policy and the policy of 
the SECV can be explained by the differences in their organizational 
structures. Their different tariff policies and attitudes to country 
areas are, in part, the outcome of these differences. 
The centralized structure of the SECV leaves it more open to 
persuasion from outside in the acceptance of ethical judgments concerning 
the social and political considerations we have mentioned. The spread of 
control in New South Wales makes it more difficult for the electricity 
industry to play such a large part. We have pointed out in Chapter Six 
that there may well be times when the implementation of government 
policy, adequately explained and spelled out, can be more efficiently 
and cheaply carried out through the agency of a semi-government authority. 
The danger of course lies in the future independence of that same 
authority. 
We are left finally with two points in the development of our 
thesis. The centralized nature of the industry in Victoria has led it 
under the influence of the Government to a marked degree, and the SECV 
can now be seen as an integral part of the State Government's continuing 
economic programme. The same is nowhere near as true of the industry 
in New South Wales. We have also traced out the history and development 
of the two organizations and the social and political roles they play in 
the community. It is obvious that these heritages from the past must 
also be included in any suggested changes in their pricing policies. 
1 
Report on the Organization of Electricity Supply, EANSW April 3, 1957. 
p.16. A further statement can be found in its 1962/63 Annual Report. 
In reply to requests for more assistance to country areas, the EANSW 
OTote: 
The Authority has reached the conclusion that adequate 
incentive to [country] electrical development is derived 
from the following:-
(a) present assistance from government subsidy 
(b) uniform bulk supply tariff of Electricity Commission 
of New South Wales 
(c) taxation rebate allowance in respect of electricity 
loan rates paid 
(d) the assistance from local electricity revenues 
(e) the enhanced values of properties brought about by 
the provision of electricity supply. [p.16] 
This attitude is different to the one held in Victoria where it would 
appear country consumers receive relatively more assistance. 
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CHAPTER TEN 
FINANCING CAPITAL EXPENDITURE FROM REVENUE 
In most economies the electricity industry is one of the largest 
single users of capital. The manner in which the capital is raised 
varies from place to place. Our major interest in this chapter is the 
use of surplus funds from revenue to meet the needs of capital 
expenditure. 
Sometimes the Statutes setting up the industry give 'rules' under 
which the financial affairs of the industry should be conducted. For 
example, the electricity industry in Britain presently has three 
financial obligations.^ 
(a) All deficits should be covered, not necessarily 
in the year in which they occur, but over a 
defined number of years. 
(b) Provision should be made in the accounts to bring 
depreciation based on historical costs up to the 
level of depreciation based on replacement values. 
(c) Reserves should be set aside which are large enough 
to allow a contribution to capital development and 
to be a safeguard against premature obsolescence 
and similar liabilities. 
Neither of the industries in Victoria or New South Wales have anything 
like this statutory control over their financial requirements. Only 
two sections of the Victorian Act (No.6377) even vaguely refer to 
these matters. Section 81 requires that a 'full and faithful' record 
of the SECV's accounts be kept and normal reports, etc. be made. 
Section 85 appears to be.more of a 'free hand' statement than an actual 
requirement. 
The Commission may in respect of its works and undertakings 
establish such reserve funds for renewals or depreciation 
as it thinks fit... 
There is, however, one Parliamentary control which is of some 
importance. The SECV is limited to a statutory maximum to its 
More detail concerning the financial obligations of the electricity 
industry in Britain can be found in the 1963 Select Committee Report 
of Nationalised Industries - Electricity Industry [para.138+], and in 
the Command Paper on the Financial and Economic Obligations of the 
Nationalised Industries [para.19]. More recently see Cmnd Paper 3437 
(HiMSO, London, 1967). 
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borrowings. Each time this limit is required to be increased a Bill 
has to be introduced into Parliament. This practice allows some very 
limited discussion of the financial operations of the SECV but it is 
uncommon for the Bill not to receive the approval of the Parliament. 
In New South Wales the statutory control of the financial operations 
of the industry is similarly very weak. Because the EANSW is only a 
coordinating body we would not expect to find much regulation in the 
Electricity Development Act of 1946.^ The Electricity Commission Act, 
1950 (Act No. 22.1950), setting up the ECNSW, might be expected to 
contain more guidance, but it is just as open-ended as the Victorian 
one. Section 53 requires the ECNSW to keep 'true and regular accounts' 
in respect of each of its 'funds'. Section 54 would appear to be the 
only section even approximating a financial requirement and it is 
peculiarly open-ended. 
The expenditure of each fund shall...be charged against 
income and capital as nearly as may be in accordance 
with commercial principles. 
In fact there is no direction or guidance from the State, in either 
Victoria or NSW, which specifies the obligations of the industry in this 
matter. 
It is not an easily understood subject. Outside of the industry 
there is probably very little knowledge of the problem. One matter 
which needs clarification is the meaning of the term 'surplus'. 
Normally it is that part of the revenue left over after paying all 
expenses and allowing for all costs. An element of contention enters 
the discussion when we come to define depreciation because an 
excessively accelerated depreciation allowance reduces the accounting 
value of the 'surplus' without diminishing the funds available for the 
internal financing of capital projects. 
We will see shortly that this has happened in the SECV. But it 
is not only in the SECV. The practice is widespread in public utilities. 
Wickham reports that similar problems arise in France where one of the 
tasks of the administration is to 
1 
The retailing bodies are controlled under the New South Wales Local 
Government Act. Under this Act there are no specific requirements 
concerning internal financing. 
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...discover or prevent accounting subterfuges designed 
to increase the public enterprises financial resources 
without the central Authorities becoming aware of the 
fact. [317.p.333] 
There is one obvious reason for wishing to hide such a surplus. 
It hinges around the fear that the existence of the surplus might be 
misunderstood by those who do not fully understand the nature of the 
investment process involved. Lord Citrine, in 1952, wrote about the 
British industry 
The existence of large reserves might create erroneous 
impressions as to the financial position of the industry 
and might encourage demands for reduced tariffs, [p.52] 
Prof. Edwards expressed the same view a number of years later. His 
particular concern was over the use of the term 'surplus'. He felt 
sure that it would give the wrong impression to both consumers and 
2 
unions. Later the industry in Britain did change over to the use of 
the term 'Balance of Revenue' rather than 'surplus'. 
When we come to look more closely at the SECV we will see that it 
need not only be the consumers and unions who may wish to take a share 
of the 'surplus' but also the government of the day. 
Techniques such as accelerated depreciation make the measurement 
of the surplus very difficult. It is far easier to avoid this problem 
altogether and look only at the gross profit. The British electricity 
industry is often cited as an example where approximately 50 per cent 
of capital works are financed from revenue. This does not mean that 
50 per cent of capital works are financed from surpluses. The 50 per 
cent includes depreciation allowances. It represents, in a sense, 
3 
gross profit rather than a surplus. 
1 
The Rt. Hon. Lord Citrine, Efficiency in the Nationalised Industries 
Published for the Institute of Public Administration by Allen and Unwin. 
1952, [Chapter 4, 'Electricity Supply']. 
2 
See Prof, Edwards in Hanson [186.p.255]. 
The 1963 Select Committee also commented on this problem. They 
reported: 
They [witnesses] also observed that the policy of higher 
surpluses carries its own dangers. Several witnesses 
pointed out that these large earnings would attract 
the attention of both the Trade Unions and the consumers 
of electricity, [para.159] 
3 
The figure of 50 per cent has also been given for the electricity 
industry in New Zealand, See Quarterly Survey, Australia and New 
Zealand Bank Ltd, July 1969. p,19. 
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In the Electricity Council's Annual Report for 1965/66 the 
following breakdown was given.^ 
CAPITAL EXPENDITURE 1965/66 (£m) 
Requirements 
Area Boards and CEGB 594,5 
Financed from 
Internal Resources: 
Depreciation 179.3 
Balance of Revenue 84.7 (14.2%) 
Contributions 13.0 277.0 (46.4%) 
External Sources 317.5 594.5 
It is really only the 14.2 per cent which represents the use of 
surpluses for capital development. On the assumption that the 
depreciation charge is 'fair and reasonable' depreciation would 
normally be a section of costs and only the balance of revenue would 
be relevant. Also of importance is the degree to which the earning of 
this surplus increases overall and particular prices. The effect of 
this £84.7m can be seen from the following extract of the Trading 
Account of the industry. 
£m % 
Depreciation 176.7 17.6 
Interest 150.6 15.0 
Balance of Revenue 84.7 8.4 
(Other items) 608.5 59.0 
Total 1020.5 100.0 
In simple terms this means that consumers, as a body, were paying 
approximately 8 per cent more than they would have been paying if no 
provision for a degree of self-financing was made. This example is 
adequate for our purposes but it does over-simplify the problem. To 
accurately estimate the price increase we would need to compare the average 
price with internal financing with the average price without internal 
financing. In the above example there are three factors of uncertainty:-
1 
We are indebted to Mr Ken Muir, Development Engineer for the EANSW, 
for the figures quoted above and also for advice tendered on this 
subject in a number of discussions. 
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(a) Depreciation - Is the figure quoted a reasonable measure of the 
cost of wear and tear and obsolescence, or is it an inflated figure? 
(b) Interest - Is there an imputed interest charge included as the 
'cost of capital' raised internally, and if so, how does this charge 
compare with the interest charge if the capital had been raised 
externally? and 
(c) Balance of Revenue - What would happen to total revenue if a 
price change resulted from the change to a different method of raising 
capital? This last factor would require some estimation of price 
elasticity before an answer could be found. 
Does economic theory give us any help in deciding what should be 
the level of internal financing for public utilities? It seems not. 
There is nothing in the theory of peak load pricing. It is also 
difficult to reconcile internal financing with the general welfare 
model because it is not possible to have internal financing in a 
perfectly competitive situation. To use this form of financing there 
must be a degree of monopolistic power in every industry which uses it. 
This lack of a theoretical treatment of internal financing in 
publicly owned utilities does not mean that a number of people have 
not been prepared to suggest what should be done. An incredibly wide 
variety of suggestions have been made at various times and a number of 
them are repeated in Appendix Three. One of the suggestions is that if 
all industries increase prices by the same percentage an efficient 
allocation of resources might result. Apart from its similarity to 
the proportionality thesis in the marginal cost argument, this 
suggestion has implications for all parts of the system. There would 
need to be (a) a degree of monopolistic power within each industry and, 
by implication from the need for internal financing, (b) a degree of 
imperfection in the capital market. 
Each firm's need for internal financing will depend on the 
particular imperfections which exist in the capital market, while its 
ability to finance from internal funds will depend on its monopolistic 
power to raise prices. We might normally expect that each of these 
factors will vary from firm to firm and industry to industry. As a 
result a general theoretical solution to an optimum degree of internal 
financing is impossible. 
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One other method of approaching the problem is to ask what is the 
correct allocation of resources between the public and private sectors. 
Quite often the electricity industry is in the public sector so this 
approach appears to be reasonable. But here again, economists have not 
presented anything like a united view.^ One proposal, which is rather 
similar to the one we looked at previously, is that the rates of 
reinvestment in the public sector should be of roughly the same 
magnitude as those in the private sector. Marglin has made strong 
opposition to the suggestion of comparing the public and private 
3 
sectors. 
Indeed I should hope it superfluous to add at this 
point that private sector rates of return and 
depreciation policies are totally irrelevant to the 
formulation of public sector pricing policies. 
[100.p.92] 
Meek, while opposing a direct relationship between policies in the 
public and private sectors, does not condemn the practice completely. 
He believes one reason why a comparison is not valid is because 
...the number and nature of the goals of economic activity 
are so very different in the two sectors. [101,p.114] 
On the other hand, the rate of surplus in the private sector is 
...one of the pieces of evidence - [although] by 
no means...the most important one - which public 
price makers should take into account when formulating 
their policies. [101.p.114] 
In 1956, the Herbert Committee was prompted to report: 
The whole controversy, of course, is complicated by arguments 
amongst economists as to what is, theoretically, the correct 
pricing policy for the public sector to pursue. 
2 
This proposition was put forward in a British government White 
Paper in 1961 [Cmnd. 1337]. R.L. Meek has discussed the paper and 
its implications [101.p.113]. 
3 
It is interesting to note at this point that Marglin is in favour of 
large transfers of resources to the public sector. Under certain 
conditions he supports the use of price discrimination to carry out the 
transfer: 
...provided the marginal propensity to invest revenue in 
the public sector is higher than the marginal propensity 
to invest income in the private sector, reinvestment 
considerations dictate prices for publicly produced goods 
as high as the 'traffic will bear' in order to transfer 
resources from private to public control and hence from 
consumption to investment, [100.p.58] 
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In terms of the general welfare model and a Paretian optimum there 
is no optimum level of self-financing in a public utility or for the 
public sector as a whole. We are not in a position to make statements 
about what should be done. Professor Sir Ronald Edwards, the then 
Chairman of the Electricity Council in Britain, said 
He would be a bold man who would argue that in this 
matter there is one clear principle that ought to 
override all other considerations; he would be equally 
bold to argue that the conflicting situations, when 
weighed, would lead to one defensible decision so far 
as the earning and retention of surplus revenue is 
concerned. [186.p.252] 
But this does not mean that as economists we are at a complete loss. 
From our analysis here we should be able to describe the present position 
of an undertaking and, rather than saying what should be done, say what 
can be done and what are likely to be the results of the alternatives 
which are available. 
The analysis in this chapter is aimed at this goal. We start with 
the only model we have been able to find which directly relates this 
problem to the electricity industry. It was put forward by W.G. Johnstone 
in a paper given at a conference in New Zealand in 1966 [95]. 
The analysis is very restricted applying itself to the cash flows 
within the industry and ignoring any of the wider implications of the 
policies advocated. But it is of interest because it allows us to 
introduce all of the important factors relevant to this problem in the 
SECV. 
Assume that we are examining an electricity industry which has a 
real annual capital growth rate = R and an interest rate at which the 
firm can borrow = I. Johnstone argues that: 
If the capital outlay of an authority is increasing at an 
approximately constant annual percentage rate, and this 
percentage rate of increase is greater than the percentage 
rate of interest payable on loans raised, then the use of 
loan finance for capital expenditure will result in smaller 
annual capital charges than if capital is provided directly 
out of revenue. [p.48]^ 
1 
In discussions with the SECV a surprising similarity was found between 
their theoretical approach to the problem and Johnstone's approach. The 
same conclusion was arrived at but with one difference in their aims. 
In the case of the SECV the over-riding aim was to keep prices to an 
economical minimum, a requirement which they feel is imposed upon them 
by their charter. (continued p.155) 
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That is, if R is greater than I, then the use of external rather than 
internal finance, will result in savings in the annual capital charges. 
Table 10.1 helps to illustrate this proposition. It depicts a 
situation where R = I and the capital charges from either method are 
the same. There are two necessary assumptions in Johnstone's model. 
First, he assumes that with the use of internal financing the capital 
charge in any one year is the 'annual capital expenditure' [p.46] 
thereby excluding any imputed interest, and second, the criterion of 
the best course of action is that which brings about the least annual 
cash outlay. In a wider analysis neither of these would be acceptable. 
Table 10.1 
Johnstone's Model with R = I 
Period 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Capital Stock ($) 
R=10 per cent 10,000 11,000 12,100 13,310 14,641 16,105 17,716 
Capital charge if 
internal 
financing used ($) 
1,000 1,100 1,210 1,331 1,464 1,610 1,771 
1=10 per cent 
Interest payments 
if loans raised 
over 5 years ($) 
Repayment of 
Principal 
100 110 
100 
121 
110 
100 
133 
121 
110 
100 
146 
133 
121 
110 
100 
1,000 
161 
146 
133 
121 
110 
1,100 
Capital charge if using loan finance ($) 1,610 1,771 
Apart from these assumptions Johnstone reaches his conclusions 
because he makes the implicit assumption that the rate of profit in the 
industry (P) is equal to the rate of growth of the industry (R). (it is 
implicit that prices can be raised as required.) 
1 (continued from p.154) 
However, this aim is very similar to that of Johnstone's of seeking 
a course which leads to the lowest annual capital charges. The result 
is the same. If the rate of growth of requirements is greater than the 
rate of interest then borrowing is the preferred course. 
On the practical side, it was admitted that institutional imperfections 
in the capital market dictate a certain degree of internal financing, 
even though this may be contrary to the preferred course. 
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His conclusion that the undertaking should borrow if R is greater 
than I might well be true in the absence of imputed interest. He is 
also saying that the firm should borrow when P is greater than I. This 
particular statement only tells us that the firm should invest and not 
whether it should borrow or use internal funds for this purpose. 
The converse case of R (=P) less than I highlights the problem in 
Johnstone's model. His conclusion is that where I is greater than R the 
firm should use internal funds. But when I is greater than R it is also 
greater than P in his model and the firm should not be investing at all 
according to normal economic principles. The danger in Johnstone's 
argument is that where internal funds are regarded as 'free' capital 
the relationship between the rate of return and the rate of interest 
is ignored. 
The problem of the choice between internal and external funds goes 
much deeper than Johnstone's formulation. As well as the relationship 
between R and I, we need also to take account of the relationship 
between P and I, and P and R. In fact, it is these latter relationships 
which establish the only valid link between R and I, 
A closer study of these three variables will allow us to get a 
clearer view of the problems associated with the use of internal and 
external funds. The variables are very general though and only allow 
us to draw an outline of the situation. 
It is possible to make 13 different rankings of the three variables 
P, R and I. We have listed these in Table 10.2, and in Figure 10.3 we 
have expressed them in the form of a diagram constructed around the two 
major relationships mentioned above, P and R, and P and I. 
Table 10.2 
(1) R > P > I (6) R > P =I (11) p< R< I 
(2) P > R > I (7) R< P =I (12) R> I> P 
(3) p= R> I (8) R= P= I (13) R= I > P 
(4) P > R = I (9) R< P< I 
(5) P > I > R (10) P = R < I 
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Quadrant A 
(9) 
4 W -
Figure 10.3 
P 
R 
Quadrant B 
(5) 
(4) 
(2) 
- m -
P 
I 
(11) 
(12) 
(13) 
Quadrant C 
1. 0 
(1) 
Quadrant D 
Before we go into the details of these relationships we should 
explain the meaning of the variables in a little more detail. 
What is R? R is the rate of growth of fixed assets expenditure at 
constant prices. The cause of the increase will be found either in 
an increase in the number of consumers or an increase in the 
consumption per consumer. There xvill be a multiplicity of factors 
bringing about these latter increases but the major one in terms of 
a short-term policy variable is the price of electricity. 
What is P? P is the rate of return on net investment. It is much the 
same as the rate of gross profit for the undertaking. We cannot 
describe it as the internal rate of return on new investment unless we 
define it in terms of a constant growth situation when., if all 
the relevant variables are growing at a constant rate, it is not 
unreasonable to assume that the next investment will have an internal 
rate of return about the same size as P. 
The size of P is determined by a large number of variables and it 
is with the introduction of these that the problem becomes more 
complicated, but more informative. 
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How can we change P? 
(a) We can alter prices. Altering prices brings about a number of 
changes. Depending on the price elasticity of demand both P and R will 
alter. We d iscuss R shortly so all we need to note now is that if 
demand is inelastic, as we argue in Chapter Twelve, an increase in 
price will lead to an increase in total revenue and vice versa. 
(b) We can alter the load factor. Increasing the load factor means 
increasing the utilization of existing plant without adding to capacity. 
To do so requires more consumption in the off-peak hours. If prices 
are above marginal cost, increasing the load factor in this way should 
increase P. 
(c) We can alter costs. Lowering costs would increase P, ceteris 
paribus. Probably the prime variable in this case is productivity. 
If productivity is increased costs will fall and P will increase. 
All of these variables are determinants of the size of P. As a 
policy variable price is probably the most important. Price is 
certainly the easiest to alter in the short run. Any manager of an 
electricity undertaking will testify how difficult it is to achieve 
changes in load factor and productivity as and when required. The load 
factor is determined largely by exogenous factors of taste and habit, 
while productivity increases often do no more than negate inflationary 
effects. Productivity and load factor are important determinants of P 
but price is the most important short run policy variable. 
We are now in a position to return to a discussion of the 
information in Table 10.2 and Figure 10.3 
Relationship between P and I 
Where P is greater than I investment in the undertaking will be 
profitable. If I is greater than P the investment will not be profitable, 
In Table 10.2 all but the first five combinations include a situation 
where P is either less than or equal to I. This condition is unlikely 
to occur in Australian electricity undertakings however. Practically all 
of these have a strong monopoly position in the market, fairly steady 
growth, and continuing technical progress - conditions which are 
conducive to profitable operation. 
Not all public utilities are likely to be in this position though. 
It is possible that an organization such as the NSW Railways is in a 
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position where the rate of interest on additional funds employed is 
greater than the rate of profit from their use. If such an undertaking 
is required by law, or some other outside decree, to expand its business 
then it will not be able to make a profit. It is an interesting 
position and one which deserves more attention but it is not the type 
of situation we are studying here. 
If P is greater than I there is likely to be a demand for capital 
funds. Herein lies the significance of quadrants B and D - the industry 
will be looking for capital funds. But the relationship between P and I 
tells us nothing about the source of funds which depends on the 
relationship between P and R. 
Relationship between P and R 
As a starting point let us make the assumption that an undertaking 
is already financing a certain part of its capital programme from its 
own funds. The ratio of retained earnings to borrowings we will write 
as RE:B. 
If P is less than R the undertaking will not be able to continue to 
finance the same proportion of investment from internal funds, RE:B 
will fall. The undertaking does have a number of options. It could 
increase prices or any of the other variables mentioned before which 
would have the effect of increasing P. But in the absence of such 
action RE:B will have to fall. 
If P is equal to R the undertaking will be able to continue to finance 
the same proportion of its capital funds from internal funds and RE:B 
will remain constant. 
If P is greater than R thfe undertaking will be increasing retained 
earnings faster than its capital requirements are growing. Its options 
are to reduce prices or to reduce its dependence on borrowing, i.e. 
increase RE:B. 
Figure 10.3 allows us to see all of the possible combinations. 
Quadrants A and C represent situations where new investment is 
unprofitable while B and D represent the opposite case, which is also 
likely to indicate a need for capital funds. 
Quadrants A and B are situations where it is possible to use 
internal funds to a greater extent than before or lower prices. C and 
160 
D represent situations where P has to be increased (probably through 
increased prices) to avoid a proportionate increase in borrowing. 
We have mentioned before that combinations (6) to (13) in Figure 10.3 
can be ignored because they are in areas where P is not greater than I. 
In relation to the SECV quadrants B and D are of more interest. In B 
investment is profitable and it is also possible to increase RE:B. In 
D investment should be undertaken but it would be necessary to increase 
P or lower RE:B. 
Where will we expect to find the SECV, in B or D? We can get some 
idea of the relative sizes of P, R and I from the SECV's annual reports. 
Tables 10.4 and 10.5 give information on the size of R and P respectively. 
Table 10.4 
Fixed Assets Expenditure 
(Percentage increase p.a.) 
Year ended June 
1963 7.4 
1964 8.2 
1965 8.1 
1966 8.9 
1967 8.9 
1968 7.8 
1969 7.3 
1970 6.3 
1971 5.6 
Source: SECV Annual Report 1970/71.p.40 
Table 10.5 
Rate 6f Return on Net Investment 
1970/1 1969/70 1968/9 
Interest 54.7 51.6 48.5 
Depreciation 45.5 54.0 49.0 
Provision for accruing long 
service leave and retiring 2.8 8.0 6.0 
allowances 
Balance of Income 0.1 2.9 3.2 
103.1 116.5 106.7 
Fixed assets investment 1426.7 1350.2 1270.6 
Less prov. for depreciation 399.4 368 .2 ^29.1 
Net investment 1027.3 982.0 941.5 
Rate of return on net investment % 10,0 11.9 11.3 
Source: SECV Annual Report 1970/71.p.7. 
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With regard to the rate of return, the SECV wrote in their 1969/70 
Annual Report: 
The Commission is faced with a difficult problem in 
ensuring in a competitive market that tariffs will 
encourage a greater use of electricity and at the 
same time that the overall income is sufficient to 
provide an adequate return on capital investment. A 
rate of return of about 12 per cent on fixed assets 
investment at the end of the year is needed to meet 
the annual cost of loan moneys and to finance 
internally that proportion of the capital works 
which is beyond the capacity of the loan market, 
[p.10] 
The rate at which the SECV borrows is determined by the Loan Council 
as part of its overall control of loan raisings by the public sector in 
Australia. Over the last few years this rate has ranged from 6.25 per 
cent to 7.25 per cent. 
From Table 10.5 we can see that an approximate figure for P would 
be about 11 per cent, so we are in a position of P greater than I. From 
Table 10.4 we can see that R has ranged between 8.9 and 5.6 over the 
last few years. We can either have R greater than, less than or equal 
to I. It makes no difference which we choose because these three 
alternatives are shown as combinations (2), (5) and (4) respectively 
and all of them are in quadrant B. In this situation there is a need 
for capital funds. As well there is a surplus which will allow the 
undertaking to lower prices or lessen its dependence upon borrowing. 
We will return to a closer analysis of quadrant B towards the 
end of this chapter. Our next step now is to consider the effect of a 
change in price on P and R. 
Take the case of a firm in quadrant D. If it is in a position 
where it does not want to decrease RE:B, or cannot decrease RE:B 
(which we shall see is the case of the SECV) it will have to increase 
prices. An increase in price will probably lead to an increase in P 
and a decrease in R. If demand is very inelastic we should expect a 
greater effect on P than on R, and a lessening of this situation as 
demand is more elastic. A price increase will move the undertaking to 
a position above and to the right of its original position in quadrant 
D. The reverse effect occurs if the undertaking is in quadrant B and 
lowers prices. It will move to a position below and to the left of its 
previous position. 
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Changes in prices which are associated with the internal financing 
of capital programmes have a feed-back mechanism dependent upon the 
elasticity of demand. As one increases prices to sustain a programme 
of self-financing the increases may have the effect of lessening the 
demands for funds for the programme. Or alternatively, if one is 
considering price reductions to reduce a surplus this may create an 
increase in the rate of growth and so require more funds for development. 
In electricity, where demand is relatively inelastic, such problems 
are probably not very important. However, it is a point which should be 
kept in mind when considering such theories as those presented in 
Chapter Three, If we assume that the budget constraint is the result 
of an inability to finance development without an increase in prices, 
the manner in which the price increases are carried out is important. 
It is true that the higher prices go to those demands which are least 
elastic where the feedback will be less but it may not always be 
inconsequential. 
Self-Financing in the SECV^ 
In Table 10.6 we give the SECV's requirements and sources of 
capital funds for the past eighteen years. Funds are required for 
both direct expenditure on capital and for the redemption of loans. 
Like a number of similar organizations the SECV relies fairly heavily 
on lenders converting their old loans into new loans. 
The SECV has often made mention of its problems of finding the 2 
capital necessary for its development and as Table 10.6 shows, the 
sources of finance have become considerably diversified in recent 
years. The problems confronting the SECV stem from two sources:-
(a) restricted entry to the loan market, and 
(b) the long construction period of its projects. 
Before the SECV can raise extra funds on the loan market it 
requires the approval of the Victorian Parliament to increase the limit 
imposed on its total borrowings. As a rule this has not caused much 
difficulty. 
^ Self-financing of capital development takes place in the industry in 
NSW but due to its decentralised nature it is not easily related to 
the arguments which we can put for the SECV. However, the details of 
self-financing in NSW are included in Appendix 7. 
^ See in particular the Annual Reports for the financial years ending 
1956, 1958 and 1964. 
Table 10.6 
State Electricity Commission of Victoria 
$m. 
Capital Requirements Source of Capital Finance 
Year S.E.C . Rediict 1 on 
ended 
June 30 
Capital 
Expendt. 
Loan 
Redempt. Total 
Loan 
Market 
State 
Treas. Adv. 
'Self- Internal 
help' Funds ' . ' 
Provident 
Fund 
X.X V-. ^ JL. V-/ L L
in Reserve 
Liquidity 
1954(a) 45.8 10.0 55.8 46 .0 12.0 
1955(a) 38.0 2.0 40.0 36.0 4.0 
1956(a) 38.0 2.0 40.0 22.0 2.0 8.0 
1957 40.2 2.8 43.0 33.6 7.6 
1958 50.3 33.2 2.0 4.6 10.44 
1959 53.34 - 53.34 28.1 7.4 4.72 13.12 
1960 56.10 4.52 60.62 32.2 8.0 5.08 15.34 
1961(b) 54.6 10.4 65.0 28.8 19.0 5.4 20.6 
1962(b) 60.2 26.6 86.8 51.8 15 .0 6.0 17.2 
1963(a) 62.2 25 .1 87.3 50.0 16.5 23.0 
1964(a) 72 .2 7.6 79.8 34.3 14.0 23.2 
1965(a) 76.4 24.5 100.9 51.1 16.0 32.0 
1966 88.0 20.3 108.3 47.3 12.0 49.0(34.4) 
1967 95.6 14.9 110.5 42.9 16.0 40.5 5 .5 5.6 
1968 105.7 17.6 123.3 43.2 17.0 46.6 5.4 11 .1 
1969 103. 7 24.2 127.9 49.7 17.0 16.4 44.8 
1970 97.1 17.5 114.6 46.6 15.0 13.6 49.4 -10.0 
1971 93.2 13.5 106. 7 48.4 6.0 10.5 39.3 2.5 
Source: 
Notes: 
SECV Annual Reports. Where figures are missing it indicates that no information was available 
in the Annual Report of that, or other, years. 
(a) Figures for these years were not obtainable in the same form as the figures for other years. 
The information has been gathered from a number of different sources and may not always total 
accurately. 
(b) In 1960/61 an excess of $8.8m was raised to help meet heavy loan redemptions in the following 
year. In 1961/62 $3.2m was raised for the same purpose. 
ON IjO 
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Of far more importance is the fact that entry to the loan market 
is restricted. As a Statutory Authority, the SECV is required to 
obtain the approval of the Loan Council for every loan raising 
undertaken in the market. This means that it needs approval for the 
amount of the loan, the rate of interest offered, the terms of the 
loan, the timing of the offer and the length of time for which the 
loan will be open for subscription. As the Annual Reports of the 
SECV show, the conditions imposed by the Loan Council have not always 
been in accordance with the wishes of the SECV. Therefore, they have 
been forced to seek out other sources of finance. But there is still 
another constraint. 
Where projects may take upwards of five years before they start 
earning revenue, it is important that capital finance be available 
throughout the period to allow a speedy conclusion of construction 
projects. The decisions of the Loan Council must necessarily be made 
with the current state of the loan market in mind, and from this can 
arise conflicts between the Council's decisions and the longer-term 
capital needs of the SECV. 
As well, the State Treasury, which makes interest bearing advances 
to the SECV, is not in a position to guarantee funds on other than a 
short term basis. In recent years these factors have led to the SECV 
having to obtain funds outside of the loan market, and having to obtain 
them in such a way that the long-term construction periods of the 
projects were adequately covered. 
Details of the composition and the operations of the Loan Council can 
be found in Commonwealth Payments to or for the States 1969-70. 1969 -
Parliamentary Paper No. 55.1969. pp.58-60. 
2 
As early as June, 1952, in an 'Interim Report on Operations', the 
SECV noted this problem. They reported that: 
While the physical works have to be planned on a long-term 
basis the finance, per force of circumstance, is planned 
for less than a year ahead. [p.6] 
In a report by a firm of American consultants, in 1956, it was noted 
that- 'The greatest handicaps under which the State Electricity 
Commission is working are insufficiency and uncertainty of capital 
funds'. [Ebasco Report]. 
The SECV noted that the report '...emphasises that the only _ 
alternative to providing adequate long-term finance is to restrict 
expansion of the State system and the growth of load to existing 
consumers.' [1955/56 Annual Report p.6] 
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The Loan Council is interested in keeping a stable loan market in 
Australia, an admirable policy which, in the long-run, is probably of 
benefit to all of the citizens of Australia. It does, in a sense, 
provide an intangible 'public good'. But it has meant that semi-
governmental borrowers are restricted in their entry to the market. 
The SECV stressed this in their 1958/59 Annual Report. 
Nothing has occurred during this year to allay the 
uncertainties stressed by the Commission in its last 
two reports consequent upon its public loans in the 
last three years being only two-thirds subscribed. 
It is not a sufficient answer that with underwriting 
aid the Commission has continued to achieve its annual 
loan raising quota. However, the national policy 
which governs matters of this kind is established in 
the clear knowledge of the severe competition from 
other investments encountered by semi-governmental 
borrowers. Hence the Commission can but continue 
to conduct its affairs under this serious disability. 
[p.ll]2 
As a rule the announcement of tariff increases has evoked little 
response in terms of critical appraisal of the merits or otherwise of 
the case. The announcements themselves are concise and invariably 
carry a heavy emphasis on the inevitability of the action. 
Last year it was forecast that unless capital finance 
became ™ o r e frequently available... it would be 
necessary to obtain a higher proportion of capital 
from the Commission's own revenues...The borrowing 
authority has not been increased; accordingly it 
has been necessary to raise retail electricity 
charges... for the specific purpose of obtaining 
additional capital to provide for the expanding 
electricity needs of Victoria. [SECV Annual Report 
1955/56.p.5] 3 
1 
We do not intend to convey the impression that the downgrading of a 
competitive rate of interest as a determinant of the allocation of 
capital in the economy is necessarily a good thing. Stability of the 
loan market in this way has probably resulted in some reallocation of 
expenditure and resources as semi-government authorities raise their 
prices to gain capital finance. The actual outcome, though, would be 
very hard to estimate. 
2 
The previous Annual Report made a similar comment. 
T h e C o m m i s s i o n . . . c o n t i n u e s to a p p r o a c h a m o s t u n f a v o u r a b l e 
loan m a r k e t in w h i c h other types of i n v e s t m e n t are m o r e 
a t t r a c t i v e than loans at s e m i - g o v e r n m e n t r a t e s and 
c o n d i t i o n s . [p.5] 
3 
A n o t h e r e x a m p l e of a similar a n n o u n c e m e n t can be found in the 1963/64 
A n n u a l R e p o r t . 
The last increases in electricity tariffs in 1956 and 1958 
(continued on p.166) 
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At no stage has the SECV attempted any justification for their 
actions other than that there was no alternative. For that matter it 
has never questioned its apparent right to demand the amount of 
resources necessary to meet all the demands made upon its system. It 
has assumed that it is entitled to whatever proportions of the total 
resources available in the community it needs to meet its unfettered 
growth. 
One fear expressed by some of the members of the industry in 
Britain was that the raising of prices and the accumulation of a surplus 
would attract unwanted attention from unions and consumers who did not 
understand what was happening. It is possible that in Victoria such 
a fear became a reality, not in the form of demands from unions or 
consumers, but from the Government. In Chapter Eight we described 
the tax imposed on the SECV as a supplement to State Revenue. This 
tax came at a time when funds were being accumulated within the SECV 
for development purposes. The first payment of the tax resulted in a 
depletion of these accumulated funds and a further tariff increase to 
replace them. The SECV announced this increase in its 1966/67 Annual 
Report. 
The additional annual funds for capital works obtained 
at the last tariff review in January, 1965, have been 
totally absorbed by the higher costs now prevailing. 
In these circumstances it was necessary to increase 
electricity tariffs by an average of 57o from 1st November, 
1967, to provide additional revenue of about $10 million 
in a full year. [p.8] 
But what were these 'higher costs now prevailing' that had depleted 
the additional funds for capital works? Earlier in the same report 
the SECV had said: 
3 (continued from p.165) 
were designed to provide additional funds for capital 
works, but by the end of the 1964/65 financial year 
cost increases will have absorbed the whole of the 
additional finance obtained from these tariff 
increase s... 
It is necessary also to ensure that the Commission's 
reserve liquidity against inevitable disturbances to 
capital finance - from the loan market and internal 
funds - which occur from time to time is not otherwise 
permitted to fall below £10 million which the Commission 
considers to be the barest minimum... 
To meet the requirements of the accelerated works 
programme and to preserve the Commission's liquidity 
it is essential to restore the flow of capital funds 
from internal funds. This requires an increase in 
tariffs to provide additional revenue of about £4.75 
millions per annum. [p.15] 
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...the $2,906,045 reduction in the balance of income 
for capital works is attributable to the provision 
of $5,000,000 for Statutory transfer to the 
Consolidated Revenue of Victoria on the Commission's 
revenue. The first statutory payment of $4,800,000 
was effected this year in respect of 1965/66 income 
as an appropriation from the Contingency and General 
Reserve. [p.5] 
It seems likely that the ability to earn a surplus, and the surplus 
itself, attracted the attention of the Government when it was looking 
around for a way out of its own financial dilemma. The reason for 
the SECV not being more specific about the price increase probably 
came from a desire to avoid an association between the increased 
tariffs and the Government's tax. 
One other very useful source of funds has been the 'self-help' 
scheme. It has been particularly useful in periods when funds from 
other sources have been scarce. The SECV described the scheme in its 
1955/56 Annual Report in these words: 
Since 1951 [the] ... rural extension programme has continued 
to depend on a plan of self-help whereby prospective 
consumers make advances towards the capital cost of 
construction. Under this arrangement, quarterly accounts 
for electricity consumed are offset against each advancej 
interest is credited on advances. Within the limits of 
its available funds the Commission has undertaken 
extensions on a'fifty-fifty' basis. However, some 
prospective consumers \^ ho have been eager to expedite 
their extensions have offered to advance the full 
capital cost. [Self-help]...has proved a very 
practical answer to a problem arising directly from the 
general shortage of funds for capital works. [p.13] 
Finally we should note that internal financing of capital 
development brings about a redistribution of income. The most obvious 
redistribution is from present to future consumers of electricity. 
As well, due to the SECV's policy of uniform tariffs, it leads to a 
redistribution from city consumers to country consumers. The costs 
of capital extensions in the country are greater than they are in the 
city areas, so if all consumers pay the same price there will be a 
distribution of real income to country dwellers. However, the size 
of this redistribution is reduced by the extent of the 'self-help' 
scheme whereby country consumers supply their own capital. 
Let us now go back to where we left our analysis of Figure 10.3. 
We said that the SECV is in a position in quadrant B. This should 
be no surprise now. If for example, it had been in a position in 
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quadrant D it would have had to increase prices to undertake investment. 
This would have been necessary because it is not in a position to 
decrease RE:B because of the controls by the Loan Council. Any price 
increases in quadrant D would move the undertaking towards a position 
in quadrant B, which is where we found it. 
The limits to price increases such as this are set by the ability 
not to show a large surplus which would attract the attention of the 
government, the consumers or the unions, i.e. political limits. 
In the years 1968-1970 the SECV was in a position of a very 
healthy surplus, such that it could either maintain prices and increase 
the proportion of internal funds used or lower prices. This situation 
appears to have arisen in the following fashion. 
During the 1960's the SECV undertook an extensive capital 
development programme, extending the transmission and distribution 
system as well as installing new base load generating plant. In the 
two years to June 1971 this programme drew to a close. Table 10.4 
shows the fall off in fixed assets expenditure associated with the end 
of this programme. Along with this fall off in the need for capital 
funds goes a diminished need for internal funds. In terms of our 
previous analysis it means a reduced R and a wider gap between P and R 
which must present itself in the form of a surplus, no matter how 
disguised. 
One way to dispose of such a surplus is to reduce tariffs and this 
is what the SECV did in 1970. The reductions were made to both 
Industrial and Domestic Class consumers. (The details of the alterations 
to the tariffs are contained in Appendix Ten along with a discussion of 
the question as to how such tariff decreases should be handed on to the 
consumer.) According to the SECV's public statements the decrease in 
the domestic tariff was to combat increased competition from natural 
gas, and the reduction in industrial tariffs was to 'assist in promoting 
industrial development in Victoria'. No doubt these statements are 
true but the more important question relates to where the funds came 
from to allow the reductions. According to the SECV the reductions 
reflect 
...very significant economies being effected even 
during a period of rapid growth.^ 
1 
SECV Annual Report 1969/70.p.6. 
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This may be partly true but it is no doubt also true that it was 
possible to reduce prices because of the diminished need for capital 
funds raised from revenue. 
Table 10.7 gives the percentage changes in three important 
variables to illustrate this point. It shows the annual change in 
Fixed Asset Expenditure (from Table 10.4), the excess of operating 
income over operating expenditure (excluding depreciation) and the 
annual change in total depreciation (which includes the accelerated 
depreciation charges for the briquette factories). 
Table 10.7 
Year ended 
June 
Fixed Assets 
Expenditure 
Excess of operat-
ing income over 
operating 
expenditure (excl. 
depreciation 
Total 
Depreciation 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
(7o increase over previous year) 
8.9 
8.9 
7.8 
7.3 
6.3 
5.6 
-18.0 
8.3 
34.5 
29.4 
0 
- 2 0 . 0 
32.8 
3.3 
15.8 
3.1 
12.0 
-17.2 
Source: SECV Annual Reports 
Accompanying the decline in the rate of growth of capital expenditure 
is an absolute decrease in the operating surplus following the price 
decreases.^ This is naturally accompanied by a corresponding decrease 
in the accounting item depreciation in which the surplus was included. 
From Table 10.5 we can see that in these later years P has fallen. 
But the fall in P is not only due to the decrease in prices. It is 
probably unfortunate for the SECV that the decision to reduce prices 
was followed very closely by a decision of the government to increase 
the State Tax (see Chapter Eight) from 3 per cent to 4 per cent. As 
well, successful applications were made by a number of the SECV's 
employees for substantial pay increases which averaged about 9 per cent. 
1 
It is true that costs also rose in a period of inflation but not 
enough to be the sole cause of the change. 
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From a position of a fairly strong surplus the SECV has been 
reduced to a situation where it felt it necessary to report in its 
latest Annual Report that 
...a general increase in tariffs will be inevitable 
unless further substantial operating economies can 
be made...[SECV Annual Report 1970/1.p.5] 
The combined effects of a tariff reduction, increased State Tax and 
increased costs has put the SECV in a position where it is clearly 
worried about its ability to maintain the previous level of investment 
from internal funds. 
The most obvious worry no doubt is the need to mobilise enough 
funds to allow the next major capital project to proceed on time. This 
is the Newport Power Station Project to install two 500MW natural 
gas-fuelled generators before 1978. The total amount of funds needed 
is not known but it certainly will require a large amount of capital 
funds and keep the pressure on the SECV to at least maintain its 
previous differential between P and R. 
It follows from our discussion that there are no formal rules for 
determining the proportion of capital funds that should be raised by a 
public authority through self-financing. However, we have been able 
to show the factors which determine how much will be raised in this 
fashion. They are the past history of internal financing, the size of 
the capital requirements, the rate of interest, the rate of return on 
investment (incorporating the influences on productivity and load 
factors) and the 'political' constraints placed on borrowing and 
price changes. It is the interaction between these factors which 
determines the amount of capital funds raised internally. 
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PART C 
CHAPTER ELEVEN 
COSTS, LOADS AND PRICES IN THE SECV 
We must bear in mind that they [the British electricity-
industry] started, at least, with distinctive traits of 
monopoly and there is nothing more obnoxious than a 
statutory monopoly charging what the traffic will bear. 
R. Kelf-Cohen. Twenty Years after 
Nationalisation. 1969 p.217 
There are numerous ways in which costs can be collated and used. 
They can be divided into functional groupings, departmental groupings, 
etc., depending on their intended use. Our concern is the relevant cost 
concept for tariff framing. 
It has been our contention throughout this thesis that the concept 
of marginal (or incremental) cost, as expressed through the theory of 
Peak Load Pricing, is the appropriate one for the purpose of framing 
an economically efficient tariff structure. It appears that in the 
past the SECV has used a far more traditional division of costs which 
separates costs into Demand costs. Energy costs. Customer costs and 
Residual costs. A very brief explanation of each will suffice.^ Demand 
Costs are those which vary with the capacity of the system and chiefly 
comprise interest and depreciation charges. Energy Costs are those 
which vary with the quantity of energy supplied, e.g. fuel costs. 
Customer Costs vary directly with the number of consumers connected, 
e.g. metering and billing costs, and Residual Costs are those costs 
2 
which cannot readily be included in any of the above categories. 
1 
Further treatment of this subject can be found in Davidson [129.p.60], 
Troxel [115.pp.595-7], Barnes [65.pp.325-32] and Graham [229]. 
2 
These descriptions are quite general. In some specific cases they 
have been defined slightly differently. For example, see the publication. 
Costing and Tariffs [228], by the EANSW. In this case their concern is 
with the costs of a retail undertaking which buys its electricity in 
bulk from a central generating body. They say: 
...the demand costs for a distributing authority are 
principally the demand charge paid under the bulk 
supply tariff. [p.2] 
But demand costs, so defined, have little economic meaning and are 
dependent upon the accounting and tariff framing procedures of the 
supplying body. 
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In this traditional approach the next step is to allocate each of 
these costs to the various classes of consumers, the most complicated 
allocation belonging to the Demand and Residual costs. There are 
numerous arbitrary ways in which such costs could be allocated as well 
as numerous ways which have found their way into the literature of 
electricity pricing.^ All of them though are arbitrary allocations -
despite their 'scientific'background - if the goal in mind is for 
prices to accurately reflect the cost of supply. 
One very real danger in splitting costs up into allocable groups 
lies in the inclusion of depreciation in the demand costs. If demand 
costs are going to be allocated it is first necessary to get a correct 
valuation of depreciat ion. We commented in the previous chapter on 
the way depreciation charges can be varied to camouflage the funds 
available for internal supplies of capital finance, and how such 
funds normally take the form of depreciation plus surplus. An 
overstatement of depreciation then would mean an overstatement of 
demand costs when measured on the traditional basis. The result would 
be that the allocation of the burden of raising the extra revenue for 
capital purposes would depend on whichever arbitrary method was chosen 
for the allocation of the demand costs. 
The relevant cost concept for tariff framing is one which includes 
the time of production and consumption as a variable. Such a concept 
takes account of the fact that peaks exist in demand and that the cost 
per unit varies in relation to those peaks. The cost allocation 
inherent in the theory of Peak Load Pricing suggests that capacity cost 
should be allocated to the 'peak' consumers. We have explained the 
rationale of this in Part A but it is worth recapitulating here. As 
Davidson recorded it: 
The cost concepts relevant for rate-evaluation and rate-making 
purposes are, first, the additional cost that will be incurred 
if another kilowatt hour of electric energy...is sold - the 
expected marginal or incremental output cost (which includes 
marginal energy cost, and may or may not include marginal 
capacity cost depending upon the time when the kilowatt hour... 
is used); and second, the additional cost that must be 
defrayed by the utility if another customer is added by the 
utility...If these expected additional costs are not fully 
1 
For example, Garfield and Lovejoy [85.Chpt 10], Bary [66], 
Ineson [93], Lefferson [97], Vennard [222], EANSW [228] and 
Bonbright [156, and 72.p.337]. 
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covered by the particular rate applicable in every case, 
the consumer will be paying less for the marginal 
sacrifice of productive resources than would the consumer 
of some other commodity had the resources been used to 
produce that commodity, [129,p,69] 
As well as the implication for capacity costs, peakiness in demand 
often leads to the use of older, less efficient plant with higher 
operating costs. As a result, it is generally the case that marginal 
operating cost will be higher at the time of peak demand. 
1. SECV Production, Cost and Load Characteristics 
(a) General 
The Victorian system is a combination of thermal and hydro power 
with the bulk of the State's supply coming from the brown coal fields 
of the Latrobe Valley where the base load thermal plants are installed. 
Table 11.1 gives a general outline of the system's annual production 
characteristics. 
Table 11.1 
Generation Statistics, SECV (kWh x 10^) 
1 
Year Base thermal Other Hydro Net Total 
thermal inter-
change 
with 
NSW 
(b) % (b) % (b) 7o (c) (a) 
1963/64 5453 ,5 67,7 1567,8 19.5 1031.6 12.8 +591.7 8644.6 
1964/65 6221 ,0 68,0 1217.3 13,3 1709.5 18.7 +485.4 9633.2 
1965/66 7759 ,5 78,1 1066.7 10,8 1103.2 11.1 +214.3 10143.7 
1966/67 8783 ,1 79,4 942.8 8,6 1330.4 12.0 -153,4 10902.9 
1967/68 9698 ,8 82.6 722.8 6,1 1326.8 11.3 -188.6 11559.8 
Notes: (a) 
(b) 
(c) 
The figures take no account of losses on interchange 
or power used in the generating stations. 
The percentage calculations exclude interchange. 
Minus indicates net exports and plus indicates net 
imports, 
Source: SECV Production Coordination Department: Annual Supply Reports. 
The peak demand in the SECV occurs in the winter, normally in July 
or August. Figure 11.2 shows the system load curves for a day in 
January and a comparable day in July, 1968. The change in the pattern 
of consumption is quite clear. Figure 11.3 shows the overall load 
See Appendix Six for a map of Victoria outlining the system network. 
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pattern for a complete year, and Figure 11.4 gives some idea of how the 
annual figures given in Table 11.1 (excluding interchange) were split 
up over the 24 months of 1967 and 1968. The two arrows on Figure 11,4 
indicate the winter months which had the highest unit production in 
each year, but it does not follow of course, that these months also had 
the highest recorded system maximum demand for the year. Figure 11.4 
illustrates three points, 
(a) Base load thermal power meets the bulk of the power requirements. 
(b) Hydro-electric power is generated at all times of the year, but 
meets a higher percentage of demand in the summer months. This 
is not surprising when it is realised that a large proportion of 
the SECV's hydro power comes from the Commonwealth-run Snowy 
Mountains Hydro Electric Authority which also has irrigation 
responsibilities,^ 
(c) Expensive peak load thermal power, generated mainly in and around 
the Melbourne metropolitan area, is more important in the winter 
months of high demand than in the lower demand summer months. But, 
as can be seen from Table 11.1, this importance has been declining 
in recent years. 
Figure 11.5 shows the actual breakdown of what type of plants were 
in operation on the day of the 1968 annual system maximum demand. From 
an inspection of Figures 11.2-11.5 we can see these major characteristics 
of the system:-
(a) the annual system peak occurs in winter; (Figure 11.3) 
(b) the greatest daily range in supply occurs in the three winter 
months of June, July and August; (Figure 11.3) 
(c) at the peak both hydro and peak thermal plants are in use 
(Figure 11.5); and 
(d) during the summer months there is a minimal amount of peak thermal 
plant in operation. (Figure 11.4) 
'Restrictions in operational flexibility [of hydro sources] are imposed 
as a result of regulating pondage limitations, limits of water flow in 
tunnels, river flow (flooding) limitations, forced or unplanned 
operation due to abnormally rapid snow melt or high rainfall, or conflict 
of irrigation release requirements with electricity requirements. 
SECV News [241] 
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It should be remembered though that the use of hydro and what would 
normally be peak thermal power in summer may be occasioned by the need 
to undertake maintenance on base load thermal plant. 
Ideally the next piece of information would be the relative costs 
of operation for the various types of plant. We mentioned earlier that 
Peak Load Pricing has two cost implications - one concerning capital 
costs and the other the change in marginal energy cost. First let us 
look at the former. Table 11.6 shows the relative size and growth of 
depreciation and interest charges over the last ten years. 
Again, we should use caution in interpreting the depreciation 
figures. We have already pointed out that depreciation can be used to 
camouflage the internal funds available for self-finaneing. It appears 
that this is partly the case here. To establish an efficient tariff 
mechanism along the lines we are suggesting, it would be necessary to 
isolate that part of the depreciation charge which could be said 
reasonably to reflect the loss of value of capital equipment due to 
the passage of time. This part alone should be included in the capacity 
costs. The treatment of the premium for capital works is discussed in 
the next chapter. Unfortunately, with the information which is 
available to us, it is impossible to distinguish between these two 
components. Table 11,6 gives some idea of the magnitude of the capital 
costs that exist within the industry. 
The second element of cost which is relevant is the increase in 
marginal operating cost concurrent with the increased winter consumption. 
Without detailed information we cannot document this increase fully but 
Figure 11,7 gives some idea of the relative operating costs.^ A type 
of 'system marginal cost curve' is derived for three different years by 
plotting the direct costs per unit for each station in ascending cost 
order. The measurement on the vertical axis is an index of costs and 
2 is not the actual costs of production. 
1 
Another brief, but not very helpful, look at the costs of supplying 
electricity in Victoria can be found in reference [237] by Peirson. 
2 
The figures from which this construction has been drawn were made 
available by Dr John Paterson of the Urban Research Unit, Australian 
National University, from an unpublished Ph.D thesis. He in his turn 
received them from the SECV. 
Table 11.6 
Relative Increases in Selected Series - SECV 
Deprec iation Interest Opera ting Fixed Assets Tot al 
Year Expen ses Expenditure Assets 
$m • Index $1 Tl, Index $m. Index $m. Index $m. Index 
1957/58 9. 7 100 15 .9 100 59 .4 100 517. 1 100 518 ,9 100 
1958/59 11. 8 122 21 ,5 135 60 .5 102 581, 5 112 548 ,3 106 
1959/60 15. 3 158 23 .7 149 70 .1 118 632, 2 122 591 .0 114 
1960/61 20. 8 214 25 o9 163 80 .3 135 679. 9 131 632 o3 122 
1961/62 21, 3 220 28 .9 182 84 .8 143 737 . 6 143 676 .3 130 
1962/63 24. 6 254 31 .9 201 92 .4 156 792. 0 153 724 .3 140 
1963/64 27o 8 287 34 . 1 214 103 .4 174 856. 9 166 775 .2 149 
1964/65(i) 29. 9 308 36 .3 228 111 ,2 187 926. 8 179 831 ,9 160 
1965/66(i) 39. 7 409 39 .1 246 119 .9 202 1009. 1 195 883 . 1 170 
1966/67(i) 41. 0 423 41 .8 263 128 .4 216 1098. 8 212 941 .2 181 
1967/68(i) 47. 5 490 45 .5 286 135 ,0 227 1184. 3 229 985 .9 190 
1968/69(i) 49. 0 505 48 .0 302 145 .4 248 1270. 6 246 1041 .5 201 
Notes from Table 11.6 
(i) Depreciation for these years includes additional depreciation of briquette factories, 
1964/65 $Tn.2.0 1966/67 $m.4.0 1968/69 $m.6.0 
1965/66 $m.5.0 1967/68 $m.6.0 
(ii) Includes - interest on capital liabilities 
- interest on consumers' and other advances for construction, and 
- interest on current liabilities. 
Source: SECV Annual Reports 
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This illustration is only an indication of the relative costs and 
some qualifications to it should be noted. The costs for each station 
were derived by dividing the annual totals of direct cost per station 
by the kilowatt hours sent out by that station. Therefore, each 
particular segment of the curve depends on the actual production from 
that station in that particular year. It should also be noted that the 
costs are put together in order of direct cost per kWh sent out and not 
necessarily in the order in which the stations might be expected to 
come into operation. But even with these limitations, it is quite 
obvious that the operating costs of peak thermal plant are considerably 
higher than those of the base thermal plant. 
We have not yet mentioned the cost of hydro produced electricity, 
or the cost of electricity obtained through interchange arrangements 
with the ECNSW.^ There is virtually no information available on the 
interchange arrangements other than the fact that day to day 
negotiations take place on the price and availability of power at 
either end. 
The SECV uses an opportunity cost basis when assessing the value 
of power from its own hydro sources. This is distinct from the actual 
amount paid for the hydro power from the Snowy Mountains Authority. In 
the SECV News, in 1967, the SECV described its method of evaluating hydro 
thus : 
In a mixed hydro-thermal generating system the value or worth 
of hydro energy (as distinct from its cost) may be regarded as 
being equal to the estimated cost of the generation that the 
hydro energy will replace. All other things being equal, this 
results in the hydro value tending to vary inversely with the 
quantity of water or energy that is available... 
Since the value of hydro energy depends upon the the total 
system energy demand, availability of thermal plant and hydro 
energy available... variations in value will occur depending 
upon the time of the day and the month of the year during 
which it is integrated into the generating system. [241] 
The value of hydro power thus described, is different to the price paid 2 
for the power from the Snowy Scheme. There is no similar 'price' to 
attach to hydro power coming from the SECV's own hydro plants. Therefore, 
1 
A discussion of the theoretical aspects of the economic efficiency of 
interchange and its costing, as well as costing for hydro power, can 
be found in Hughes [92]. See also Harberger and Andreatta [87]. 
2 
In 1968, McFarlane estimated that the amount paid for Snowy power 
was '...more than l.Od per kWh'. [234.p.98]. 
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it is reasonable to suggest that the cost of hydro power which is 
relevant for economic purposes, is the opportunity cost as described 
above. For convenience, we ignore the matter of hydro power in the 
rest of the thesis but it is fairly clear that no great obstacles arise 
from its inclusion if such an approach is used. 
(b) Class Load Characteristics 
The load characteristics we have described above have been for the 
overall system. They are the summation of various different load 
groupings. The most obvious groupings are the classes of consumers to 
whom electricity is sold. The three major classes are the Domestic, 
Commercial and Industrial classes. To disaggregate these components of 
demand is not an easy task and, as we will see later, it is possibly not 
a very rewarding one either.^ However, it is one of the few ways in 
which the final demand for electricity is analysed in Australia. The 
most common method of analysis in Australia is by taking samples of the 
demand characteristics of areas where the majority of the consumers 
are known to belong to one particular class. Upon this basis the SECV 
estimate the class load components for the day of the system annual 
maximum demand. It should be remembered that by its very nature the 
peak load is an abnormal load and such a graph may not be as useful as 
it first appears, but it is the most common evidence of class load 
characteristics available at this time. 
The SECV has withheld permission for the inclusion of class load 
diagrams in the text of this study on the grounds that the detailed 
information in these diagrams, if made public, might be of advantage 
to their competitors (and critics?) However, permission has been granted 
to include this information in a 'confidential appendix' which is not 
for publication. Such an appendix. Appendix 8 - 'Confidential Information' 
has been included at the end of this study. The appendix contains seven 
diagrams, numbered 1-7, and prefixed by the letters 'C.I.'. 
Figures C.I.I and C.I.2 are copies of the estimated Class Loads 
for the SECV on the day of system annual.maximum demand for the year 
1968. It is clear from these estimates that the most important cause 
of the annual system peak is the coincidence of a very high domestic 
1 
References [294-301] are a few of the many works devoted to the 
analysis of load curves for electricity undertakings. 
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demand with the end of the daily industrial and commercial loads.^ At 
other times of the year different patterns of class demand may occur. 
That this is likely to be the case is implied by the findings of an 
excellent report compiled by two of the SECV's employees, Dr R.R. Booth 
and Mr D.J. Knipe. By using various aggregative methods the report 
produces estimated load components for the major classes for average 
July weekdays, Saturdays and Sundays, and average February weekdays, 
Saturdays and Sundays. While the document is very difficult to check 
for accuracy, it appears to be internally consistent and is indeed 
pathbreaking in its analysis of load components for an Australian 
electricity undertaking. 
Figures C.I.3, C.I.4 and C.I.5 are drawn from information in this 
Report, and show the difference in load shape between the total loads 
of the July and February average weekdays. This information is at the 
top of the illustration and is identical in each diagram. At the 
bottom of each illustration is shown the difference in the estimated 
load shapes for the three major classes. The figures are drawn so as 
to illustrate the change in load shape. (The actual quantitative 
difference between the loads in July and February is not obvious 
because of the different scales applying to the two months.) It is 
clear that the major reason for the difference in the total load 
shape (shown at the top of each figure) can be traced to the Domestic 
Class. 
In one part of the Report the authors have attempted to detail 
the load characteristics of the major components of the Domestic Class. 
Similar illustrations to those in Figures C.I.3, C.I.4 and C.I.5 are 
shown in Figures C.^ .1.6 and C.I. 7. Only the two major components of 
the domestic consumption are shown here - the lighting and heating 
component, and the cooking component. While cooking accounts for 
roughly half of the peak, it is the heating and lighting component 
which shows the greatest variation between February and July, and in 
that sense, is a major cause of the domestic peak. In view of the fact 
that weather conditions are the major determinant of the timing of the 
peak this result is not very surprising. 
Similar characteristics were found by T.I. Farkas [294] using figures 
which appear to be from the Sydney County Council, the largest of the 
retailing bodies in New South Wales. Mr Farkas was not prepared to have 
his results reproduced in this study. 
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Let us recapitulate on what we have seen up to this point. The 
SECV has a winter peak, part of which is met by relatively expensive 
peak thermal plant or hydro plant which has a high opportunity cost at 
that time. All of the three major classes contribute to the peak but 
the most important contribution is that of the Domestic Class. The 
lighting and heating components of this class appear to be the demands 
which vary most over the year and contribute to the class increase at 
the time of the winter peak. It should not be overlooked that during 
the winter months the absolute demand caused by cooking (which is peaky 
in character) is approximately the same as that for lighting and 
heating. 
2. The Tariff Structure of the SECV 
Now that we have seen some of the system's load and cost 
characteristics, we are in a position to look at the present tariff 
policy. Copies of the SECV's tariff schedules are given in Appendix 
Five. 
One of the major difficulties in any analysis of the pricing 
system of an electricity undertaking is the large range of tariffs 
used. The SECV is no exception in this regard having 37 different 
rates under which electricity can be purchased.^ 
The tariffs are mainly block tariffs, two-part tariffs or 
special purpose tariffs. With so many of them we cannot deal with 
them all in detail so we will limit ourselves to the details of the 
more typical ones. Figure 11.8 illustrates some of the block tariffs 
and also gives some idea of the wide diversity which exists among them. 
Tariff GB is the main Domestic tariff and it has a final block of 2.1 
c/kWh. From Table 11.9 we can see that the average annual consumption 
per consumer was 3,750 kWh in 1968/69. Domestic class consumers have 
their meters read every quarter so 900 kWh would be a reasonable 
estimate for average quarterly consumption, although we would expect 
the winter quarters to be a little bit higher and the summer quarters 
to be a little lower. If we allow for the consumption which is metered 
under the other Domestic tariffs it is still quite possible that for 
1 
Descriptions of the many different types of tariffs and their 
histories can be found in Byatt [176], Davidson [129 Chpt. 6], Caywood 
[74.pp.39-79], Bolton [71] and Garfield and Lovejoy [85.p.154]. 
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many of the consumers in the Domestic Class their marginal consumption 
would be priced at the final block price. We can only make assumptions 
about this sort of detail because information concerning the frequency 
distribution of consumption per class is not available. 
Table 11.9 
Average kWh Sold Per Consumer Per Annum - SECV 1948-68 
Class All 
consumers Year 
ended 
June 
Domestic Industrial Commercial (excl. 
Bulk 
Supplies) 
1948 1,127 32,880 3,102 2,891 
1949 1,333 33,039 3,373 3,151 
1950 1,521 32,352 3,533 3,281 
1951 1,553 32,226 3,791 3,565 
1952 1,495 29,145 3,736 3,627 
1953 1,579 27,621 3,942 3,675 
1954 1,739 29,761 4,285 4,001 
1955 1,889 30,982 4,614 4,274 
1956 2,089 32,009 4,966 4,583 
1957 2,235 31,044 5,173 4,700 
1958 2,333 31,105 5,334 4,839 
1959 2,474 31,055 5,648 4,987 
1960 2,584 32,415 5,949 5,168 
1961 2,741 32,105 6,500 5,364 
1962 2,699 31,279 6,644 5,323 
1963 2,881 35,570 7,145 5,830 
1964 3,049 43,449 7,648 6,590 
1965 3,214 47,815 8,144 7,120 
1966 3,293 46,392 8,694 7,186 
1967 3,433 46,763 9,297 7,441 
1968 3,474 46,905 9,833 7,583 
1969 3,750 44,422 10,797 7,714 
Source: SECV Annual Report 1968/69, p.51. 
Tariff E, the unbroken line, is the Commercial All-Purpose Low-
Voltage Tariff, and it has a final block price of 2.05 c/kl-Jh. This 
tariff is very much like a combination of two other Commercial tariffs, 
Tariff A and Tariff C (see Appendix Five). It is also a substitute for 
the Commercial All-Purposes Maximum Demand Tariff V which has an energy 
rate of only 0.8 c/kWh but a minimum demand charge which amounts to 
around $700 per month. 
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Table 11.10 
Average Income (Cents) per kWh Sold, SECV 1948-1968 
Class All 
Year consumers 
ended Domestic Industrial Commercial (excl. 
June Bulk 
Supplies) 
1948 1.262 0.725 1.569 1.013 
1949 1.286 0.813 1.728 1.098 
1950 1.286 0.875 1.779 1.151 
1951 1.401 0.949 1.817 1.245 
1952 1.663 1.163 2.140 1.504 
1953 1.960 1.413 2.561 1.774 
1954 1.939 1.403 2.591 1.762 
1955 1.843 1.398 2.590 1.728 
1956 1.856 1.460 2.699 1.753 
1957 1.915 1.690 3.123 1.903 
1958 1.898 1.713 3.218 1.923 
1959 1.973 1.826 3.313 2.026 
1960 1.998 1.839 3.321 2.053 
1961 1.978 1.833 3.279 2.050 
1962 1.978 1.811 3.253 2.044 
1963 1.968 1.730 3.235 2.004 
1964 1.951 1.559 3.204 1.903 
1965 1.962 1.516 3.241 1.886 
1966 2.016 1.566 3.254 1.944 
1967 2 .002 1.575 3.215 1.944 
1968 2.035 1.633 3.290 1.999 
1969 2.091 1.744 3.317 2.097 
Source: SECV Annual Report 1968.69. p.52 
The average monthly consumption per consumer for the Commercial 
Class is about 3,700 kWh. (Commercial consumers have their meters read 
every month.) Even if we allow for consumption taken under other 
tariffs for the class it seems clear that a large number of Commercial 
consumers will not be consuming their marginal units at the price of 
the final block. This is only one manifestation of the higher average 
price which operates for the Commercial consumer, we will see more 
later. 
Tariff D, the dotted line, is an Industrial All-Purposes Tariff, 
and is much the same as Tariff E in scope except that the consumer has 
to consume over 125,000 kWh per month before he reaches his final block. 
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These are illustrations of only a few of the block tariffs which 
exist. The next most common form of tariff is the two-part tariff. 
In the SECV it takes two forms. In both cases there is an energy-
charge and a 'fixed' charge but the form of the 'fixed' charge can vary. 
In some cases it is related to the demand properties of the consumer 
(that is, demand in the electrical sense of kilowatts). The most 
important tariff of this kind is the High Voltage Industial All-Purposes 
Maximum Demand Tariff M. This tariff has a block rate energy charge 
which has a price of 0.66 c/kWh for the lowest block. The demand charge 
is $3.17 per kilowatt of maximum demand recorded between two consecutive 
monthly meter readings. This section of the tariff is subject to a 
minimum charge which amounts to around $1,500 per month. 
The other type of two-part tariff is that which contains a 
'service charge'. For example, the Commercial Residential Tariff G 
has an energy rate of 2.21 c/kWh and a service charge of 19 cents per 
month per room in the dwelling, rooms being appropriately defined by 
the SECV. 
As well as block and two-part tariffs there are also some special 
purpose tariffs. In the Domestic Class there is Tariff I which 
specifically applies to off-peak hot water services, and Tariff J which 
is for combined storage space heating and storage hot water. 
These are only some of the many tariffs which operate in the SECV. 
We can see from them that it would be extremely difficult to compare 
two tariff systems as a whole, or even two tariffs within the same 
system. But such comparisons are made and the methods used fall into 
either one of two methods. 
The first method is to estimate some average consumption figures 
and relate these to the relevant tariffs and compare the total costs. 
The second is to look at the average revenue per kWh earned by the 
particular tariff group. This second measure is a form of 'average 
price' and while it is a rather crude measure it is sufficient for 
our purposes and will be the one used here. 
One attempt at an overall appraisal of a tariff system with the 
use of graphs can be found in [185.p.33]. Unfortunately, it is a 
very complex structure based on a double-log chart with three different 
scales on the vertical axis. 
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Table 11.10 shows the income per W'Jh sold for the three major 
classes over the last 20 years. It Is clear that the average price 
per kWh is highest for the Commercial Class and lowest for the 
2 
Industrial Class. Table 11.11 gives similar information to that in 
Table 11.10 except that it is divided into the three metropolitan 
branches and the eight country branches. (See map in Appendix Six.) 
Table 11.11 
Average Income (Cents) per kWh Sold, SECV 1967/68 
Domestic Commercial Industrial 
Three Metropolitan „ 
Branches 2.004 3.340 1.523 
Eight Country Branches 2.120 3.189 2.091 
Source: SECV Electricity Supply Department Annual Report 1967/68 
As might be expected, due to the uniform tariffs operating 
throughout the State, the differences between country and city are not 
very large. The largest difference is in the Industrial Class and is 
probably caused by the use of the block form of tariff in this class. 
The higher average consumption by Industrial consumers in the 
metropolitan area, and therefore lower average price, could explain the 
difference. 
One particular form of sales which tends to make the average price 
for the Commercial Class higher than the others is the Lighting Tariff 
('A' Tariff). The details of this tariff can be seen in Appendix Five. 
Briefly, it is a two-block tariff with the first 100 units selling at 
8.0 c./kWh and any further units at 7.4 c./k^ ^^ l. In 1967/68, Tariff A 
1 
In 1967/68 the percentage of total sales attributed to the major 
classes were: Domestic 28 per cent. Industrial 26 per cent, Commercial 
14 per cent, Bulk Supplies 21 per cent, other 11 per cent. [SECV 
Annual Report 1967/68 p.5]. 
2 
The same situation can be found in all the other States of the 
Commonwealth. The following table has been compiled from Statistics 
in the Electricity Supply Association of Australia's 1967/68 Statistical 
publication. Because of differences in measurement interstate 
comparisons should not be made from this table. 
Revenue in cents per kI^rh Sold for the Year Ended 30 June, 1968 
New South Tasmania 
Wales ^^ Australia Australia 
Residential 1.94 2.08 1.67 2.38 1.49 
Commercial 2.84 3.27 2.74 2.95 1.91 
Industrial 1.55 1.74 1.46 1.78 0.58 
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accounted for over one quarter of the total income of the Commercial-
General Class while representing less than half of that percentage of 
the class sales. (It should be noted that it is quite unusual for a 
commercial consumer to be taking all of his supplies under Tariff A. 
As a rule, the consumer would be taking supply under more than one 
Commercial tariff with Tariff A being only one of the supply tariffs 
involved.) The same lighting tariff (Tariff A) applies to the 
Industrial-General Class as well, but neither the number of units sold 
nor the revenue earned is as significant as it is in the Commercial-
General Class. 
Before we conclude this section there are a few observations we 
would like to make concerning various aspects of the pricing system. 
(a) Cla sses 
The existence of the present classes is an historical feature of 
the system. In the industry's infancy domestic consumption primarily 
meant lighting, and industrial consumption meant daytime power usage. 
The divisions are no longer as clear cut. New demands are arising 
continuously and being fitted into one or other of the existing three 
major classes. Notwithstanding the earlier cost analyses shown, it is 
difficult to really understand the conglomeration of costs and loads, 
the aggregate of which make up the total picture for each class. 
In economic terms the division of consumers into these class 
groupings means little more than a convenient division for purposes of 
price discrimination. It is unfortunate that it is upon the basis of 
this division that most of the sales data collected in the SECV is 
dissected. Such a situation makes the task of economic analysis 
(e.g. attempts at measuring price elasticities) very difficult. 
(b) Uniform Tariffs 
As we have already noted in Chapter Eight, the prices charged for 
each particular tariff group are the same throughout the State, The 
tariffs do not therefore reflect any difference in cost as a result of 
the geography of the system. 
(c) Block Tariffs 
Block tariffs are now the most common form of tariff used by the 
SECV. The main deviations from its use are the flat rate energy charge 
^ SECV Electricity Supply Department Annual Report 1967/68 
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made for off-peak water heating; a two-part tariff for the Commercial 
Residential tariff group; and a 'Hopkinson type' two-part demand rate 
which is used for high voltage Industrial supplies, with a blocked tariff 
for the energy component of the tariff. 
Supporters of the block tariff within the industry have normally 
relied on one of two basic arguments which we present here with 
reference to domestic consumption, but the principles apply equally to 
other consumption. 
2 
(i) It is a promotional tariff. As long as the price decreases 
with each successive block, the greater the consumption the lower will 
be the average price per unit. Supporters of the promotional argument 
either believe in quantity discounts or subscribe to a belief in 
decreasing costs similar to that of the 'excess capacity theorists'. 
Neither view is in accordance with our principle of setting tariffs 3 such that they reflect the economic costs of supply. 
(ii) The higher priced earlier blocks are designed to cover a 
specific cost. These costs may include: - the average customer costs 
4 
associated with metering and billing; the estimated costs of supply 
of specific appliances, e.g. lighting and small appliances, then larger 
appliances, then cooking, then water heating, etc.;^ some contribution 
towards capacity cost. 
It would be quite valid to incorporate the customer cost into a 
marginal cost-based tariff structure.^ However, because the other 
costs of supply vary with the time of supply, attempts to incorporate 
these in the form of a block tariff would not improve the economic 
efficiency of the tariff. 
1 
The fixed portion of this tariff is based on the number of assessed 
rooms in the residence. This type of tariff was also the type used 
for the major Domestic tariff until 1967. As early as 1940, Lewis 
was arguing that this particular use of the two-part tariff was incorrect 
and misleading [137.p.54]. See also Houthakker [135,p.14]. 
2 
See Bonbright [ 72 . pp . 57-8]. 
3 
Davidson has an excellent chapter on the economic appraisal of block 
tariffs [129.Chpt.2]. 
4 
See Garfield and Lovejoy [85,p.155], 
5 
See Davidson [129.p.27], 
6 
See Houthakker [135,p.11] and Bonbright [72,p,312], 
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(d) Off-Peak Tariffs 
The two major off-peak tariffs offered are for the use of storage 
water heating and storage space heating appliances. The details of 
these tariffs can be seen in Appendix Five. They are simple tariffs. 
For the domestic class the water heating rate is a flat rate of 
1.05 c./kWh and for the storage space heating tariff (or a combination 
of both appliances) 1.05 c. for the first 1,200 units and 0.85 c. per 
unit for all further consumption for the quarter. 
One of the supposed advantages of a block tariff is its ability to 
cover the fixed charges and customer costs in the first block of the 
tariff. Because one would not expect an off-peak tariff to carry any 
fixed charges, the use of a flat rate tariff for off-peak consumption 
would initially seem to be an accurate reflection of the economic costs 
involved. But such is not the case. The use of a block tariff for the 
combination of the two off-peak appliances highlights the promotional 
aspect of this tariff.^ Two important points should be made concerning 
the use of off-peak tariffs. 
(a) If the utility recognises that the cost of producing off-peak 
power is lower than that for power produced at other times, why should 
the sales under this tariff be restricted to certain uses of power? 
Optional off-peak tariffs for the Industrial and Commercial classes do 
in fact partly recognise this fact, but the sales to these two classes 
under this tariff, amount to less than half of the restricted use 
Domestic off-peak sales. 
(b) Some writers, notably Clemens [180], have argued from the 
point of view that off-peak tariffs are, to a degree, an alternative to 
the type of tariff indicated by marginal cost methods. This view is 
only partly correct. While accurately pricing the off-peak consumption 
is one facet of the marginalist approach, it is only a minor part. The 
major part of the theory concerns the efficient pricing of the peak. 
It might be argued that in the case of the SECV, where the storage 
space heating tariff was necessarily imposed upon an existing tariff 
system, that the previous tariff could not be changed. From Figure 
11.3 we can see that in summer the off-peak water heating load can 
sometimes be the daily peak. Under these circumstances_it might be 
felt that the lowering of its price would worsen this situation. But 
of course, if this was the case then the new storage space heating 
tariff should not have been introduced at all. 
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If, as we contend here, the efficient allocation of resources is our 
aim, then it is the effect on investment, brought about by pricing the 
peak, that is important. Therefore it is of prime importance that the 
peak price accurately reflects cost. 
Reflection of cost in off-peak prices is a concomitant feature, 
but to concentrate on this aspect alone, to the detriment of the other, 
is to place emphasis on the efficient use of existing resources at the 
cost of contributing to a greater misallocation of resources in the 
future. Obviously the efficient utilisation of present resources and 
efficient allocation of future resources are both important but the 
emphasis of such theories as that of Peak Load Pricing lies in the 
latter rather than the former.^ 
(e) Bulk Supply Tariff 
In the financial year 1968/69 25 per cent of the SECV's total 
sales were made under the category described as 'Bulk Supplies' and 
2 
earned 21 per cent of the SECV's income from electricity sales. 
Practically all of these bulk supplies were made to the 11 Metropolitan 
councils who retail electricity. The SECV has never published the 
details of the Bulk Supply tariff but it has been possible to obtain 
the following incomplete details from customer sources outside of 
the SECV. It is a two-part tariff with a demand charge and an energy 
rate, both ccmponents having a base rate and a maximum rate. Table 
11.12 gives the details of the tariff. 
Table 11.12 
SECV Bulk Supply Tariff 
Base Rate Maximum Rate 
M.D. Charge $/kW. (measured monthly) 32.40 61.08 
Energy Charge c./kWh 0.608 0.666 
1 
We might normally expect the use of prices which distinguish between 
the peak and off-peak periods to assist in both of these tasks. 
However, there are cases, such as a perfectly inelastic demand for peak 
electricity, where pricing the peak efficiently will fulfill its 
economic function of resource allocation but not alter efficiency in 
the use of existing resources. 
2 
SECV Annual Report 1968/69.p.7. 
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We noted in Chapter Six that the SECV has been attempting to 
acquire the 11 Metropolitan Bulk Supply Councils for some time. Since 
the introduction of the uniform tariff throughout the State (including 
the Metropolitan Bulk Supply Areas), one of the stated reasons for the 
SECV's attitude has been that it should be allowed to collect all of 
the surplus being earned in the metropolitan area as a result of the 
uniform tariff. These surpluses would help to compensate it for the 
losses being incurred in supplying the country areas.^ 
Following these lines the SECV has adopted the following method 
2 of charging for bulk supplies of electricity to these 11 councils. 
The maximum rate is charged for all sales and a rebate is made to the 
3 
Councils individually. The method of determining the rebate is not 
known, but the end result is the charging of a base rate plus a premium, 
supposedly to make some contribution towards the cost of the electrical 
development, or subsidi zation, of the country areas of the State. For 
our purposes the most important feature of the tariff is its structure. 
The base rate is a two-part tariff which does not change over time. 
As well, there is a premium. The premium has to be seen as a constraint 
upon any suggestions for change in the pricing structure of the bulk 
supply of electricity. 
1 
See SECV Annual Report 1965/66.p.12. 
2 
No claim is made for absolute accuracy in these details as the 
information available is incomplete. The details, however, are 
sufficient for our purposes and cannot be refuted by any published 
document known to this author. 
3 
In its latest Annual Report the SECV comments: 
Expedients devised in an attempt to meet these problems 
are becoming increasingly complex and early action is 
necessary if the present unsatisfactory situation is 
to be resolved. [SECV Annual Report 1968/69.p.20] 
One can only imagine that this comment applies equally well to the 
Bulk-Supply Tariff. 
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CHAPTER TWELVE 
A REVISED TARIFF STRUCTURE 
1. Introduction 
The tariff structure outlined in the previous chapter is complex 
and does not lend itself to a simple explanation. Its present form 
is the result of a multiplicity of factors. The class groupings and 
the large number of tariffs are mainly the result of historical 
factors but there is also evidence of the influence of cost factors. 
There does not appear to be a tariff which is offered at lower than 
the cost of supply so cost factors probably set a lower limit. 
We have seen in earlier chapters that the undertaking has to earn 
a total revenue which is greater than the costs of electricity supply 
so costs must play some part in the process of setting prices. Clearly 
tariffs such as the special-purpose off-peak tariffs are cost derived. 
They probably reflect the lowest price the undertaking was prepared to 
offer after the operating costs at off-peak times, and the price 
reduction necessary to attract consumers into these particular markets 
were taken into consideration. 
It seems that marginal, or incremental costs have played only a 
minimal role in the determination of price differentials between 
groups of consumers. Rather, the philosophy in setting these relative 
prices is more akin to that described as 'charging what the market 
will bear' or 'value of service' pricing. In economic terminology 
both of these concepts fall under the heading of price discrimination 
which is defined around the relationship between the price charged for 
the unit and the cost of supplying the unit. Price discrimination does 
not exist simply because of price differentials among the units sold, 
but because the price-cost ratio differs among the units. Equal prices 
charged to two consumers whose costs of supply differ is as much price 
discrimination as any of the more obvious forms. 
The ideas associated with 'value of service' pricing have a long 
tradition in the electricity supply industry^ Even up to the present 
day its supporters are just as convinced of its efficacy as its 
detractors (mainly economists) are of its irrelevance. Among the 
For a review of this history see Bonbright [72.pp.82-92] 
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more recent advocates of 'value of service' principles of pricing have 
been Garfield and Lovejoy.^ 
The purposes of this approach to the differential 
pricing of utility services are: (1) to enable the 
utility to sell a volume of service which will 
maximise the utilization of its plant and equipment; 
(2) to achieve thereby the lowest average unit costs 
of operation; and (3) to afford the utility the 
best possible opportunity of earning the allowed 
rate of return. [85.p.143] 
The first two points have been repeatedly challenged by economists. 
As presented above they are very similar to the arguments put by what 
have been described as the ^ejccess capacity theorists' seen in Chapter 
One. Their argument rests largely on the assumption that the existence 
of decreasing costs warrants a continued expansion of output. That is, 
price discrimination is desirable because it will lead to an expansion 
of output by allowing sales to be made to some consumers at very low 
tariffs, thereby expanding output and reducing average price to all 
consumers. Economic arguments against such thinking have been put by 
Davidson [129.p.102], Bonbright [72.Chpt.19] and Hirshleifer [320.p.92] 
all of whom point out that such a principle, employed on its own, 
cannot reflect the economic costs of supply. 
The protagonists in the debate fall into fairly clear cut 
divisions of support or opposition. The excess capacity theory has 
little to support it but it is possible that the use of price 
discrimination as a pricing tool is not entirely without value. If 
the implications of Chapter Three are taken into account we might 
envisage a tariff system which attempts both to reflect the economic 
costs of supply and appropriate as much of the consumers' surplus as 
is necessary to meet the financial constraints. 
Before we look at this interesting possibility we will first 
outline the extent of price discriminatory practices in the present 
pricing structure of the SECV. We can distinguish four distinct forms 
of price discrimination. 
(a) Classes 
The existence of classes of consumers allows the undertaking to 
allocate average costs within the organization and also to practice 
1 
See also Coyle [15] and Clemens [7-10]. 
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what we know as third degree price discrimination, after Pigou's 
analysis. The preconditions for this form of discrimination are 
- a monopolistic seller 
- non-transferability of the goods sold, and 
- the ability to divide customers into groups 
according to their price elasticity of demand. 
The first two conditions clearly exist in the SECV and need no 
discussion. The third requires knowledge of the elasticity of demand 
which we discuss in detail later in the chapter. What we want to 
point out here is the analytical problem caused by the overlapping of 
tariffs and classes. For example, the off-peak hot water tariff I can 
be found in all three of the Domestic, Commercial and Industrial Classes. 
The price is the same in each case but the qualifications to become a 
consumer are different. This sort of pricing is not part of the class 
price discrimination to which we have referred. 
Not all of the tariffs which occur in any class are an attempt to 
divide consumers into groups based on elasticities for discrimination 
purposes. However, there is one obvious example of such a case. We 
refer to the Commercial and General Glass consumers served under 
Tariffs A and E. In the previous chapter we saw the very high average 
price charged to consumers in this class. There is no evidence that 
the cost of supplying these consumers is so much greater than the cost 
of supplying other consumers as to warrant the difference in price. 
On the contrary, the available evidence would indicate that much of 
the supply to the commercial consumers is made where load density is 
highest, i.e. in commercial centres. Where load density is high the 
relative costs of electricity supply are reduced. Figures G.I.2 and 
G.I.4 in Appendix 8 indicate that these consumers have loads which are 
at their highest during the daytime and fall off markedly just prior 
to the system maximum demand, indicating that there is no reason why 
they should incur any excessive share of capacity costs. 
By implication the Commercial Class is subjected to price 
discrimination because it has a low price elasticity of demand. This 
would particularly apply to the extensive use of electricity for 
commercial lighting, a sub-market of the demand for which there is no 
practical alternative. 
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One might wonder in this case why the use of electricity for 
domestic lighting purposes has not been similarly priced.^ The answer 
is possibly two-fold. There is an extra cost involved in special 
metering equipment for the large number of domestic consumers who would 
be involved. Also, domestic electricity prices are politically 
sensitive and any hint of discriminatory pricing as obvious as this 
would be regarded as very undesirable by the government, and therefore 
by the undertaking. 
It is possible that the group of people who form the Commercial 
Class are not regarded as representing a substantial political force 
where electricity prices are concerned. In this case, the politically 
feasible upper limit on their prices may be higher than for other more 
politically sensitive classes of consumer. The assumed ability of the 
commercial users of electricity to pass on the increased price in terms 
of higher prices for their own product may also help account for the 
apparently higher feasible maximum price for the commercial class. 
(b) Block tariffs 
The second form of price discrimination observed is that between 
consecutive units consumed by the same consumer, or between consumers 
within the same tariff group. It arises through the use of the block 
tariff form of pricing. It is also commonly described in Pigou's 
terms as second degree price discrimination. Tariffs such as GB, C, E, 
N, B and D all present a tariff where it is possible for two consumers 
to be taking supply at the same time under identical conditions but be 
paying different prices. They also permit the possibility of a small 
consumer taking all of his supply at off-peak and paying more per unit 
than a larger consumer who takes all of his supply at the peak-period. 
Under these conditions price is not associated with the economic 
costs of supply and price discrimination exists. If the price of the 
blocks is sufficiently high then it is also possible under this form 
of tariff to earn revenue in excess of the costs of supply. 
(c) Country and city 
Many of the costs of supplying electricity are a function of the 
geographical density of the consumers. Transmission and distribution 
^ There is a similar lighting tariff in the industrial ^ ^ 
consumption under it is not very large and it is 
the tariff by taking supply under an alternative industrial tariff. 
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costs, and losses involved in transporting electricity all increase the 
greater is the distance from the generating station to the consumer, 
and the further apart are the consumers. It is not unusual then to 
find that the cost of supply to country areas is greater than that to 
city areas. 
We have discussed the uniform tariffs at some length in Chapter 
Eight and all that is required here is to record that the existence of 
uniform tariffs leads to a degree of price discrimination to the 
extent that it divorces prices from their economic cost of supply among 
consumers. 
(d) Peak and off-peak 
Once we accept the concept of cost allocation given by the peak 
load pricing theory any tariff which is constant over the whole day, or 
year, must of necessity be discriminatory in its effect. Such a tariff 
will discriminate in favour of those who consume units at the time of 
peak supply and against those who consume during the off-peak period. 
On the assumption that the peak consumption is not entirely inelastic 
under-pricing the peak will result in over-consumption of peak units 
and over-investment in plant to meet that demand. 
We have already indicated in Part B of this thesis that political 
factors have played a part in deciding the relative level of tariffs in 
the SECV - although probably not the content of each tariff. In this 
chapter we have also mentioned the historical factors creating a 
legacy from the past within which new tariffs have to be interwoven. 
A full analysis of the history of the tariff system would not be 
possible without the full cooperation of the undertaking itself and 
there is little hope that this would be forthcoming. We have been 
able to show the major ways in which prices for electricity appear to 
depart from their economic cost. Price discrimination is usually 
associated with the profit maximising monopolist and it is possible to 
detect an element of this association in the case of the SECV. Of 
course it has not shown its presence in terms of 'profits' in the 
normal sense, but rather in the earning of a surplus 'hidden' in 
depreciation and other reserves. This surplus, over and above the 
costs of electricity supply, is used to cover the losses on briquettes, 
tramways, far-flung rural extensions and most importantly, to provide 
an adequate amount of internal funds for capital development. 
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In achieving this extra revenue it is most likely that the forms 
of discrimination described under class and block-tariffs are the most 
important. The other two, country and city and peak and off-peak, are 
very difficult to quantify, and as well, it is quite possible that 
neither practice is leading to a creation of surplus funds, i.e. uniform 
tariffs might be simply a transfer mechanism whereby the surplus earned 
on the city consumers is transferred to the country consumers with 
none left over. The same may be the case with peak and off-peak 
consumers. 
Whether this is true or not, the practices described as second and 
third degree price discrimination are the most obvious ways of raising 
any surplus revenue, and as such apply equally to country and city, 
peak and off-peak consumers. 
Our final task is to make recommendations as to how this tariff 
system might be reconstructed so that it more accurately reflects the 
economic costs of supply. At the same time it must be capable of 
earning a surplus large enough to allow the undertaking to fulfill the 
social and political role it now undertakes. 
2. A Suggested Tariff Structure for the SECV 
One way of illustrating the practical implications of the 
theoretical sections of this study is to make up a set of tariffs 
based on the principles we have espoused.^ As far as it has been 
possible the magnitudes and values assumed in our proposed tariffs 
have been derived from the year 1968/69. But we must emphasise that 
the values used are not meant to be estimates of the actual variables, 
2 to do this we would need far more information than we have available. 
^ Other articles related to the application of marginal cost pricing are 
by Houthakker [135], Crew [181] and [76], Harberger and Andreatta [87], 
Johnson [94] and Turvey [147.Chpt.9 and 308]. On the purely practical 
side are writings devoted to the Tariff Vert in France and the Bulk 
Supply Tariff in Britain. For Britain see [178,200,201,217,223] and 
for France [172,173,179,199]. 
2 
In reference [308] Turvey outlines some of the problems associated 
with the measurement of marginal cost and concludes 
I trust that what I have said above is sufficient to 
show that estimating marginal cost is an enormous task 
and that even rough approximations are beyond the 
capability of the odd unaided economist, [p.127] 
He goes on to say that even if all the required measurements were made 
...'pure' marginal cost pricing is non-operational. Prices 
have to reflect a weighted average of marginal costs over 
periods of time, over geographical areas and so on. [p.127] 
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(a) Assumptions 
Our assumptions for the organizational structure of the SECV are 
as follows. First we assume that the metropolitan bulk supply councils 
have been disbanded and their consumers are served by the SECV. We 
discuss the general problem of bulk supply tariffs later in the chapter, 
but for the moment, if we leave them out we can aggregate all of the 
relevant variables in the basic tariff. This leaves us with a fully 
centralised electricity undertaking. 
We also assume that tariffs have to be uniform over the State for 
each class of consumer. Following our discussion in Chapter Eight it 
would be quite unrealistic to assume otherwise. 
(b) Choice of time periods - peak, plateau and off-peak 
Any tariff based on marginalist principles will be expected to 
reflect the changes which take place in marginal cost over the time of 
day and over the time of year. It is necessary for us to divide up the 
time of day and the time of the year into periods over which various 
parts of the tariff will operate.^ 
Let us take the time of year first. We saw some of the problems 
of defining the peak in Chapter Five, and in that chapter we made one 
suggestion as to some divisions based on the British experience of a 
'plateau' peak as well as a peak proper. There are many other ways in 
which we could describe the peak each involving different levels of 
2 abstract ion. 
Figure 11.3 in the previous chapter shows us the complete 
continuous load curves for the system in the year 1968. If we use this 
information we can draw abstracted load curves to represent the basic 
changes in demand which took place over the year. Figures 12.1, 12.2 
and 12.3 show three such simplified expressions of demand changes over 
the year. 
See Houthakker [135.p.5] for an argument that seasonal tariffs alone, 
without changes over the time of day, are inadequate for our pricing 
purposes. 
^ For a discussion of the definition of the peak see Meek [201] and 
Turvey [147.p.101]. 
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Figure 12.3 is much the same as the figure shown in Chapter Five, 
incorporating a peak 'plateau'. The other two depict a simple off-peak 
situation, the length and severity of the peak changing in each case. 
We can also undertake a similar expression of demand periods over 
the time of day. This we have done in Figures 12.a, 12.b and 12.c, 
each, once again, representing a different level of abstraction. 
^^ Figure 12.a Figure 12.b Figure 12.c 
6 am 6pm 6 am 6pm 6 am 6 pm 
The periods of time illustrated in these diagrams are:-
12.1 May to August is the peak 
12.2 May to October is the peak 
12.3 June and July is the peak and May, August, September 
and October the plateau 
12.a 2300 - 0630 
0630 - 2300 
12.b 2300 - 0630 
0630 - 1700 
1700 - 1900 
1900 - 2300 
12 .C. 2300 - 0630 
0630 - 1000 
1000 - 1700 
1700 - 1900 
1900 - 2300 
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In framing our time of day/time of year tariff we could choose any of 
the combinations of 1, 2 and 3 and a, b and c. For example 3c would 
give us the most accurate reflection of cost, but it would also be the 
most complex structure as well. On the other hand, la or 2a would be 
simpler but would not reflect the changing costs as well. 
We can make two points concerning the degree of simplicity of the 
structure. First, the simpler the structure the more averaging of costs 
will be required, and second, the simpler the structure the less chance 
there is of the peak shifting to some other time period. Naturally, 
the simpler the structure the less accurate is the portrayal of costs 
in the tariffs. 
For our illustration we choose combination 3b, We do this partly 
for simplicity and partly because we feel it would possibly suit the 
SECV's conditions. Remembering that our case is only an illustration 
probably the only comment we need make on the choice is the assumed 
existence of one peak in the tariff when there is both a morning peak 
and an evening peak in the system. Simplicity was one factor in the 
choice, and the other was the assumption that in the longer term 
(long enough for consumers to change their domestic appliances) those 
domestic consumers, who are largely responsible for the peak, will 
change their appliances as a result of the night peak price. Because 
the night and morning peaks must be complementary to some extent, 
pricing the night peak will also curtail consumption at the time of 
the morning peak. The assumption also simplifies our analysis. 
We make one exception to our choice of combination 3b and this is 
that in the summer months of the tariff we will use combination 3a. 
We can see in Figure 11,3 that the summer months have a fairly 
constant loading over the whole day. 
Table 12.4 shows how many hours per year each part of the tariff 
runs for, the total amounting to the number of hours in a year. The 
calculations for this and a number of succeeding tables have been 
calculated in Appendix Nine, 
Table 12.4 
Hours of operation of each tariff period 
Time of Year (Months) 
Time of day (hours) Off-peak Plateau Peak 
2300 - 0630 1357.5 922,5 457,5 
0630 - 1700 1900.5 1291.5 640.5 
1700 - 1900 362.0 246.0 122.0 
1900 - 2300 724.0 492.0 244.0 
4344.0 2952.0 1464.0 = 8760 hours 
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If we also make some assumptions concerning the average level of demand 
during these time periods (see Appendix Nine) we can calculate the 
approximate number of GWh's (one million kilowatthours) supplied 
during these times in the year 1968, as shown in Figure 11.3. This 
information is given in Table 12.5. 
Table 12.5 
G\'Jh per tariff period 
Time of Year (Months) 
Time of day (hours) Off-peak Plateau Peak 
2300 - 0630 1300 1000 600 
0630 - 1700 2500 2000 1200 
1700 - 1900 500 400 300 
1900 - 2300 900 700 400 
5200 4100 2500 = 11,800 GWh 
The total production of 11,800 GWh is of the same order as the actual 
production for the year 1968 which can be derived from the annual 
reports. 
Next we need to obtain some values to represent the operating and 
capacity costs of the system. 
(c) Costs 
Operating costs. For the year 1968/69 the total operation and maintenance 
costs shown in the Annual Report were $73.797m. Total G\</h sent out for 
the same period was 11,074. Expressed per kWh the operation and 
maintenance costs were 0.66 cents per unit. We must expect this figure 
to be higher than the operation and maintenance costs of generation 
alone because, presumably, the figure includes all maintenance for the 
system as well as the operation expenses of the briquette factories 
etc. Nevertheless it is a fair enough approximation for our purposes. 
Capacity costs. For the same period depreciation was $42.959m. and 
interest was $47.961m. From our discussion in Chapter Ten we expect 
the depreciation figure to be inflated so let us assume that the total 
capacity cost applicable to the electricity system is $70m. 
It is with the introduction of the above figures that we largely 
depart from the calculation of marginal values as depicted in Part A. 
However, the averaging process we will use is sufficient for the end it 
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serves even though it avoids the problems associated with concept and 
measurement of marginal cost, the coincidence of generation, transmission 
and distribution systems, measurement of marginal cost of transmission, 
etc. 
The time of day/time of year tariff we are espousing will have its 
highest price at the time of the system peak. These higher prices will 
be the result both of the higher running cost per unit brought about 
by the operation of older less efficient thermal stations, and the 
allocation of the capacity cost to the peak. If we allocated all of 
the capacity costs to the 122 peak hours in the winter months the price 
would be incredibly high and probably lead to the peak shifting to a 
nearby period. The capacity costs therefore need to be allocated more 
widely to avoid this problem. There are three peak periods occurring 
in the winter months during which, according to Table 12.5, approximately 
1900 GWh were produced. This is an average of 3,7 cents per kWh (based 
on $70m. capacity costs). It is an exceptionally crude figure and is 
meant as little more than a guide for some guesses as to the relative 
prices we can set over the time of day and time of year. Table 12.6 
outlines one such price schedule. 
(d) A Cost-Related Tariff Structure 
The figures in Table 12.6 are largely self-explanatory and allow 
for a range of prices from 0.4 cents per unit to 4.6 cents. Allowance 
has been made for the fact that less efficient plant is brought into 
operation during the peak period and so the running cost per unit will 
increase as the peak approaches. 
Table 12.6 
A Basic Tariff Structure (cents/kWh) 
Time of Year (Months) 
Time of day 
(hours) 
Off--Peak Plateau Peak 
Operat-
ing 
Costs 
Capacity 
Costs 
Operat-
ing 
Costs 
Capacity 
Costs 
Operat-
ing 
Costs 
Capacity 
Costs 
2300 - 0630 
0630 - 1700 
1700 - 1900 
1900 - 2300 
0.4 
0.6 
0.6 
0.6 
0.4 
0.8 + 
0.8 + 
0.8 + 
0.8 
1.6 
0.8 
0.4 
1.0 + 
1.4 + 
1.0 + 
2.4 
3.2 
2.4 
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The weighted average of these running costs would be expected to come 
to something like the figure given earlier, 0.66 cents. The ratio of 
0.4 to 1.4 (1:3 .5) does not seem very far wrong if we consider the 
range shown in the direct costs in Figure 11.7. This figure also 
appears to be confirmed by Pierson [237.p.607] in the cost information 
he depicts for the SECV. In Meek's article on the New Bulk Supply 
Tariff, he quotes a difference in running cost between peak and 
off-peak of 0.47d. to l.Od. for the CEGB. [201.p.48] 
Our capacity costs are allocated mainly to the peak months but 
it is felt that the plateau months also should receive some of these 
charges to lessen the likelihood of the peak shifting to these times. 
A shift over the time of the year is not very likely because the 
timing of the peak depends more on weather conditions than on prices. 
There is far more likelihood that the peak will shift within the time 
of day so the capacity charges on either side of the peak time in the 
peak months are set to discourage such a shift. 
The overall range in the tariff including the capacity cost is 
0.4c. to 4.6c. for the cost-related portion of the tariff. While this 
is not the total tariff it might be of interest to compare this ratio 
with figures which have been suggested for other undertakings. The 
important difference in each case is that the shorter the peak period 
chosen the higher will be the ratio of peak to off-peak prices. In 
the early 1950's Little suggested a ratio of 17.5:1 for Britain, 
while Houthakker suggested 7:1.^ The difference between the two is in 
the length of the peak period. Little restricted his peak demand 
period to 60 hours while Houthakker's appears to be much longer. More 
recently, Crew has quoted two different ratios. For the Pennine 
Electricity Board, one of the distributing authorities in Britain, he 
suggested 7.7:1 [181.p.17]. For the CEGB he suggested a price range 
2 
from 0.4d. per unit to 4.5d. per unit [76.p.91] 
A little closer to home Kolsen appears to have guessed a ratio 
for New South Wales in 1966, of 3.0d.:0.75d. [233.p.570] but he used 
a very long peak running from 7.00a.m. to 9.00 p.m. This different 
definition of the peak helps to explain some of the differences 
between his tariffs and ours. 
^ Little [140.p.59] and Houthakker [135.p.22]. See also Steiner [144.p.591] 
and Davidson [129.p.194] for a discussion of the general problem. 
2 
See also Harberger and Andreatta [87]. 
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To see whether our own prices are realistic in total terms we can 
calculate the amount of revenue they would earn by multiplying the 
figures for GWhs produced, in Table 12.5 by the prices in Table 12.6. 
We have done this in Appendix Nine and the total revenue amounts to 
approximately $135m. In the Annual Report covering the year 1968/9 
total revenue was close to $200m. 
From this we need to deduct four items of expense which have not 
been included in the direct operating and capacity costs covered in the 
tariff in Table 12.6. These are Administration, etc., $19m., Employees 
Benefits, Acc ommocation etc., $10m., Allocations to Reserves and 
Transfers to Government, $20m. and the $20m. we deducted from the value 
of depreciation earlier. We are left with $130m. to be recovered from 
the above tariff which is sufficiently close to the $135m. calculated. 
This calculation is a very rough check because at the prices given 
in Table 12.6 there is no real reason to believe that the kWhs sold in 
each tariff period will be the same as they were before the tariff was 
introduced. This would only be the case if demand were completely 
insensitive to price. 
We discuss price elasticity in greater depth in the next section 
so here we will simply assume that demand alters by certain percentages 
in response to the introduction of the new tariff. The assumed 
percentages are listed in column (ix) in Appendix Nine. 
The effect of price changes on the load curve 
Figure 12.7 shows load curves related to the tariff periods we 
are using. The continuous line is the assumed loading (abstracted 
from Figure 11.3) prior to the price change. The details are given in 
column (iv) in Appendix Nine. The load factor for this system, i.e. 
the ratio between actual output and the output with the peak prevailing 
over the whole period, is 64 per cent [2.1^^8760)' ^^^ 
shows us the assumed loading after the price changes. The peak has 
decreased and the off-peak demand has increased. 
The load factor for this new demand pattern is 72 per cent, 
(^2,024 ) .g ^ substantial improvement. Column (xiii) in the 
(1.89 x 8760) ^ 
Appendix indicates that total revenue in this new system is only a 
little less than it was previously. 
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As a result of the changes in the load pattern we will eventually 
expect to see a change in the costs of operating the system. Plant 
which previously operated only for short times at the peak will now 
be expected to operate for longer periods. It is likely that this 
change would make it worthwhile to introduce new base load plant 
into the system within a year or two of the demand changing. The new 
plant will lead to a saving in costs as it takes its place as the 
cheapest and most efficient plant in the system. 
The outcome of the change in costs is that a new tariff should be 
devised. We can see then that the introduction of a tariff as described 
here is not going to be simple. There will need to be experimentation 
and there will probably be some interference with consumers' long range 
planning. If all of the conditions of demand were known the problem 
would not be as great. Successive iterations of price and demand 
could be carried out prior to the announcement of the tariff and 
hopefully, consumers' actions would bear out the assumptions made. 
We are now in a position to outline how the basic pricing schedule 
shown in Table 12.6 can be extended to cover a number of extra 
possibilities. 
Customer-related costs 
The tariffs we have outlined would be uniform over the whole State 
but we have achieved this largely by ignoring the fact that some costs 
of supply are a function of distance from the generators, and the 
density of consumers. We have averaged out the costs of supplying 
country and city and used this average cost as the relevant one for 
pricing purposes. This is the same practice as is currently used by 
the SECV following their policy of discrimination against the city 
consumers in favour of the country consumers. 
In a programming formulation of the problem the introduction of a 
constraint of a uniform tariff for all consumers, or for all consumers 
in a particular class, may lead to a different answer, but it also 
may not reflect the basic reason for the constraint existing. 
We will probably wish to add some extra tariffs to our basic 
structure. Consumers who receive their supplies at higher voltages 
than the minimum will not be incurring the same costs as those consumers 
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on the lowest voltage.^ Therefore, we will probably want to introduce 
a special high voltage tariff with lower prices. How the reductions 
are made will depend largely on the costs associated with the transmission 
and distribution system but the basic outline we have given here will 
not be altered significantly. 
A Community Service tariff could also be introduced. The price 
reductions to be made depend largely on the goals of the government and 
the undertaking. If it were possible, the reductions might take the 
form of an overall reduction retaining the same relative prices for 
the tariff. Any losses incurred as a result would have to be made up 
from other consumers in the form of the surcharges which we will be 
investigating shortly. 
In this matter though it is well to remember that it should not be 
the functi on of the SECV to redistribute income for social purposes - the 
same argument applies for uniform tariffs - and that the change to a new 
tariff might be a good time for the SECV to confront the government 
with a view to divesting itself of this role. We would not expect such 
an approach to be very successful though, as we have suggested in 
earlier chapters. So for our purposes we will assume that these social 
welfare functions will continue to be performed - even after a 
confrontation with the government. (If we accept this position we 
might even go further and suggest that the range of these functions 
be extended to include a lower tariff for old-aged and invalid 
pensioners.) 
If we leave aside these extra tariffs for a moment, our total 
shortfall of funds, relating to our given year 1968/9, is about $70m. 
Of this about $40m. is for internal financing, payments to reserves, 
transfers to governments, etc. and we will deal with it in the next 
section. The other $30m. we will assume can be made up of $10m. which 
can be related directly to the number of customers, and $20m. in 
overheads which cannot be related to customers, energy or demand, but 
is necessary expenditure if anyone is to be served. 
For the overhead cost we will allocate the cost on a per unit 
basis. Total sales for our system (col.(xii) Appendix Nine) is 10,000GWh, 
or 10,000 million kWh. To raise 2,000 million cents it will be 
1 
In its present tariff structure tha SECV allows a discount of 5 per 
cent on the low voltage tariff if a consumer takes line supply at a 
specified higher voltage. See Appendix 5, Tariff M - Option III. 
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necessary to add 0.2 cents to the existing price per kWh sold. This 
should be added to the prices in Table 12.6. 
As far as possible, customer-related costs should be charged 
directly to those customers who incurred them. Some degree of averaging 
is necessary but it should be possible to charge each customer the 
estimated cost of having him on the system for one year. This would 
be the cost of metering, billing, collecting and maintenance directly 
related to his supply. 
A single bill once a year is possible but is probably not as 
palatable as a smaller charge every time a bill is presented^ To 
overcome the identification problem we will introduce classes of 
consumers, each member of which pays the same averaged customer cost 
for that class. (Classes of consumers were to be introduced in the 
next section relating to the surcharge, so we will leave detailed 
discussions of the subject until then.) 
Let us assume that there are 1,000,000 consumers, (the actual 
figure for 1968/9 was 981,535), 800,000 of whom are domestic consumers 
and 100,000 each of commercial and industrial consumers.^ Commercial 
and industrial consumers usually have their meters read every month and 
domestic consumers have theirs read every quarter. As an approximation 
to the costs involved we will assume that it costs $8 per annum to keep 
a domestic consumer on the system and $16 per annum for a commercial 
or industrial consumer. 
One way to recover the costs of supply then is to have an overhead 
charge of $2 per quarter for domestic and $1.40 per month for commercial 
and industrial consumers. The charge could take the form of the fixed 
part of a two-part tariff. As well as our basic tariff structure we 
now have added to it a fixed charge which will be different between the 
domestic class and the other two classes of consumers. 
This completes our section on the cost-related portions of the 
imaginary tariff schedule we are compiling. It is highly simplified 
in calculation but not necessarily so in outline and relative 
1 
For a general discussion of the relationship between the complexity 
of tariffs and the number of consumer classes see Turvey [147.p.106]. 
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magnitudes. But the simplification has led to some limitations in its 
presentation and we should mention these before we move to the subject 
of the surcharge. 
Limitations 
Probably the biggest limitation lies in the use of the averaging 
of costs to arrive at the values shown. In our case it is unavoidable, 
and to some extent will be unavoidable in practice as well. But it has 
allowed us to skip over the conceptual problems associated with the 
measurement of marginal energy cost and marginal capacity cost. The 
values of long-run marginal cost or short-run marginal cost do not 
appear in our schedule and in their place we have used average costs. 
We can only hope that the difference is not very great between the 
marginal values and the average values we have used here. 
Another problem is presented by the 'one-year' nature of the 
analysis. It arises in two ways - one forward and the other back-ward. 
The latter could be overcome by having information available for 
previous years to allow demand data to be collected on the basis of the 
probability of demand occurring at different times of the day or year. 
The forward problem hinges on the possibility of a price change not 
only altering the actual level of sales in a once and for all manner, 
but also altering the rate of growth of demand or sales. In this case 
the effect on the future becomes much more complicated. It is difficult 
to know just how important a problem this could be. At a first glance 
there would appear to be other, more important determinants of growth 
rates than the actual level of prices. The rate of change of prices, 
or the rate of change of prices relative to the price of substitutes 
may be important but probably such things as the rate of growth of 
income, and changes in taste are far more important determinants of 
the rate of growth of electricity demand and energy. Whatever the case 
it will still be necessary to make some forecast of the likely effect 
of a price change on the future total demand for the product. 
(e) The Surcharge 
As a starting point we have to earn surplus revenue over and above 
that which we have already discussed, of about $40m. This figure is 
largely an assumption. We have pointed out in Chapters Eight and Ten 
how difficult it is to arrive at an accurate figure for the amount 
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which has to be earned in any given year to satisfy the social and 
political obligations which we outlined. 
Because we have been using average costs we find that the total of 
all revenue earned with our tariffs will cover the total costs of 
generation. If we had been able to use marginal costs for the 
calculation of energy and capacity costs we might have found that 
through the existence of decreasing costs our cost related parts of 
the tariff did not produce enough revenue to cover the average costs of 
electricity supply. (See Chapter Four for some indications as to the 
likelihood of this.) 
It does not follow automatically that a combination of marginal 
cost pricing and decreasing costs will lead to a deficit in practice 
even though it does in theory. A surplus even may appear as the result 
of a consistent underestimation of demand growth leading to prices 
higher than those which would have applied had the investment programme 
been optimal.^ There is also the role of inflation. Inflation will 
lead to different values arising for economic loss and accounting loss. 
With a sufficiently high rate of inflation the accounting loss will be 
2 
less than the economic loss, and it may even disappear altogether. 
We will not try to set any sort of value on a possible deficit for 
the SECV. If such a deficit did arise we assume that it would be added 
to the total amount we have already mentioned to cover the requirements 
for internal finance, transfers to the government, and the subsidies 
to the briquette industry and the tramways. 
In the theoretical terms we have been using we have a budget 
constraint in operation on the undertaking. The undertaking is required 
to earn a surplus over and above the revenue which it would normally 
earn as a result of marginal cost pricing for its electricity business. 
Our results in Chapter Three, along with common sense, suggest that we 
1 
See Westfield [151.p.69] 
2 
In 1960 Boiteux reported that EDF had only a small accounting loss 
even though the industry had decreasing costs and a much larger economic 
deficit. This arose, he said, because 
...average and marginal cost are of about the same 
order of magnitude, because the difference between 
revalued average cost and average accounting cost 
is about the same as the difference between revalued 
average cost and marginal cost. [70.p.26] 
See also Turvey [308,p.131] 
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raise the revenue with a surcharge, or quasi-tax on various consumers, 
depending on the elasticity properties of their demands.^ Logically, 
a tax on consumers with the least elastic demands will have the least 
distorting effect on the allocation of resources. 
The same problem we are discussing here has attracted the attention 
of other writers on the subject. But it is only recently - since the 
studies on the budget constraint - that there has been any suggestion 
of a clear answer. Bonbright, for instance wrote: 
The problem of determining what surcharges will impose 
the least harm,...when the rates as a whole must yield 
total revenue requirements is perhaps the most complex 
and most difficult problem of modern rate theory. [72.p.302] 
Turvey also commented: 
The problem of how to meet this excess [of cost] with 
the least damage to resource allocation deserves more 
attention... It is, indeed, but one of a number of 
political and social reasons for departure from marginal 
cost purism. [146.p.430] 
But the answers which we saw in Chapter Three have not arisen as a 
completely new idea. Something of the same idea was inherent in 
Ramanahan's proposals in Chapter Six, and Bonbright also has suggested 
something similar. He recommended that the tariff should have two parts 
...a minimum rate, called a 'price', and a surcharge 
called a 'quasi tax'... The 'price' component should 
be set at marginal cost - at the specific cost that 
can be imputed on a causal basis to a relatively small 
increment of service. The surcharge, on the other hand, 
is a charge in excess of specific cost and is designed 
to yield an appropriate share of the unallocable total 
costs. [72.p.302] 
He did not specify the manner in which the surcharge would be allocated 
between consumers but it is a fairly obvious next step to relate it to 
price elasticity. 
Price elasticity 
What we are talking about is price discrimination, discrimination 
between consumers on the basis of their elasticity of demand. We will 
not be able to undertake perfect price discrimination and have a 
different price for every consumer based on his individual elasticity, 
1 
See Bye [183.p.131] for an interpretation of Boiteux on this subject 
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so one of our problems is going to be the introduction of consumer 
classes which we have already mentioned in relation to customer-related 
costs in the previous section. But, before we do this there is another 
topic which requires discussion. It is price elasticity and its 
measurement in the electricity industry. 
In any analysis of the demand for electricity it must be remembered 
that electricity is never demanded for itself, electricity in such a 
form being positively harmful. What is demanded is the service, or 
output, of an appliance or machine which uses electricity as a necessary 
input. For example, the question of whether or not to use electricity 
is really a question of whether to use an electrical appliance in 
preference to one which does not require an electrical input. 
When we consider the vast number of electrical appliances and 
machines in our modern society, and all of the factors which influence 
the demand for the output of these machines, we can appreciate the 
magnitude of the task of discovering what are the influences on the 
demand for electricity. There will have to be a degree of abstraction 
and there are many uses of electricity which we can ignore (e.g. 
electrical carving knives). But what should be the level of abstraction? 
Let us take the completely aggregated case first. In terms of a 
statistical analysis the immediate problems are related to a definition 
of the two data terms, price and quantity. The only variable we can 
use for price is the average revenue earned per kWh sold, and for 
quantity, the average consumption per consumer. For example, in 1968/9 
these figures were 2.097 cents and 7,714 kWh respectively. 
The basic fault with the average revenue measure lies with the 
large number of tariffs and tariff types which are used to earn the 
revenue. For example, let us assume that from our aggregated data we 
discovered that in the past a 1 per cent increase in average revenue 
was accompanied by a 0.2 per cent decrease in consumption per consumer. 
With such a range of tariffs there are many different ways in which an 
identical increase in average revenue could be obtained - an overall 
increase in tariffs, rearrangeme. t of the blocks, increases in the 
fixed charge, and so on. There is no reason to assume that all of 
these possibilities, while leading to an identical increase in average 
revenue, would have the same effect on quantity demanded. It is 
fairly safe to conclude that statistical analysis of the aggregate 
demand for electricity will not give results which have sufficient 
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meaning for the purposes we have in mind. We require knowledge of the 
smaller units of consumption. Even here we run into the same problem 
of the measure to be used to represent price. 
Ideally, we would use consumption data related to groups of 
similar appliances, electric domestic cooking, domestic heating, 
commercial cooking, etc. but there is no data collected on this basis. 
The only two groups of data available relate to the consumer classes, 
and individual tariffs. The only publicly available data is that of 
the consumer classes but as we saw in Chapter Eleven each class 
comprises a number of tariffs which leads us into the same problem 
of average revenue as with the aggregated data. Even for a single 
tariff, if it is not a simple flat rate energy charge the same problem 
occurs. There will be many ways of achieving a given percentage 
increase in average revenue and there is no proof (or enough price 
changes to allow one to obtain it) that each of these alterations to 
the price schedule will have the same effect on consumption. 
For our purposes then we are forced to rely on intuitive notions 
as to the level of price elasticities. 
The overall demand for electricity? 
Because of its nature in use, electricity is close to being a 
necessity in many fields. Areas such as lighting, electronics, 
electrolytic processes, etc. leave little room for substitute fuels. 
In other areas it is costly and inconvenient, certainly in the short-run, 
to change to an alternative source of energy. Only in a few areas like 
heating and cooking is electricity under direct competition from other 
fuels. We conclude that the overall demand for electricity, whatever 
that means, is relatively inelastic,^ possibly of the order of 0.2 or 
0,3, In the longer term, when consumers have more opportunity to change 
their appliances, it may be a little higher, 
^ This belief is certainly subscribed to by some authors from within the 
electricity business. 
It is a feature of the power and energy business that 
there is a steady and continuous 'sellers' market. In 
economic terms the demand is inelastic, in ordinary 
language the consumer knows what he wants and is willing, 
within limits, to pay what it takes to get it. [A.W. Pedder 
and E.L.E. Wheatcroft. 'Principles for the economic 
evaluation of alternative energy sources'. Vol.10 Economic 
Evaluation of Alternative Energy Sources, 6th World Power 
Conference, Melbourne 1962.p.3997] 
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The commercial consumer 
From our previous discussions it appears that the Commercial class 
is far less elastic in its demand than are the other two classes. 
Under the Commercial Tariffs the SECV supplies 'Shops, Offices, 
Warehou ses. Theatres, Public Buildings, Schools, etc'. For a large 
part of this supply there are no substitutes - lighting, cash registers, 
office machines, computers, lifts, film projectors, etc. For further 
proof we can cite the fact of very high tariffs already in existence 
which are not substantiated by higher costs. We conclude that the 
2 demand for electricity by commercial consumers is very inelastic. 
The industrial consumer 
Very little is known of the characteristics of this supply in 
Victoria. In total it is very strongly correlated with the level of 
industrial activity but little is known of its responsiveness to price. 
There are some facts which may give us a clue. 
This class has by far the highest average consumption per consumer 
of the three major classes (Industrial 44.4 MWh, Commercial 10.8 MWh and 
Domestic 3.7 MWh for the year 1968/9). Most of the industrial 
consumption is in the metropolitan, or nearby areas by consumers who 
probably average over 100 MWh per annum. Because of such high 
consumption it is probably in this class that the threat to install 
one's own power plant, using diesel fuel, oil or gas, is taken most 
seriously. If industrial electricity prices were high, which they are 
not for these large consumers, it would probably pay a number of 
consumers to generate their own power. We might expect then that 
around the prevailing price for electricity demand will be reasonably 
elastic. 
One factor mitigating against this is the need to have standby 
equipment ready for use in times of breakdown or maintenance. If the 
consumer installs his own standby equipment his capital costs per 
1 
SECV Tariff Brochures. 
2 
Prof. Prest in an article on the electricity industry in Australia 
commented: 
Presumably the demand for commercial purposes... 
is regarded as inelastic and therefore charged at 
relatively high rates, whereas that for industrial 
...is regarded as elastic and therefore charged 
at relatively low rates. [239.p.138] 
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unit will increase proportionately and possibly outweigh the advantages 
he hoped to gain from the lower operating costs. 
One alternative to installing his own standby equipment is for the 
consumer to ask the SECV to provide standby facilities from the State 
system. Under an efficient pricing system the SECV should charge for 
such a service at a price per kW equal to the cost of installing extra 
base load generating capacity and transmission and distribution 
facilities of an equivalent size. Theoretically this involves a move 
to the left of the system marginal cost curve bringing about savings 
in the operation of all plants but it is felt that the size of the 
request for standby would not be large enough to warrant consideration 
of this point. This price relates only to the cost of the service, 
any power taken would be charged at the ordinary rate. 
As the number of consumers using standby facilities increased the 
diversity of their expected loads would increase and the price for 
standby facilities would fall accordingly. 
The SECV has always demanded a high price for standby facilities 
with the result that there are virtually no consumers taking supply 
under these conditions.^ The implication is that this high standby 
charge has removed one area of competition from the industrial market 
and made the demand more inelastic than it would have been otherwise. 
We can make two other points concerning the industrial supply of 
electricity. Firstly, we might expect that the larger industrial 
consumers would maintain a much closer cost analysis than most other 
consumers and so be more sensitive in reacting to price changes, 
tending to increase price elasticity. Secondly, tending the other way, 
we have already pointed out in Chapter Eight that Fuel, Light and Power 
only come to about 2 per cent of the specified costs of production of 
Victorian factories. On balance we conclude that the demand for 
In March 1971 the SECV published the details of its tariff schedule 
for standby facilities. For a high voltage consumer the tariff is the 
same as the Industrial Maximum Demand Tariff - M with an additional_ 
charge of the demand rate of that tariff ($3.17 per kW per month) times 
the contracted rate of standby supply. This is a charge of $38.04 per 
kW per annum. ^ 
In Section 2(c) above we used a figure of $70m. per annum for_ 
capacity charges in 1968/9. 2500MW would be a conservative estimate of 
installed capacity for that period and this gives a price of $28 per kW 
overall. The cost for base load plant would be less than this. Of 
course, our figures are only approximations but they are adequate to 
show that the SECV's standby charge is quite high. 
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electricity for industrial uses is inelastic but it is probably more 
elastic than the demand for commercial uses. 
The domestic consumer 
Of all the classes the domestic class has received the most 
attention concerning its demand characteristics. When one considers 
its contribution to peak loads, the political importance of its price, 
and the marketing activity in the field of domestic appliances this 
attention is not surprising. Most of the attention to this class has 
only come since the middle sixties so it is probably safe to say that 
its importance was belatedly recognised. 
A number of uses of domestic electricity are not subject to very 
much competition. Things like lighting, refrigeration, washing 
machines, electrical and electronic equipment (radio, television, etc.) 
meet with little competition. At the same time, they are not large 
consumers of electricity, probably comprising about a third of total 
domestic supplies. The largest sources of consumption of electric 
power in the home are cooking and heating appliances. (See Appendix 
Eight, C.I.6 and 7). These uses are also subject to intense marketing 
pressure from oil and gas suppliers. This has been particularly 
noticeable since the introduction of natural gas into Victoria in the 
last few years. The cooking and heating sections of domestic demand 
are probably among the most sensitive to competition of any of the 
electricity demands. But this does not necessarily reflect a 
responsiveness to the price of electricity. The price of power is 
only one factor, and probably a minor one when compared to the price 
of the appliance and its substitutes, income levels and promotional 
gimmicks such as free installation of appliances. 
We would expect domestic supplies to be more elastic than commercial 
supplies but a comparison with the industrial class is much more 
difficult. So our conclusions on the relative elasticities are: the 
demand for electricity in all three classes is inelastic, i.e. it has 
1 
Baxter and Rees, in what is probably the most comprehensive analysis 
of its kind, concluded that the industrial demand for electricity in 
Britain 
...is highly responsive to changes in output and 
fuel technology but relatively unresponsive to 
price. [But due to the inherent problems of 
measurement]...This latter result, however, is a 
first approximation only... [244.p.296] 
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a price elasticity of less than one, which largely results from the fact 
that each of the classes has a fairly high proportion of sales that are 
not subject to competition. The Commercial class is the most inelastic 
around the prevailing prices. The Industrial and Domestic classes are 
more elastic and will probably have elasticities of roughly the same 
magnitude. 
Cross-elasticity of demand 
We first discussed cross-elasticity in Chapter Three with regard 
to the budget constraint problem. When we confront it as a practical 
problem we find that the problems associated with measurement are at 
least as great as those we have outlined for the measurement of own-price 
elasticity. We are again restricted to intuitive observations to extend 
our analysis. 
In the context of our discussion here we can specify two kinds 
of cross-elasticity. First there is the cross-elasticity of demand 
between electricity and other fuels like gas and oil. 
Up to now we have ignored this problem and we have no intention of 
trying to introduce the competitive nature of the fuel market at this 
stage but it is obvious that the SECV cannot ignore its competitors 
when it is formulating a pricing policy. 
The principles we have annunciated here apply equally well to the 
gas industry and it is hoped that if the SECV ever adopted the 
suggestions we make that it would be part of a larger policy for the 
total energy sector which would involve gas in the same types of tariff 
changes. This implies a reduction in the amount of competition which 
now takes place and^greater cooperation in the interests of the consumer. 
In this way electricity sales lost at the peak to gas would be purchased 
by the consumer at the appropriate price for peak gas supplies, and if 
this was lower than the cost of electricity the consumer would have made 
a saving. 
Even if such cooperation existed we are left with one problem for 
which we have no answer. How can we encourage the oil industry, which 
is privately owned, to be part of the overall policy? The problem of 
integrating the pricing policies of these three industries is a very 
interesting one but outside of our present scope. 
^ A similar problem has been touched on by Turvey in [305.p.339] where 
he treats the existence of the private sector as a constraint leading 
to a sub-optimum result. 
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The second form of cross-elasticity which arises is between the 
different demands for ele ctricity. There is no relationship between 
the classes of consumption because it is illegal to resell electricity 
or to be classified as belonging to two classes. However, there may be 
some cross-relationship between demand at different times of the day, 
for example, the peak and plateau periods. To some extent we might 
expect these two demands to be substitutes, i.e. if the price of 
electricity increases between 5.00 p.m. and 7.00 p.m., some demands 
will be brought forward or delayed to avoid the higher price. To this 
extent we might expect some cross-elasticity of demand to exist between 
the two periods. 
If we follow the rules expounded in Chapter Three we would 
accordingly put a proportionally greater surcharge on the plateau 
demand which is a substitute for the peak. 
But surely we have seen this same factor before in a different 
dress. What we have been discussing is the likelihood of the peak 
shifting. Our earlier discussion in Part A, on using prices to equate 
supply and demand to avoid the peak shifting, amounts to the same thing. 
Our inclusion of capacity costs in the plateau months in Table 12.6 is 
also an expression of the same problem. 
Our problem now resolves itself to one of allocating the surcharge 
on the basis of elasticity, ignoring the cross-elasticities involved. 
Block tariffs 
In Chapter Three the surcharge was imposed in the form of an 
increase in the price per unit of the product. The possibility of 
using a two-part tariff or block tariff was not included. We would 
expect though that a block tariff would have a less distorting effect 
than would the imposition of a surcharge on top of the price per kWh. 
We are going to use a block tariff in our pricing schedule. There is 
the theoretical problem mentioned in Chapter One that a block tariff 
might drive some consumers away who would have been willing to pay the 
marginal cost of the units supplied. There is also the problem that 
if the blocks are too large some of the consumers may not be consuming 
a sufficiently large amount to get to the last block even if its price 
is set at marginal cost. We can overcome this latter problem by 
keeping the size of the block small. The importance of the first 
problem is difficult to gauge. We have already said how difficult 
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it is to measure elasticity and it would be much more difficult to 
discover what effect the introduction of a new block into a tariff 
might have. 
We would not expect that the effect would be too large though 
because we have already noted that the demand for electricity is 
inelastic. Both Meek and Johnson have supported the use of block 
tariffs in situations similar to the one we have here. 
The point here is that in order to achieve an optimum 
allocation of resources all that is really needed is 
an equality between marginal cost and the price of 
the last unit sold...Thus if you can charge a different 
price for earlier units, or levy some kind of fixed 
charge which is independent of the number of units sold, 
you are home and dry, and may get the best of both worlds. 
Meek [101.p.122] 
In order to coyer the deficit...the firm might abandon 
the single price policy in each market in favor of 
charging some users more than others on the basis of 
the strengths of their individual demand curves... 
(Footnote) The firm might set up a block rate schedule 
for each user. Under an ideal schedule the price for 
the marginal unit would be equal to the marginal cost, 
thereby avoiding discrimination at the margin. 
Johnson [94.p.132] 
Meek was referring to the sale of electricity and Johnson to the sale 
of the service provided by communications satellites. In the case of 
electricity, where the size of consumption can vary widely among 
consumers it is necessary to make sure that the blocks are not so large 
that very few consumers will be consuming at the marginal price. 
Deciding on the manner in which to introduce the block tariff is a 
difficult problem. Davidson [129] and Oi [321] have constructed models 
to show the optimum number and size of blocks to achieve maximum profit 
but our problem will also require an experience and detailed knowledge 
of the demands for electricity. If for no other reason than a lack of 
this experience.ya^guiHfi a.^iugle block for each tariff which is 
sufficiently small that most consumers within that class will be 
consuming most units at the marginal price. Table 12.8 gives us the 
relevant information. 
Table 12.8 
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Average kWhs Rev. 
Meter- kWh per Size per Number Price per 
ing consumer of block of c/kWh Revenue consumer 
period per block per con- p. a. 
per iod (a) annum sumers $m 3 
Domestic qtr 940 360 1440 800,000 1.5 17.3 22 
Commercial mnth 900 360 4320 100,000 4.0 17.3 173 
Industrial mnth 3700 360 4320 100 ,000 1.5 6.5 65 
(a) SECV Annual Report 1968/9 
We have arbitrarily chosen a combination of block size of 360 units and 
prices of 4 cents and 1.5 cents. The two prices represent roughly the 
differences in elasticities we might expect to find for the classes. The 
total revenue earned is close to the $40m. required. There are other 
combinations of block size and prices which would also earn the required 
revenue and so long as they reflect something like the differentials we 
have here then there is nothing to say that they are not to be preferred 
to the one we have here, or vice versa. 
In many ways a block tariff with a single small block is very much 
like imposing a lump sum service charge. The final column in Table 12.8 
tells us by how much per annum the introduction of the block tariff 
increases each consumers bill. We could have introduced these amounts 
as fixed charges but we have chosen to treat them in the form of block 
tariffs which is the form of tariff already in existence in the SECV. 
The two-part tariff with a high fixed charge is not new to Australia, 
because it has been used in the pricing system for telephones for a long 
time. 
As we might expect, the highest cost per consumer is in the 
commercial class, but our charge here is less than these consumers were 
paying under their previous tariffs. Take for example. Tariff E, the 
Commercial All-Purpose Tariff. Its first blocks are 
up to and including 100 kWhs 8.00 cents 
the next 900 7.40 
the next 1000 85 
the next 3000 4.25 
If we assume that any charge above 3.00 cents is a surcharge, the total 
amount of surcharge paid per month is as shown in Table 12.9 
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Table 12.9 
cents kWhs $ 
5 X 100 = 5.00 
4.4 X 900 = 39.30 
1.85 X 1000 = 18.50 
1.25 X 3000 = 37.50 
100.30 
When we superimpose a block tariff on our time of day prices it is 
necessary to divide the block into smaller blocks for each time of day. 
There are many ways of doing this but we will simply divide it equally. 
(f) The Final Tariff 
We can now add together all of the parts of the tariff including the 
fixed charge and the extra 0.2 cents per unit discussed before. As an 
example, the Domest ic tariff for the peak months would look like this. 
Domestic Tariff Schedule 
(Months of June and July) 
Fixed Charge $2.00 per quarter 
cents/kWh 
Time of Day First 90 units All other units 
2300 - 0630 2.1 0.6 
0630 - 1700 5.1 3.6 
1700 - 1900 6.3 4.8 
1900 - 2300 5.1 3.6 
The pricing system we have outlined is a combination of marginal 
cost principles and second and third degree price discrimination. 
Within this basic structure there are numerous alternative tariff 
structures (to the one we have outlined here). In practice the decisions 
regarding the time of day and time of year to use, the size and number 
of the blocks, the different classes of consumer, etc., could only be 
made after extensive analyses of the present system. One possibility 
which would need to be investigated, for example, is the creation of a 
single tariff for lighting for all consumers. It might be possible to 
create a special class of consumption for this inelastic demand. 
One would also want to try and predict the outcome in sales and 
revenue which would follow from the imposition of any particular form 
of the tariff. A model could be built to simulate the system and 
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illuminate the different results. Such a model would require 
considerable information detailing the system as well as preliminary 
work on measurement of the variables involved. The following 
information would be needed: the load and peaking characteristics of 
the generation, transmission and distribution systems, the load 
characteristics of the different classes of consumption of supply, 
the marginal costs of supply, estimates of elasticity of sales and 
demand (MW) by classes, number of consumers, and the frequency 
distribution of consumption per consumer for each of the present 
tariffs. 
We have already outlined the problems associated with the 
measurement of elasticity and marginal cost but some estimate of these 
variables would be essential information for the introduction of the 
type of tariff we have proposed. The actual structure and values 
would be determined by the result of the studies undertaken. We do not 
know what the answers to these studies would be but we do not expect 
that they would be too far removed from the illustrative figures given 
here. 
(g) Bulk Supply Tariffs 
In some ways the problems of devising an economically efficient 
tariff structure are less when we are considering a bulk supply tariff. 
Among the advantages are:-
(i) the small number of large consumers, all of whom are 
experienced in the industry, 
(ii) the decreased importance of metering costs allowing 
the use of more sophisticated equipment, and 
(iii) the ability of the consumer and the supplier to meet 
and discuss, and sometimes mutually derive, the tariff 
structure. 
We have seen that bulk-supply tariffs are used in the SECV (see 
Chapters Six and Eleven) and in the NSW electricity undertaking (see 
Chapter Six and Appendix Four). The NSW tariff is the most important 
of the two, being the only tariff used for the sale of electricity by 
the generating authority. 
The cost-related portions of the tariffs should be treated no 
differently to the manner outlined for the SECV. The structure should 
be related to the time of day and time of year when consumption takes 
place. This structure should encourage the retailer to set up his own 
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tariff structure which will reflect the bulk-supply tariff. If it is 
costly for the retailer to purchase electricity in the winter months 
there is an obvious incentive for him to charge a higher price to those 
consumers who consume at those times. 
The introduction of the surcharge and the presentation of the 
final tariff present some minor difficulties. Let us take the case 
of the SECV first. Because of uniform tariffs the SECV demands that 
the retail prices of the bulk supply authorities are the same as those 
of the SECV. These would be as we have already outlined them. But 
what of the price the SECV must set to the local authority? It should 
be the same as the retail price less those costs which the authority, 
and not the SECV, is paying. The tariff then will be as given in 
Table 12.6, covering the operating and capacity costs, plus whatever 
portion of the surcharge is deemed to belong to the authority. For 
example, if the authority undertakes its own capital expansion of the 
distribution system then it should receive part of the surplus created 
to allow for internal financing of this expansion. The difference 
between the retail tariffs and the bulk-supply tariff will also 
include the funds needed to meet other costs of supply, such as customer 
related costs. 
The SECV is quite unique in that it is capable of setting both the 
retail tariffs and the bulk-supply tariffs where they exist. The 
situation in NSW is quite different being more akin to the British 
sytem where each retailing authority has much more independence in 
setting its own tariffs. So far as earning a surplus is concerned we 
have seen in Chapter Nine and Appendix Ten that both the central 
authority and the retailing bodies are required to earn a surplus for 
reasons either of internal financing or payment of subsidies. 
The councils should be encouraged to set time of day/time of year 
tariffs in response to the same structure in the bulk-supply tariff 
and impose upon this the extra requirements of the surplus in the same 
fashion as we have outlined for the SECV. Because of the limited 
skilled manpower in the Councils, some of which are quite small, this 
may prove to be a reasonably difficult practical task, but it does 
not present any theoretical problems. A difficulty does arise however, 
when we come to discuss how the central authority should include its 
surcharge in the bulk-supply tariff. It is not in a position to 
discriminate between councils on the grounds of elasticity so it will 
probably have to seek a simpler solution. One answer would be to 
229 
include a fixed charge per month as part of the tariff for each 
council. Such a charge would be a separate part of the tariff and 
not alter the main structure of the tariff based on costs. The 
allocation of the fixed charge among the councils would have to depend 
partly on bargaining between the parties and partly on which cross-
subsidizations the government wished to undertake among electricity 
consumers. 
The role of the retailing authority then would be to super-impose 
on the cost related time of day/time of year tariff a surcharge 
sufficient to meet the fixed charge levied by the central authority as 
well as earning it a large enough surplus to continue to carry out 
the same proportion of internal financing of its capital programmes. 
Most of the problems of detail associated with changing the NSW 
tariff-structure are associated with the retail authorities. It would 
not be a difficult task to alter the bulk-supply tariff, and once it 
was altered the incentive to change the retail tariffs would exist. 
It would probably be necessary to give some help to the councils to 
change their tariffs and it might also be a good time to assist the 
amalgamation of some of the smaller councils into larger more viable 
units. 
3. Some Possible Problems 
We should give a brief outline of some of the considerations which 
might inhibit the acceptance and implementation of the proposals we have 
made. 
(a) Information. We have already dwelt at some length on the 
problems of deriving the-necessary information regarding demands and 
costs. The only point which needs emphasis is the need for 
experimentation in getting the information. We wholeheartedly agree 
with Turvey when he wrote in 1968 
The only practicable method of securing quantified 
analysis is to engage in large-scale long-term 
experiments of the type now being pioneered in 
Britain. [148.p.113] ^  
(b) Managerial Attitudes. It is probably not unfair to say that 
most public utility managers in Australia care very little about the 
effect of their pricing policies on the resource allocation of the 
community. For most of them, the measures of their success are likely 
^ See also Bonbright [72.p.368] and Boggis [171]. 
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to be linked with such things as the number of consumers served, or the 
growth rate of capacity, total sales or revenue.^ So long as these 
attitudes prevail there is little likelihood of implementation of our 
T 2 
proposals. 
What is needed is a complete appraisal of the role not only of the 
SECV, but of all public utilities in Australia. Such an examination has 
never been undertaken. The role of public utilities in both the United 
States of America and Great Britain has received much attention through 
the establishment of regulatory authorities and regular Parliamentary 
Select Committees in these two countries respectively. In comparison, 
public utilities in Australia have been allowed to remain relatively 
free of continuing public discussion and investigation of their role 
and their success in playing this role. 
Such investigation and examination, which amongst other things 
would depend upon increased public awareness, is probably a necessary 
precondition to the changes we have suggested here. 
(c) Size and Political Environment. In Chapter Six we put 
forward the proposition that the SECV is too large an organization to 
accept readily the quite radical changes which we are suggesting. Not 
only would the SECV require economic justification for the change, but 
it would also require political approval. Political approval can be 
1 
Little's comment on the British electricity industry in 1953 would 
appear to be appropriate to the SECV today. 
The electricity industry has completely failed to 
set up a pricing system which will enable it to 
produce amounts of electricity which are in the 
national interest. It is interested only in 
selling as much as possible, consistent with 
covering total costs, and not in the least with 
selling the right amounts. [140.p.151] 
The electricity industry in both America and Britain have, in the 
past, been accused of the same thing. See Houthakker[135.p.6], 
Troxel [56.p.295] and Bonbright [72.p.368]. However it is doubtful 
if the same charge could be made in Britain with the same force today. 
2 
The nature of the promotional rivalry between gas and electricity 
in Victoria would tend to strengthen this belief. That electric 
ranges should receive as much sales promotion as they do, when their 
demand (and cost) characteristics are so well known, is a continuing 
source of amazement to many observers and indicates the scant attent ion 
given by the SECV to the wider implications of their tariff and 
promotional policies. 
For a much more realistic approach than that of the SECV see Vennard 
[222.p.185]. See also .Appendix Ten for a discussion of the SECV s 
latest 'promotional' domestic tariff. 
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envisaged for political changes, e.g. uniform tariffs, but it is not so 
easily imagined for radical changes based solely on economic arguments. 
We should not, however, emphasise this problem unduly. It is obviously 
important but by no means insuperable. 
(d) Costs. To change a tariff system in the way we have suggested 
would not be a costless process. The costs of seeking information may 
not be insignificant, but probably the most important cost changes are 
related to the metering and billing process. There are over one 
million consumers and it is likely that each consumer would require a 
new, more expensive meter. How much more expensive would depend largely 
on the complexity of the tariff and the special contracts which could be 
drawn up with meter manufacturers for such a large order. 
It has sometimes been suggested that the smaller domestic consumers 
in the system need not come under the more complex tariff, but have a 
simpler and less expensive tariff system. Harberger and Andreatta, in 
their proposed tariff system for an Indian undertaking suggested 
...since for small consumers there is no way of distinguishing 
peak from off-peak consumption, the best practical solution 
is simply to charge the [peak] rate for all kWh they 
consume. The resulting 'overcharge' for electricity 
taken in off-peak hours will apply only to a small 
fraction of the total electricity taken by these groups. 
An overcharge for off peak use is inevitable in this 
case, and there is no point in reducing the peak-time 
charge below the appropriate level in an effort to 
sweeten the pill. [87.p.46] 
Because of the importance of the domestic consumption to the peak, 
and the fairly high average consumption of the class, we do not suggest 
that any domestic consumers be left off the proposed tariff. Ultimately 
it will be a matter of cost which will decide the matter, but if at 
all possible the domestic class should be included in total. 
Apart from metering, the administrative costs associated with 
billing will depend to some extent on the number of tariffs in operation. 
We do not expect very much trouble in this regard however. Although 
our suggested tariff is far from simple it is certainly no more 
complicated than the multiplicity of tariffs which already exist in the 
SECV. It is fairly clear that the costs of the change would not be 
insignificant but we should not look at them in isolation. Rather 
^ This same view about Australian undertakings has been expressed 
by Kolsen [233]. He also believes that the extra costs of metering 
the domestic class would not be prohibitive. 
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their importance lies in a comparison with the savings which might be 
achieved from the introduction of the new tariff. 
(e) Equity. The question which immediately comes to mind is - to 
what extent is it reasonable to expect those consumers with less elastic 
demands to pay proportionately more towards fulfilling the social and 
political obligations of the SECV than other consumers? When he was 
discussing rate regulation in America, Baumol [310] posed the same 
question and tried to devise a set of rules which would guard against 
uncontrolled exploitation of these consumers with inelastic demands. 
Our own problem is not as acute. 
We already have some idea of the degree of discrimination which 
classes of consumers are prepared to tolerate. (If they were fully 
aware of the situation this may not be the case.) For our purposes 
all we need do is make sure that the discrimination we are proposing 
is not too much out of line with that which already exists. As we have 
already pointed out, the illustrative system we have used here is 
probably less harsh on consumers with inelastic demands than is the 
existing system. 
In the same context of equity, Turvey has suggested that it may 
even be necessary to make sure that the new tariff reflects the old 
one as closely as possible. Too many complainants may introduce 
quite unwelcome political opposition to the change. 
In the end... even the purest of mortals has to 
keep an ear close to the ground and, like us of 
coarser clay, include a quiet life as one of the ^ 
variables in his objective function. [308.p.134] 
4. Some Likely Effects if our Proposals were to be 
Implemented 
While we have tended to stress the effect of our proposals on 
resource allocation, the decision whether to introduce any changes in 
tariff policy, if taken seriously, would probably be made on the 
criterion of the amount of capital expenditure that would be saved. 
By increasing the price of peak electricity the rate of growth of peak 
demand would probably be reduced and some saving in capital expenditure 
achieved. (It follows, of course, that the rate of growth of total 
sales and revenue may also be curbed as certain peak demands, probably 
domestic ones, were transferred to gas where the peak problems and the 
cost to the community are less.) 
^ See also Johnson [94.p.135] 
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Experience in France and Britain suggests that substantial 
capital savings would be made. Watts has tentatively estimated that 
the new tariff structure in Britain has '...shifted 100-200 MW from 
the peaking hours..,' in one winter.^ Considerable savings were also 
2 
achieved after the introduction of the Tarif Vert. There is no reason 
to expect that similar substantial reductions could not be achieved 
in Victoria. These reductions might be expected to lessen the need 
for internal financing and thereby allow some reductions in prices. 
The industry would probably measure the worthwhileness of the 
change by comparing the capital savings with the extra costs of 
3 
metering and accounting which would be necessary. As we have already 
pointed out these extra costs will be dependent upon the type, and 
complexity of the particular tariff structure which was being considered. 
The other side of this capital saving would be the effect on the 
SECV's competitors. Robin Pope [238] has estimated the resource savings 
to be gained by transferring certain water heating, space heating and 
4 
domestic cooking markets in Victoria from electricity to gas. Her 
very conservative estimates of the net social benefits of the 
reallocation over the period 1950-1 to 1964-5 are: 
...of the order of $60m. for the metropolitan 
area of Victoria, and $120m. for the metropolitan 
areas of New South Wales. [238.p.5-8] 
That no claim was made that the reallocation was 
optimal indicates that the claims made here may be 
but miniatures of the possible savings through 
resource reallocation in the energy market, 
[p.5-10] 
These are the types of estimates which would have to be made if the 
proposed tariff changes were to be adequately appraised. Pope's study 
certainly underlines the fact that savings can be made for the 
community through resource allocation in the energy market. 
^ See Watts, P.E. 'Electricity Costs - A Reply (2)'. Economic Journal 
78.1968.p.989. 
^ See Boiteux [123.p.83], [172.p.148] and Masse [199]. 
Houthakker has suggested this procedure: -
.the time-of-day tariff will be successful if the 
additional consumer costs it calls for are less 
than the capacity cost it saves. [135.p.22] 
See also Bonbright [72.p.289] 
^ She assumes that the reallocation could be achieved by adjusting 
the l e ' H f sales tax on the appropriate gas and electric appliances. 
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As well as the direct effect on resources and the SECV we can 
m e n t i o n one m o r e possible effect of a more intangible nature - the 
effect on the distribution of income. To a large extent the geographical 
distribution of income would remain as it is now because we have assumed 
that this present distribution was to be treated as a constraint. But 
there is one possible redistribution which is of some interest even 
though it probably would not be very large. 
From some investigations done by the SECV it appears that the 
ownership of peak usage domestic appliances, e„g. electric ranges and 
space h e a t e r s , increases as the number of rooms in the consumers' 
residences increases. If we can equate the number of rooms in a 
residence with the consumers income we can postulate that wealthier 
consumers will own a larger proportion of the peak usage domestic 
appliances. (It is certainly well known that electrical appliance 
ownership in general increases with income.) 
If this is the case, it means that retaining the present tariff 
system, where peak electricity is underpriced, is of greater advantage 
to the rich consumer than it is to the poor consumer. A change to a 
closer reflection of real costs in the tariffs would lead to some 
redistribution of income in the direction of a greater egalitarian 
distribution among electricity consumers. 
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APPENDIX 1 
THE MARGINAL COST CONTROVERSY AND THE PUBLIC 
U T I L I T Y ECONOMISTS IN AMERICA IN THE 1940's 
In Chapter One of the text we examined the 'marginal cost 
c o n t r o v e r s y ' and its implications for decreasing cost industries. 
In doing this we ignored a very similar discussion which was taking 
place in A m e r i c a at the same time, mainly in the American Economic 
R e v i e w and Land Economics. Some of these contributors, such as 
C l e m e n s , were included in Chapter One where it was felt that they 
offered a different line of thought to the mainstream. 
This in no way means that the American contributions were not 
h e l p f u l , quite the contrary. The practical bias, and the interest 
shown in the problems of a practical application of incremental cost 
p r i c i n g , are of definite value in an understanding of Peak Load Pricing, 
Peak Load Pricing is itself a theory with a heavy practical b i a s , and 
indeed, a number of its features can be seen to have precedents in the 
practical problems looked at by the public utility economists in the 
1940's. It is because of this emphasis on practicality, not in spite 
of it, that this part of the controversy was not included in the 
strictly theoretical first section of Chapter One. 
The role of the public utility economist in America has been an 
interesting and a complex one. Up to the 1940's his m a i n task was 
the evaluation and interpretation of various concepts of utilities and 
their r e g u l a t i o n . Little notice was given to theoretical welfare 
economics and the writings of such economists as Marshall and Pigou 
received scant attention. 
A good example of the 'companies, commissions and courts' type 
of approach can be found in a standard textbook of the time by Irston 
R . Barnes [65]. It was called 'The Economics of Public Regulation' 
and was published in 1941. Of the nearly 900 pages of text he devotes 
only three to the idea of incremental cost pricing. But one must 
admit that the theory of marginal cost pricing was not very well 
developed at that time. 
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A chronological table of the contributors to the marginal cost 
debate is sho^oi below. 
Bibliography 
1938 Hotelling [21] 
1939 Montgomery [35] 
1941 Clemens [7] 
1942 Troxel [54] 
1943 M [55] 
1943 ( I [56] 
1944 Pegrum [43] 
1944 Troxel [57] 
1945 Clemens [8] 
1947 Troxel (Book) [115] 
1948 C1emen s [10] 
1950 Clemens (Book) [9] 
The contributions of Hotelling and Montgomery (advocating incremental 
cost pricing with government subsidies if necessary) were the starting 
point of the debate. The suggestion was extensively investigated by 
Troxel in a series of three articles in 1942 and 1943. In particular 
he looked at the practical problems of using such a policy, and the 
possibility of using it to replace the existing form of regulation of 
public utilities. His support for the new system was based on the 
'excess capacity' idea. His stand was that if an industry had excess 
capacitv, as did most utilities at the time, then increasing output 
would be socially beneficial. If the industry also had decreasing 
costs then the output would be produced at lower average cost. 
Incremental cost pricing seemed to fit both of these ideas. 
Troxel concluded that it was a very interesting device and should 
be tried. However, in practice it would have many difficulties in 
implementation, particularly its acceptance by public utility 
Commissioners and Congressmen. He did note, as well, that the theory 
itself offered no answer to the basic problem of how much private and 
how much public oraership there should be for public utilities, and 
trying to implement incremental cost pricing in both spheres 
simultaneously would create many problems. 
In 1944, Pegrum in a 'comment' and Troxel in a 'reply', agreed 
that the problems of its introduction seemed insurmountable. They 
also agreed that incremental cost pricing would work most effectively 
under public o^ership, but it seemed that the mood of the politician 
was against any more socialization of utilities. 
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Both before and after Troxel's articles, Clemens (in 1941 and 1945), 
asserted that incremental cost pricing and all of its problems were 
unnecessary. He said utility managers were already achieving the 
socially desirable objective through discriminatory pricing. This 
attitude of Clemens has been examined in Chapter One and found to be 
dubious in at least one of its basic assumptions. But it is an 
attitude which he continued to hold in a later article in 1948 and in 
a book, published in 1950. 
In 1947 Troxel published his book entitled, Economics of Public 
Utilities. The publication of this book represents a minor turning 
point in the course followed by public utility economists in America. 
His examination of the proposal of marginal cost pricing (which does 
not add very much to what he published in his earlier articles) is far 
more detailed than that which Barnes gave the subject six years earlier. 
Two later textbooks, which were to become standard in the field 
(Clemens 1950 [9] and Bonbright 1961 [72]) also followed the same 
pattern as Troxel, devoting a reasonably large amount of space to the 
1 1 proposal. 
However, the major part of the work of the public utility 
economists was, and still is, devoted to 'companies, commissions and 
courts' and the general problem of regulation. This is not to decry 
all the useful information gained about the practical problems of 
implementation of various schemes. However, such attitudes as Troxel's, 
for example, where he discussed marginal cost pricing as an alternative 
to the present form of regulation, rather than the possibility of the 
two being used together, has in many ways obscured some of the more 
important parts of the theory. 
A more recent textbook by Garfield and Lovejoy, 1964 [85], shows a 
swing back to the earlier situation. In a textbook entitled Public 
Utility Economics, only one and a half pages devoted to the topic, 
'Theoretical Economics and Public Utility Rates', indicates a rather 
brief treatment of the subject. 
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APPENDIX 2 
PEAK LOAD PRICING PRIOR TO 1949 
In Chapter Two we assumed that Peak Load Pricing could be dated 
from Boiteux's articles in 1949. This was not intended to infer that 
the use of a form of marginal cost pricing in a peak situation had 
n o t been envisaged earlier than this. Lewis, in 1941, in an article 
on the two-part tariff [137], and in -a reply to a criticism of that 
article [138], indicated that he recognised the correct solution to 
the problem^ but he failed to pursue the matter as far as later 
authors. 
His basic approach to finding the optimal prices was very similar 
to that which Davidson was to suggest 15 years later. This was the 
practical suggestion of setting two prices, as in a firm peak situation, 
with all of the capacity costs going to the existing peak, and if the 
peak shifted the off-peak rate was to be increased and the peak rate 
lowered until a balance was struck. While this suggestion had much 
practical m e r i t , neither Lewis, nor Davidson later, offered a solution 
with the formal elegance of that of Boiteux and Steiner. 
Of similar importance as a forerunner of later works was a 
statement by Troxel, an American public utility economist, in 1942 [54]. 
Troxel was inspired by Hotelling's paper in 1938 [21] so it is easier 
to follow his argument if we start with that paper. Hotelling had 
suggested the use of a 'rental' charge in a situation where demand 
exceeded supply under a marginal cost pricing scheme [21.p.264]. The 
pricing policy was aimed at bringing supply and demand into equality. 
Troxel built this suggestion into a diagrammatical exposition which is 
quite similar to that of Boiteux. He interpreted it as 
...[providing] for payment of a 'rental' as a means of 
limiting the use of the existing equipment. This rental, 
existing only when there is a scarcity of plant capacity 
fixes a sufficiently high price to limit the demand. [54.p.463] 
1 
He wrote in his reply: '...by adjusting ^ ^ ^ ' T ^ l ^ ^ ' n a t e 
supplies at different times of the day it may be possible to e U m nate 
peaks and keep the equipment fully utilised'. ^ ^8.p 401]. Also 
W r e there L e variations in the intensity of demand, e q u r p m ^ t will 
not be continuously occupied unless different prices are charged at 
different times.' [p.408] 
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Troxel produced a diagram in 1942 [p.464] (it is included in his 
book in 1947 [115.p.458]) which illustrated this point. It is 
reproduced here as Figure 2(a). 
Figure 2(a) 
Cost, 
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D \ \ / 
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The curve I.C. is Incremental Cost and it can be taken as the equivalent 
of marginal cost. If demand is as shown by the demand curve D , price 
will be p^ and no rental is charged. If demand is D , price will be 
2 3 
p^ and the rental equal to p .A" per unit. If demand is D the rental 
will be p^.B. While Troxel did not see this specifically as a peak 
situation it is, in essence, the same solution we saw in Chapter Two. 
The rental (or share of capacity cost) is in proportion to the strength 
of the demands above the AVC which, according to Boiteux's assumptions, 
is also SRMC. 
Another striking similarity to the course of the later debate was 
Troxel's worry over whether this was in fact marginal cost pricing 
(see Chapter Four). Troxel first expressed his doubt in 1942. 
At no point in the discussion of the rental, however 
does Hotelling indicate whether prices remain equated 
to incremental cost even with the receipt of the 
rental or whether the rental charge represents an 
addition to prices determined already by means of 
incremental cost. [54.p.463] 
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In 1943, he removed any doubt as to whether this form of pricing was 
in fact discrimination. 
This rental, measured for a period of operations as the 
diffe rence between total revenue and total variable cost 
for the period, becomes larger as the plant is more 
fully utilized. Thus, some of the investment may be 
retrieved though no attempt is made to calculate the 
rental for the purpose of retrieving the investment. 
The rental is price determined rather than price 
determining. [56.p.293](Emphasis not in original). 
It is this fact, that the basis of the allocation of capacity cost is 
price determined rather than price determining, which is at the heart 
of the answer to the discrimination charge. 
Troxel failed to follow through any of these arguments, 
preferring instead a more detailed analysis of the practical problems 
involved in marginal cost pricing. There can be no doubt though that 
in his articles interpreting Hotelling, there are distinct forerunners 
of what was later to be the Pricing Rule of the Peak Load Pricing 
Theorists. 
On the Investment side it is also possible to find precedents 
for what was later stated as the 'investment rule'. In 1939, 
Montgomery [35,p,44] suggested an investment rule based on the 
difference between short and long-run marginal costs. He stated it 
like this. 
If N = the operating costs of new equipment, 
and 0 = the operating costs of old equipment, 
and C = the capacity costs of the new equipment (i.e. 
depreciation and interest) 
then if 0 > N + C, plant size should be increased. 
If we think of 0 as being SRMC, and N and C as AVC and 'long-run 
marginal capacity costs' respectively, we have a similar rule to that 
which Boiteux suggested. N + C = AVC + LRMCC = LRMC and so, 
Montgomery's rule is: if SRMC > LRMC then new equipment should be 
installed. 
Montgomery was not the only one to see this. Clemens advocated 
the use of this investment rule in a number of places. His initial 
statement in 1941 was: 
if either the marginal cost of increasing the output 
of the existing plant (short period marginal cost) or 
the marginal cost of expanding the plant (long period 
marginal cost) is less than the demand price, output 
should be expanded. [7.p.800] 
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If we assume that the short-run optimal pricing rule of price equal to 
SRMC is being observed, then Clemens' rule for investment is that 
if SR>IC(=p)>LRMC, plant should be extended. In 1945 [8], and again in 
his book in 1950 [9], Clemens reaffirmed this position. The basic 
reasoning behind such a rule is simple. Clemens claims that it was 
Lerner in 1937 [8.p.70] who first pointed out that 'the optimum plant 
was the one at which short and long-run marginal cost were equal to 
each other and to the demand price'. 
There is much similarity between these statements and what 
Boiteux formulated as his investment rule. Boiteux's assumption that 
plant is always of the optimum size (i.e. SRMC=LRMC), is a fundamental 
2 part of his investment rule. 
While it is true that Boiteux was not the originator of this 
concept, it is also true that neither Clemens nor Montgomery used the 
rule in a multi-demand sense (such as peak and off-peak). Boiteux's 
solution was the first use of the concept in this sense. Certainly 
nowhere prior to Boiteux were the two interacting rules for pricing and 
investment policy put together into such a complete explanation of the 
multi-demand case. 
A fuller statement of the idea was made in Clemens' 1945 article [8]: 
Output can be increased in two ways. The existing plant 
can be utilized to a greater extent. In this event 
operating expenses (short-run marginal costs) will be 
the relevant data. On the other hand the plant can be 
expanded, in which case total costs (long-run marginal 
costs) will be the relevant data. Management will 
adopt the method that involves the lower incremental 
cost...Hence, long and short-run marginal costs and 
demand price tend to equality. [p.70] 
2 
Gabriel Dessus, another member of the French School, stated the same 
thing in 1949. 
...the correct adjustment of installations is precisely 
dekned by the equality of the marginal cost of potential 
overloading to that of equivalent additions to equipment. 
It follows that the increase in costs necessitated by an 
expansion of output may be defined either as the increment 
in the cost of using a fixed quantity of equipment, or 
as the cost, per unit of time, of the necessary additions 
to installations operated at constant cost. L142.pp.44-5J 
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A P P E N D I X 3 
INTERNAL FINANCING 
W e n o t e d in the text that there is no economically efficient 
a n s w e r to the q u e s t i o n of the existence o f , or the degree of internal 
f i n a n c i n g . T h e subject has received quite a lot of attention in the 
l i t e r a t u r e . A large number of the w r i t i n g s are statements of opinion 
and i m p l i c i t or explicit v a l u e j u d g m e n t s . Very few of them are 
supported by e v i d e n c e of any sort and m o s t depend on the particular 
v i e w the author is taking in his statement, 
A n u m b e r of these opinions w e r e offered by authors w r i t i n g about 
the B r i t i s h N a t i o n a l i s e d I n d u s t r i e s . As a result the heat of that 
debate w a s t r a n s f e r r e d to the m a t t e r of internal financing on m o r e than 
one o c c a s i o n . 
T h i s a p p e n d i x includes a few of those references w h i c h have not 
b e e n included in the t e x t . Its intention is to illustrate the fact 
that there is n o single answer to the problem and to show that a 
large n u m b e r of factors are i n v o l v e d . M o s t of the contributors 
included h e r e take only one of the m a n y facets of the problem as 
o u t l i n e d in the text, and h a v i n g m a d e their value judgment concerning 
t h a t , offer a solution to the overall p r o b l e m . 
P u b l i c S e c t o r V e r s u s Private Sector 
The H e r b e r t C o m m i t t e e [220] in 1 9 5 6 , came out quite strongly 
a g a i n s t the use of internal funds in the N a t i o n a l i s e d I n d u s t r i e s . They 
based their o p p o s i t i o n around the argument that 
P r i v a t e industry surpluses are the rewards of 
c o m p e t i t i o n and b e l o n g to the current s h a r e h o l d e r s , 
and p l o u g h b a c k by directors is a compulsory 
investment of shareholders m o n e y and not a compulsory 
p r o v i s i o n for future capital r e q u i r e m e n t s . [para.343] 
T h e y argued further that because the surpluses earned in the 
p u b l i c sector w e r e not earned in c o m p e t i t i o n , and because there was 
little r e t u r n to 'shareholders' in the public sector, 
...we [do n o t ] think it proper for the electricity 
supply industry to go beyond the limits of self-financing 
that w e h a v e suggested a b o v e . [para.345] 
(The limit to w h i c h they refer was one set with reference to a m a x i m u m 
a m o u n t of internal finance r e l a t e d to the amount of surplus needed to 
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cope with unseen contingencies and fluctuations in the normal supply of 
capital through the market.) The attitude of the Herbert Committee has 
been criticized by a number of writers for different reasons. 
W.A. Robson attacked the Committee over the accuracy of some of their 
statements: 
...to suggest that nationalised industries are in a 
position to charge what they like, and to exploit 
gaily and irresponsibly their monopolistic position, 
is the very reverse of the truth. By comparison with 
private enterprise they are in a position of conspicuous 
disadvantage in this respect. [213.p.308] 
Michael Shanks was also of this opinion. 
The most extreme and discriminatory form of this argument 
against self-financing comes from the Herbert Committee. 
In a travesty of the actual position, it argued that 
profits ploughed back in the competitive world of private 
enterprise are the 'prize of success' whereas, in sheltered 
nationalised industries, they would merely be the result 
of extortion. [214.p.60] 
J.R. Sargeant, in a chapter in Shank's book [214], argued; 
There is no economic reason why public enterprise should 
be expected to conform to the habit which private 
enterprise has of financing a large part of its net 
investment from internal resources. The correct approach 
is to ask what proportion of internal to external 
financing minimises the total cost of capital. [214.p.253] 
While Sargeant believes that there is a correct mix of internal and 
external finance, others would prefer to leave the mix to the industry 
concerned. For example, Robson wrote: 
...I see no reason why nationalised industries should 
not be as free as profit making companies to find as much 
money for capital development from internal resources as 
they think fit. [213.p.311] 
Inflation 
There appears to be much confusion amongst those discussing 
internal financing as to the relevance of arguments concerning inflation. 
Some have argued that increasing prices to allow a surplus to be earned 
would add to the fires of inflation. Others have been of the opinion 
that if the industry is allowed onto the capital market then this will 
be a cause of inflation via the increased rate of interest. The link 
^ Kelf-Cohen puts this view in his recently published book. See Kelf-
Cohen, R. Twenty Years of Nationalisation. Macmillan. London. 1969.p.214 
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between internal financing (or lack of it) and inflation is a very 
tenuous one at the general level. It is dependent upon a number of 
variables about which it is difficult to be precise. These variables 
include: 
the manner in which the surplus is earned, e.g. an 
overall price increase or price discrimination; 
- accessability of the industry to the loan market 
and the effect on the rate of interest if it did 
enter the market; 
the change in the demand for resources by the private 
and public sectors which would result from the course 
of action decided upon, and 
the overall state of demand in the economy. 
If the state of these variables is unknown then it is very difficult 
to predict what effect internal financing would have on the rate of 
inflation. In other words, it is very much dependent upon the particular 
circumstances prevailing in each case. 
Sir Roy Harrod was one who advocated a very high level of internal 
financing as part of an overall plan to combat inflation in Britain 
[187.p.238]. He recognised that this would entail substantial price 
increases in electricity but he was convinced that prices were too low 
compared with private industry anyway. The increase in public sector 
prices would make them more comparable. 
Imperfections in the Capital Market 
Most of those who suggest a general policy for all of the public 
sector are ignoring the basic fact that the need to finance internally 
depends on the particular imperfections faced in the capital market, 
institutional or otherwise. They also ignore the fact that the ability 
to finance internally depends upon a number of factors including the 
degree of monopolistic power, and cost and production characteristics. 
The electricity industry in all countries is a large consumer of 
capital. It is recognised by many authors that the local capital market 
may not be able to satisfy this demand. Cassell, speaking of the 
situation in Britain said: 
Ideally, the resources [for investment] should be made 
available by the voluntary savings of the community, 
but in present circumstances the savings are simply 
not there. If the investment is to be financed without 
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inflationary consequences, the necessary funds must 
be exacted from consumers by prices pitched well above 
costs. [186.p.229] 
Maurice Bye had a similar view of the same problem in France. 
Self-investment, however, raises a basic problem. Is 
a price which provides enough revenue for re-investment 
appropriate for a public service industry? Theoretically, 
the answer is that such a policy is not appropriate at 
all: self-investment, from a point of view of the general 
interest, is the worst procedure for a nationalised 
industry. In practice, however, given an anemic financial 
market...it seems that development in the nationalised 
sectors will be toward increasing self-investment. [183.p.144] 
We saw in the text of the thesis that institutional imperfections 
were the main reason why the industry in Australia undertook a high 
degree of internal financing. This appears to be the case in Britain 
and other countries as well,^ 
Other Value Judgements 
Sometimes it is very difficult to be clear as to why an author 
takes a particular view of this subject. One writer on the British 
situation, R. Kelf-Cohen, offered this interpretation: 
Cheap capital for the nationalised industries was the 
cry...[i.e. from the Treasury]. This expansion of 
credit to support this vast electricity programme 
was an important factor in promoting inflation... 
It cannot be suggested that a prosperous industry 
like electricity with a bouncing future could not 
have raised their capital on the market. 
[192.p.99] 
Like a number of the writers on the subject he fails to even consider 
what effect such an action would have on the market or on any other 
industry. Only the electricity industry is examined. 
Shanks is one author, however, who makes his value judgments 
quite specific. 
...the basic fact is that the industry needs the funds, 
from whatever source, and there is, moreover, a good 
socialist reason why a part of them, at any rate, 
should be supplied from within the industry. Financing 
from the surpluses of the industry... involves a real 
increase in the total of public compared to private 
property unmatched by indebtedness. [214.p.61] 
1 
See W . A . Robson [213.p.308] and J.R. Sargeant [214.p.253] concerning 
the situation in Britain. 
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Income Distribution 
The matter of the redistribution of income from the present to 
the future consumers is one which is solely a value judgment. Some 
authors state their opinions and leave it at that. Others feel a 
need to justify why they take a specific point of view. The Herbert 
Committee was one group who followed the former course. 
To make present consumers subsidize in this way the 
capital requirements of future consumers would in our 
judgment be quite inequitable, [para,345] 
Robson is one author who feels that there is a need to explain why he 
holds the opposite view. 
The nationalised industries are now as much a part of 
the estate of the realm as any of its more traditional 
assets. It is the proper task of each generation to do 
what it can to improve and develop that estate. Inevitably 
the burden of doing so must fall on the present generation 
and some - but not all - of the benefits will be enjoyed 
by future generations of citizens. [213.p.310] 
D.J. Boswell, in a paper presented in New Zealand,^ advocated internal 
financing in the electricity industry there. His paper finishes 
rather abruptly with the following poem, without author or title, and 
the final question appended to it. Without stating his value judgment 
specifically he leaves little doubt as to where he stands. 
An old man going a lone highway 
Came at the evening cold and grey 
To a chasm vast and deep and wide. 
The old man crossed in the twilight dim. 
The sudden stream had no fears for him; 
But he turned when safe on the other side. 
And built a bridge to span the tide. 
'Old man', said a fellow pilgrim near, 
'You are wasting your time with building here. 
You never again will pass this way. 
Your journey will end with the closing day. 
You have crossed the chasm deep and wide. 
Why build this bridge at evening tide?' 
The builder lifted his old grey head. 
'Good friend, in the way that I've come', he said, 
There followeth after me today 
A youth whose feet must pass this way. 
This stream that has been as naught to me 
To the fair-haired youth might a pitfall be; 
He, too, must cross in the twilight dim. 
Good friend, I am building the bridge for him'. 
1 
Boswell D.J. Electric Supply Authorities Association of New Zealand. 
1964. Conference Reports, 'Capital Expenditure from Revenue . p.192. 
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Should our industry build bridges or barriers for future generations? 
There can be little doubt that the introduction of such value judgments to 
a discussion of the problem does little to clarify the issues involved. 
APPENDIX 4 
ELECTRICITY COMMISSION OF NEW SOUTH WALES 
UNIFORM BULK SUPPLY TARIFF 
Quarter Bulk Supply Energy Rate Maximum Demand Rates 
Ended Adjustments Supply 33 kV and Under 
Base Rate Fuel Wages Rate Above 33 kV 
d. d. d. d. £ £ 
March 1952 1.19 ^ 1.19 6, 9. 0 6.14. 0 
June 1.19 0.132 0.0125 1.3345 
September 1.19 0.140 0.0225 1.3525 
December 1. 19 0.136 0.04 1.366 
March 1953 1.19 0.088 0.045 1.323 
June 1.19 0.08 0.045 1.315 
September 1.19 0.060 0.05 1.30 9.12. 6 10.10. 0 
December 1.19 0.044 0.0525 1.2865 
March 1954 1.19 0.04 0.0525 1.2825 
June 1.19 0.04 0.0525 1.2825 
September 1.19 0.02 0.0525 1.2625 
December 1.19 0.016 0.0525 1.2585 
March 1955 1.14 0.008 0.0525 1.2005 
June 1.14 0.008 0.0525 1.2005 
September 1.14 - 0.0525 1.1925 
December 1.14 - 0.0525 1.1925 
March 1956 1.10 0.04 0.0675 1.2075 
June 1. 10 0.044 0.070 1.214 
September 1.10 0.06 0.0725 1.2325 
December 1.10 0.06 0.0825 1.2425 
Per kVA/yr 
Per kVA/yr 
ro 4> 
00 
O 1 1 a T" ^  O T* 
Bui c Supply Energy Rate Maximum Demand Rates 
v^ L i d L L C I . 
Ended 
Adjus tments Supply 33 kV and Under 
Base Rate Fuel Wages' Rate Above 33 kV 
d. d. d. d. £ £ 
March 1957 1.10 0.048 0.10 1.248 
June 1.10 0.0315 0.0925 1.224 
September 1.10 0.0035 0.0900 1.1935 
December 1.10 0.0035 0.0925 1.1960 
March 1958 0.875 -0.0105 - 0.8645 1. 6. 8 1.10. 5 
June 0.875 -0.014 - 0.861 
September 0.875 -0.014 0.005 0.866 
December 0.875 -0.0245 0.005 0.8555 
March 1959 0.825 -0.0315 0.0025 0.796 
June 0.825 -0.0315 0.0075 0.801 
September 0.825 -0.0350 0.0075 0.7975 
December 0.825 -0.049 0.01 0. 786 
March 1960 0.825 -0.0595 0.0125 0.778 
June 0.825 -0.0595 0.0175 0.783 
September 0.825 -0.0490 0.0225 0.7985 
December 0.825 -0.0455 0.0250 0.8045 
March 1961 0.795 -0.0700 0.035 0.76 1. 9. 6 1.13. 6 
June 0.795 -0.0735 0.040 0.7615 
September 0.795 -0.0665 0.0425 0.771 
December 0.795 -0.077 0.0475 0.769 
March 1962 0.755 -0.084 0.045 0.716 
June 0.755 -0.0875 0.045 0.7125 
September 0.755 -0.0875 0.045 0.7125 
December 0.755 -0.084 0.0425 0.7135 
Per kVA/mth 
Per kW/mth 
N 3 -p-
Bulk Supply Energy Rate Maximum Demand Rates 
Quarter Adjustments Supply 33 kV and Under 
Ended Base Rate Fuel Wages Rate Above 33 kV 
d. d. d. d . £ £ 
March 1963 0.755 -0.112 0.045 0.6880 
June 0.755 -0.119 0.045 0.681 
September 0.755 -0.1225 0.0475 0.68 
December 0.755 -0.1295 0.0475 0.6730 
March 1964 0.56 -0.01 _ 0.55 
June 0.56 -0.01 - 0.55 
September 0.56 -0.0125 0.002 0.5495 
December 0.56 -0.020 0.012 0.552 
March 1965 0.538 -0.0225 0.012 0.5275 1. 8. 4 1.12. 2 
June 0.538 -0.025 0.012 0.525 
September 0.538 -0.020 0.012 0.53 
December 0.538 -0.020 0.012 0.53 
c . c . c . c . $ $ 
March 1966 0.448 -0.025 0.010 0.433 2.83 3.21 
June 0.448 -0.0275 0.010 0.4305 
September 0.448 -0.020 0.010 0.438 
December 0.448 -0.0175 0.026 0.4565 
March 1967 0.448 -0.025 0.026 0.449 
June 0.448 -0.025 0.026 0.449 
September 0.448 -0.0275 0.026 0.4465 
December 0.448 -0.020 0.026 0.454 
Per kW/mth 
Per kW/mth 
h O 
U l 
o 
Bulk Supply Energy Rate Maximum Demand Rates 
Quarter Adjustments Supply 33 kV and Under 
Ended Base Rate Fuel Wages Rate Above 33 kV 
c . c . c . c. $ $ 
March 1968 0.448 -0.030 0.026 0.444 
June 0.448 -0.030 0.035 0.453 
September 0.448 -0.030 0.035 0.453 
December 0.448 -0.030 0.035 0.453 
March 1969 0.448 -0.035 0.046 0.459 
June 0.448 -0.025 0.046 0.469 
t o 
U i 
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APPENDIX 5 
STATE ELECTRICITY COMMISSION OF VICTORIA 
Details of Standard Electricity Tariffs for the State System as at 
November, 1969,^ 
Domestic Supply 
Tariffs applicable to Private Houses and Flats 
(including Dwellings of like nature associated with 
Shops, Schools, Office Buildings, Factories, etc.) 
Not applicable to Residential Premises such as Boarding Houses, Boarding 
Schools, Hotels, Hospitals, Convents, Residential Clubs, etc., which 
will be charged for according to the tariffs shown in the Commercial 
and General Tariff Schedule. 
DOMESTIC TARIFF - 'GB' 
For electricity consumed for lighting, power, heating and cooking 
between two consecutive quarterly meter readings: 
Up to and including 75 kilowatt-hours - 6.0c a kilowatt-hour 
For the next 435 kilowatt-hours - 2.3c a kilowatt-hour 
For all further consumption in the - 2.1c a kilowatt-hour 
same period 
WATER HEATING TARIFF (NIGHT RATE) - 'I' 
For electricity consumed through a separate meter by heating elements 
which are switched on only during prescribed hours by means of a time 
switch or other form of control arranged by the Commission: 
All consumption - l-O^c a kilowatt-hour 
The prescribed hours applicable from time to time in respect of any 
consumer or locality will be indicated on application. 
STORAGE SPACE HEATING (OR COMBINED STORAGE SPACE HEATING AND 
STORAGE WATER HEATING) TARIFF - 'J' 
Applicable only where an approved storage space heater is installed. 
Where an approved storage water heating system is also installed both 
1 
Some slight alterations to these tariffs after November, 1969, are 
discussed in Appendix Ten. . 
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will be served under Tariff 'J'. 
For electricity consumed between two consecutive quarterly meter 
readings through a separate meter by heating elements which are switched 
on only during prescribed hours by means of a time switch or other 
control arranged by the Commission in either -
(a) a storage space heating system alone; or 
(b) a storage space heating system and a storage water 
heating system -
Up to and including 1,200 kilowatt-hours - 1,05c a kilowatt-hour 
For all further consumption in the same - 0.85c a kilowatt-hour 
period 
The Commission may fix or vary the prescribed hours for either the 
storage space heating system or the storage water heating system at its 
discretion. The prescribed hours applicable from time to time in 
respect of any consumer or locality will be indicated on application, 
but will generally be of eight hours duration nightly for storage water 
heating, and seven hours nightly, plus three hours during each afternoon 
for storage space heating. 
MINIMUM CHARGE 
for each account rendered - $1.20 a quarter or pro rata for portion of 
a quarter. 
Commercial and General Supplies 
PART A - COMMERCIAL AND GENERAL NGN-RESIDENTIAL 
Tariffs applicable for Electricity Supply to Shops, Offices, 
Warehouses, Theatres, Public Buildings, Schoolsj etc. 
COMMERCIAL LIGHTING TARIFF - 'A' 
For electricity consumed for lighting purposes between two consecutive 
monthly meter readings: 
Up to and including 100 kilowatt-hours - 8.00c a kilowatt-hour 
For all further consumption in the same - 7.40c a kilowatt-hour 
period 
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COMMERCIAL POWER AND HEATING TARIFF - 'C' 
For electricity consumed for power and heating purposes between two 
consecutive monthly meter readings: 
Option I 
Up to and including 200 kilowatt-hours - 4.85c a kilowatt-hour 
For the next 4,800 kilowatt-hours - 2.80c a kilowatt-hour 
For the next 20,000 kilowatt-hours - 2,30c a kilowatt-hour 
For all further consumption in the same 
period - 2,05c a kilowatt-hour 
Option II - Two Rate (Prescribed Hours) 
For electricity consumed between 
7 a.m. and 11 p.m. 
For electricity consumed between 
11 p.m. and 7 a.m. 
Rental for each set of two-rate 
metering equipment 
- block rates as under 
Option I 
- 1,00c a kilowatt-hour 
- $1 a month 
WATER HEATING TARIFF (NIGHT RATE) - 'I' 
For electricity consumed through a separate meter by heating elements 
which are switched on only during prescribed hours by means of a time 
switch or other form of control arranged by the Commission: 
All consumption - lo05c a kilowatt-hour 
The prescribed hours applicable from time to time in respect of any 
consumer or locality will be indicated on application. 
COMMERCIAL GENERAL SERVICE TARIFF - 'E' 
Combined lighting, power and heating tariff. 
Option I 
For electricity consumed for lighting, power and heating between two 
consecutive monthly meter readings: 
100 kilowatt-hours - 8.00c a kilowatt-hour 
900 kilowatt-hours - 7.40c a kilowatt-hour 
1,000 kilowatt-hours - 4.85c a kilowatt-hour 
3,000 kilowatt-hours - 4.25c a kilowatt-hour 
20,000 kilowatt-hours - 2.30c a kilowatt-hour 
Up to and including 
For the next 
For the next 
For the next 
For the next 
For all further consumption in the same 
period - 2.05c a kilowatt-hour 
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Option II - Two Rate (Prescribed Hours) 
For electricity consumed between 
11 p.m. and 7 a.m. for power 
and heating purposes only - l„00c a kilowatt-hour 
For all other electricity consumed » block rates as under 
Option I 
Rental for each set of two-rate 
metering equipment - $1 a month. 
Before selecting this tariff consumers are recommended to consult the 
Commission regarding the economics of this tariff compared with 
Tariffs 'A' and 'C' or 'V'. This tariff is not recommended for 
consumers using less than 1,000 kilowatt-hours a month for lighting 
purposes. 
COMMERCIAL RANGE TARIFF - 'F' 
Available to cafes, restaurants, cake and other prepared food shops and 
the like where an electric range, electric oven, or approved like 
device of not less than three kilowatts capacity is used. 
For electricity consumed in connection with 
electric cooking ~ 2.21c a kilowatt-hour 
MINIMUM CHARGE 
for each account rendered - 40c a month or pro rata for portion of a 
month. , 
COMMERCIAL ALL PURPOSE MAXIMUM DEMAND TARIFF - 'V 
Supply under this tariff is to be taken at the low voltage level of the 
distribution system. For electricity consumed for all purposes between 
consecutive monthly meter readings: 
Option I 
Demand Charge - $3.50 a kilowatt a month (subject to a minimum monthly 
demand charge based on 200 kilowatts or one half the maximum available 
rate of supply stipulated in the supply agreement, whichever is the 
greater) . 
Energy Charge 
All consumption ~ 0.80c a kilowatt-hour 
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Option II 
Demand Charge 
PART A - $3.50 a kilowatt a month for the maximum demand recorded 
between 7 a.m. and 7 p.m. on Mondays, Tuesdays, Wednesdays, Thursdays 
and Fridays (subject to a minimum monthly demand charge under this 
Part A based on 200 kilowatts or one half the maximum available rate 
of supply stipulated in the supply agreement for the foregoing periods, 
whichever is the greater). 
PART B - 95c a kilowatt a month for each kilowatt by which the maximum 
demand recorded at any other time exceeds the maximum demand recorded 
during the periods prescribed under Part A (subject to a minimum 
monthly demand charge under this Part B based on 100 kilowatts or one 
half the maximum excess rate of supply stipulated in the supply 
agreement, whichever is the greater). 
Energy Charge 
All consumption » 0.80c a kilowatt-hour 
Notes 
Maximum Demand indicators will be reset monthly. 
For the purpose of the supply agreement, including the determination 
of demand charges, the consumer shall stipulate the maximum rate of 
supply in kilowatts to be made available by the Commission at any time 
and for the purpose of Option II ( if selected) shall divide such 
maximum rate into two parts, namely the maximum rate during the 
prescribed periods of Part A and the balance being the maximum excess 
rate under Part B, 
TARIFFS AND TARIFF COMBINATIONS AVAILABLE 
A consumer supplied under Tariff 'V' will not be supplied under any 
other Tariff. 
A consumer supplied under Tariff 'E' will not be supplied under 
either Tariff 'A' or Tariff ' C . Otherwise, a consumer may choose the 
tariff or combination of tariffs as may be appropriate to the purposes 
for which the supply is required. 
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PART B - COMMERCIAL RESIDENTIAL 
Tariffs applicable for Lighting, Power, Heating and 
Cooking in Boarding and Apartment Houses, Hotels, 
Hospitals, Convents, Boarding Schools, Residential 
Clubs and Institutions, etc. 
COMMERCIAL RESIDENTIAL TWO-PART TARIFF - 'G' 
SERVICE CHARGE plus ENERGY CHARGE 
Service Charge - 19c a month for each assessable room or pro rata 
for a portion of a month plus 
Energy Charge - 2,21c a kilowatt-hour 
Maximum Overall Rate - If the amount of the account is more than the 
declared minimum charge referred to below, no consumer will be charged 
under this tariff at an overall rate (service and energy charges 
combined) in excess of 6c a kilowatt-hour. 
Assessment of Premises for Service Charge 
An assessable room is any room (whether lighted by electricity or not 
and other than those exempted below) erected for use as a dining room, 
kitchen, bedroom, dressing room, sunroom, ballroom, lounge, servery, 
library, billiard room, sleepout, dormitory, ward, laboratory, dispensary, 
operating theatre, classroom, gjrmnasium or the like, or any enclosed 
verandah or vestibule used for such purposes. 
Each room assessed is subject to Service Charge on the basis that every 
350 square feet of floor area or part thereof constitutes one room, but 
the maximum Service Charge in respect of any one room is at the rate of 
57c a month. Each electrically-lighted tennis court, bowling green or 
croquet lawn is subject to a Service Charge of 76c a month or pro rata 
for portion of a month. 
The following are normally exempt in assessing Service Charge: passages, 
pantries, lobbies, bathrooms, lavatories, cellars, entrance halls, 
porches, garages, sculleries, and wash houses where not combined with 
kitchens, verandahs and vestibules, unless such verandahs when enclosed 
or vestibules are used for the purposes stated above. 
WATER HEATING TARIFF (NIGHT-RATE) - 'I' 
Details of this tariff are the same as shown under Part A - Commercial 
and General Non-Residential. 
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STORAGE SPACE HEATING (OR COMBINED STORAGE SPACE HEATING AND STORAGE 
WATER HEATING) TARIFF - 'IS' 
Applicable only where an approved storage space heating system is 
installed. Where an approved storage water heating system is also 
installed both will be served under Tariff 'IS'. 
For electricity consumed through a separate meter by heating elements 
which are switched on only during prescribed hours by means of a time 
switch or other control arranged by the Commission in either -
(a) a storage space heating system alone; or 
(b) a storage space heating system and a storage water 
heating system: 
All consumption - 1.05c a kilowatt-hour 
The Commission may fix or vary the prescribed hours for either the 
storage space heating system or the storage water heating system at 
its discretion. The prescribed hours applicable from time to time in 
respect of any consumer or locality will be indicated on application, 
but will generally be of eight hours duration nightly for storage 
water heating, and seven hours nightly plus three hours during each 
afternoon for storage space heating. 
MINIMUM CHARGE 
FOR EACH ACCOUNT RENDERED - 40c a month or pro rata for portion of a 
month. 
Community Service Supplies 
Tariffs applicable to Registered Charitable Institutions 
(including Public Hospitals, Benevolent Homes and 
Societies, Public Ambulance Services, Child Welfare 
Institutions, Pre-school Centres, Youth Clubs and 
Elderly Citizens' Clubs), Bush Nursing Hospitals, 
Churches and Church Halls. 
PART A - COMMUNITY SERVICE RESIDENTIAL 
COMMUNITY SERVICE RESIDENTIAL TWO-PART TARIFF - 'R' 
Applicable to approved residential premises only 
SERVICE CHARGE plus ENERGY CHARGE 
Service Charge - 16c a month for each assessable room or pro rat 
for a portion of a month plus 
a 
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Energy Charge - 2.0c a kilowatt-hour 
Maximum Overall Rate - If the amount of the account is more than the 
declared minimum charge referred to below, no consumer will be charged 
under this tariff at an overall rate (service and energy charges 
combined) in excess of 6c a kilowatt-hour. 
WATER HEATING TARIFF (NIGHT-RATE) - 'Y' 
For electricity consumed through a separate meter by heating elements 
which are switched on only during prescribed hours by means of a time 
switch or other form of control arranged by the Commission: 
All consumption - 0.95c a kilowatt-hour 
The prescribed hours applicable from time to time in respect of any 
consumer or any locality will be indicated on application, 
STORAGE SPACE HEATING (OR COMBINED STORAGE SPACE HEATING AND STORAGE 
WATER HEATING) TARIFF - 'YS' 
Applicable only where an approved storage space heating system is 
installed. Where an approved storage water heater is also installed 
both will be served under Tariff 'YS'. 
For electricity consumed through a separate meter by heating elements 
which are switched on only during prescribed hours by means of a time 
switch or other control arranged by the Commission in either -
(a) a storage space heating system alone; or 
(b) a storage space heating system and a storage water 
heating system -
All consumption - 0.95c a kilowatt-hour 
The Commission may fix or vary the prescribed hours for either the 
storage space heating system or the storage water heating system at 
its discretion. The prescribed hours applicable from time to time 
in respect of any consumer or locality will be indicated on application, 
but will generally be of eight hours duration nightly for storage water 
heating, and seven hours nightly plus three hours during each afternoon 
for storage space heating. 
MINIMUM CHARGE 
for each account rendered - 40c a month or pro rata for portion of a 
montho 
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PART B - COMMUNITY SERVICE GENERAL 
COMMUNITY SERVICE GENERAL TARIFF - 'N' 
For electricity consumed for lighting, power and heating between two 
consecutive monthly meter readings: 
Option I 
Up to and including 10 kilowatt-hours - 6.0c a kilowatt-hour 
For the next 190 kilowatt-hours - 4.3c a kilowatt-hour 
For the next 4,800 kilowatt-hours - 2.5c a kilowatt-hour 
For all further consumption in the same 
period - 2.2c a kilowatt-hour 
Option II - Two Rate (Prescribed Hours): 
For electricity consumed between the - block rates as under 
hours 7 a.m. and 11 p.m. Option I above 
For electricity consumed between the 
hours 11 p.m. and 7 a.m. - 0.9c a kilowatt-hour 
Rental for each set of two-rate 
metering equipment - $1 a month 
A consumer selecting Option II shall be deemed to have agreed to being 
charged accordingly for a period of not less than 12 consecutive 
calendar months. 
COMMUNITY SERVICE RANGE TARIFF - 'W 
Applicable to approved community service premises where an electric 
range, electric oven, or approved like device of not less than 3 
kilowatt capacity is used. 
For electricity consumed in connection 
with electric cooking - 2,0c a kilowatt-hour 
WATER HEATING TARIFF (NIGHT-RATE) - 'Y' 
Details of this tariff are as shown under Part A - Community Service 
Residential. 
MINIMUM CHARGE 
for each account rendered - 40c a month or pro rata for portion of a 
month. 
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Farm Supply 
PART A - FARM DOMESTIC SUPPLY 
Tariff applicable to Electricity Supply to Private Houses 
on Farms 
DOMESTIC TARIFF - 'GB' 
For electricity consumed for lighting, power, heating and cooking 
between two consecutive quarterly meter readings: 
Up to and including 75 kilowatt-hours - 6.0c a kilowatt-hour 
For the next 435 kilowatt-hours - 2.3c a kilowatt-hour 
For all further consumption in the same 
period - 2.1c a kilowatt-hour 
WATER HEATING TARIFF (NIGHT-RATE) - 'I' 
For electricity consumed through a separate meter by heating elements 
which are switched on only during prescribed hours by means of a time 
switch or other form of control arranged by the Commission: 
All consumption - 1.05c a kilowatt-hour 
The prescribed hours applicable from time to time in respect of any 
consumer or locality will be indicated on application. 
STORAGE SPACE HEATING (OR COMBINED STORAGE SPACE HEATING AND 
STORAGE WATER HEATING) TARIFF - 'J' 
Applicable only where an approved storage space heating system is 
installed. Where an approved storage water heating system is also 
installed, both will be served under Tariff 'J'. 
For electricity consumed between two consecutive quarterly meter 
readings through a separate meter by heating elements which are switched 
on only during prescribed hours by means of a time switch or other 
control arranged by the Commission, in either -
(a) a storage space heating system alone; or 
(b) a storage space heating system and a storage water 
heating system -
Up to and including 1,200 kilowatt-hours - 1.05c a kilowatt-hour 
For all further consumption in the same 
period - 0,85c a kilowatt-hour 
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The Commission may fix or vary the prescribed hours for either the 
storage space heating system or the storage water heating system at 
its discretion. The prescribed hours applicable from time to time in 
respect of any consumer or locality will be indicated on application, 
but will generally be of eight hours duration nightly for storage 
water heating, and seven hours nightly plus three hours during each 
afternoon for storage space heating. 
MINIMUM CHARGE 
for each account rendered - $1.20 a quarter or pro rata for portion of 
a quarter. 
PART B - FARM SUPPLY 
Tariffs applicable to Electricity Supply for Farming Purposes 
FARMING GENERAL SERVICE TARIFF - 'B' 
For electricity consumed for lighting, power and heating between two 
consecutive monthly meter readings: 
Option I 
Up to and including 10 kilowatt-hours - 8.00c a kilowatt-hour 
For the next 190 kilowatt-hours - 4.85c a kilowatt-hour 
For the next 4,800 kilowatt-hours - 2.80c a kilowatt-hour 
For all further consumption in the same 
period - 2.30c a kilowatt-hour 
Option II - Two Rate (Prescribed Hours) 
For electricity consumed between 
7 a.m. and 11 p.m. - block rates as under Option I 
For electricity consumed between 
11 p.m. and 7 a.m. - 1.00c a kilowatt-hour 
Rental for each set of two-rate 
metering equipment - $1.00 a month 
A consumer selecting Option II shall be deemed to have agreed to being 
charged accordingly for a period of not less than 12 consecutive 
calendar m o n t h s . 
WATER HEATING TARIFF (NIGHT-RATE) - 'I' 
Details of this tariff are as shown under Part A - Farm Domestic Supply. 
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MINIMUM CHARGE 
for each account rendered - 40c a month or pro rata for portion of a 
m o n t h . 
Industrial Supply (High Voltage) 
Tariff applicable for Lighting, Power and Heating in 
Industrial Establishments served from the High Voltage 
System 
INDUSTRIAL ALL PURPOSES TARIFF - 'D' 
For electricity consumed from the high voltage level of the distribution 
system for all purposes between two consecutive monthly meter readings: 
Option I 
Up to and including 
For the next 
For the next 
For the next 
For the next 
100 kilowatt-hours 
400 kilowatt-hours 
4,500 kilowatt-hours 
20,000 kilowatt-hours 
100,000 kilowatt-hours 
For all further consumption in the same 
period 
8.00c a kilowatt-hour 
7.40c a kilowatt-hour 
4.60c a kilowatt-hour 
2.30c a kilowatt-hour 
2.05c a kilowatt-hour 
1.90c a kilowatt-hour 
Discount. These charges are subject to a discount of 5 per cent or 
such other rate as may be determined by the Commission from time to 
time. 
Option II - Two-Rate (Prescribed Hours) 
For electricity consumed between 
7 a.m< and 11 p.m. 
For electricity consumed between 
11 p.m. and 7 a.m. 
Rental for each set of two-rate 
metering equipment 
- block rates as under Option I 
- 1.00c a kilowatt-hour 
- $1.00 a month 
Discount. These charges are subject to a discount of 5 per cent or 
such other rate as may be determined by the Commission from time to 
t ime. 
minimum CHARGE 
A consumer selecting either Option I or Option II of this tariff shall 
be deemed to have agreed to pay for a minimum consumption of 1,000 
kilowatt-hours in any one month at the rates prescribed under Option I, 
i e., $60.60 a month. No discount is allowable. 
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INDUSTRIAL ALL PURPOSES MAXIMUM DEMAND TARIFF - 'M' 
For electricity consumed for all purposes and for each kilowatt of 
maximum demand recorded between two consecutive monthly meter readings: 
Option I (Supply at the high voltage level of the distribution system). 
Demand Charge - $3.17 a kilowatt a month (subject to a minimum monthly 
demand charge based on 500 kilowatts or one half the maximum available 
rate of supply stipulated in the supply agreement, whichever is the 
greater). 
Energy Charge - for electricity consumed between two consecutive 
monthly meter readings: 
Up to and including 3 million kilowatt-hours - 0.775c a kilowatt-hour 
For the next 5 million kilowatt-hours - 0.700c a kilowatt-hour 
For all further consumption in the same 
period - 0.660c a kilowatt-hour 
Option II (Supply at the high voltage level of the distribution system) 
Demand Charge 
PART A - $3.17 a kilowatt a month for the maximum demand recorded 
between 7 a.m. and 7 p.m. on Mondays, Tuesdays, Wednesdays, Thursdays 
and Fridays (subject to a minimum monthly demand charge under this 
Part A based on 500 kilowatts or one half the maximum available rate of 
supply stipulated in the supply agreement for the foregoing periods, 
whichever is the greater). 
PART B - 92c a kilowatt a month for each kilowatt by which the maximum 
demand recorded at any other time exceeds the maximum demand recorded 
during the periods prescribed under Part A (subject to a minimum 
monthly demand charge under this Part B based on 250 kilowatts or one 
half the maximum excess rate of supply stipulated in the supply 
agreement, whichever is the greater). 
Energy Charge 
All consumption - 0.775c a kilowatt-hour 
Option III (Supply at 66 kV from the Sub-Transmission System) 
Demand Charge - $3.17 a kilowatt a month (subject to a minimum monthly 
demand charge based on 20,000 kilowatts or one half the maximum 
available rate of supply stipulated in the supply agreement, whichever 
is the greater). 
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Energy Charge - for electricity consumed between two consecutive 
monthly meter readings: 
Up to and including 3 million kilowatt-hours - 0,775c a kilowatt-hour 
For the next 5 million kilowatt-hours - 0.700c a kilowatt-hour 
For all further consumption in the same 
period - 0.660c a kilowatt-hour 
Discount. Option III charges are subject to a discount of 5 per cent or 
such other rate as may be determined by the Commission from time to time-
Notes 
Maximum Demand indicators will be reset monthly. 
For the purpose of the supply agreement, including the determination of 
demand charges, the consumer shall stipulate the maximum rate of supply 
in kilowatts to be made available by the Commission at any time and for 
the purpose of Option II (if selected) shall divide such maximum rate 
into two parts, namely the maximum rate during the prescribed periods 
of Part A and the balance being the maximum excess rate under Part B. 
TARIFF AND TARIFF COMBINATIONS AVAILABLE 
A consumer taking supply under any option of the above Tariffs 'D' 
or 'M' shall not be supplied under any other option or tariff at the 
same premises. 
Industrial Supply (Low Voltage) 
Tariffs Applicable for Lighting, Power and Heating 
in Industrial Establishments Served from the Low 
Voltage System 
INDUSTRIAL LIGHTING TARIFF - 'A' 
For electricity consumed for lighting purposes between two consecutive 
monthly meter readings: 
Up to and including 100 kilowatt-hours - 8.00c a kilowatt-hour 
For all further consumption in the same 
period - 7.40c a kilowatt-hour 
INDUSTRIAL POWER AND HEATING TARIFF - ' C 
For electricity consumed for power and heating purposes between two 
consecutive monthly meter readings: 
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Option I 
Up to and including 200 kilowatt-hours - 4.85c a kilowatt-hour 
For the next 4,800 kilowatt-hours - 2.80c a kilowatt-hour 
For the next 20,000 kilowatt-hours - 2,30c a kilowatt-hour 
For all further consumption in the same 
period - 2.05c a kilowatt-hour 
Option II - Two Rate (Prescribed Hours) 
For electricity consumed between 
7 a.m. and 11 p.m. - block rates as under Option I 
For electricity consumed between 
11 p.m. and 7 a.m. - 1.00c a kilowatt-hour 
Rental for each set of two-rate 
metering equipment - $1,00 a month 
WATER HEATING TARIFF (NIGHT-RATE) - 'I' 
For electricity consumed through a separate meter by heating elements 
which are switched on only during prescribed hours by means of a time 
switch or other form of control arranged by the Commission: 
All consumption - 1.05c a kilowatt-hour 
The prescribed hours applicable from time to time in respect of any 
consumer or locality will be indicated on application. 
MINIMUM CHARGE 
for each account rendered - 40c a month or pro rata for portion of a 
month. 
INDUSTRIAL ALL PURPOSES TARIFF - 'D' 
For electricity consumed for all purposes between two consecutive 
monthly meter readings: 
Option I 
Up to and including 100 kilowatt-hours - 8.00c a kilowatt-hour 
For the next 400 kilowatt-hours - 7.40c a kilowatt-hour 
For the next 4,500 kilowatt-hours - 4.60c a kilowatt-hour 
For the next 20,000 kilowatt-hours - 2.30c a kilowatt-hour 
For the next 100,000 kilowatt-hours - 2.05c a kilowatt-hour 
For all further consumption in the same 
period - 1.90c a kilowatt-hour 
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Option II - Two Rates fPrescribed Hours) 
For electricity consumed between 
7 a.m. and 11 p.m. - block rates as under Option I 
For electricity consumed between 
11 p.m. and 7 a.m. - 1.00c a kilowatt-hour 
Rental for each set of two-rate 
metering equipment - $1.00 a month 
MINIMUM CHARGE 
A consumer selecting either Option I or Option II of Tariff 'D' shall 
be deemed to have agreed to pay for a minimum consumption of 1,000 
kilowatt-hours in any one month at the rates prescribed under Option I, 
i.e., $60.60 a month. 
INDUSTRIAL ALL PURPOSES MAXIMUM DEMAND TARIFF - 'V 
For electricity consumed for all purposes between consecutive monthly 
meter readings: 
Option I 
Demand Charge - $3.50 a kilowatt a month (subject to a minimum monthly 
demand charge based on 200 kilowatts or one half the maximum available 
rate of supply stipulated in the supply agreement, whichever is the 
greater). 
Energy Charge 
All consumption - 0.80c a kilowatt-hour 
Option II 
Demand Charge 
PART A - $3.50 a kilowatt a month for the maximum demand recorded 
between 7 a.m. and 7 p.m. on Mondays, Tuesdays, Wednesdays, Thursdays 
and Fridays (subject to a minimum monthly demand charge under this 
Part A based on 200 kilowatts or one half the maximum available rate 
of supply stipulated in the supply agreement for the foregoing periods, 
whichever is the greater). 
PART B - 95c a kilowatt a month for each kilowatt by which the maximum 
demand recorded at any other time exceeds the maximum demand recorded 
during the periods prescribed under Part A (subject to a minimum 
monthly demand charge under this Part B based on 100 kilowatts or one 
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half the maximum excess rate of supply stipulated in the supply 
agreement, whichever is the greater). 
Energy Charge 
All consumption - 0,80c a kilowatt-hour 
Notes 
Maximum Demand indicatcr s will be reset monthly. 
For the purpose of the supply agreement, including the determination 
of demand charges, the consumer shall stipulate the maximum rate of 
supply in kilowatts to be made available by the Commission at any time 
and for the purpose of Option II (if selected) shall divide such 
maximum rate into two parts, namely the maximum rate during the 
prescribed periods of Part A and the balance being the maximum excess 
rate under Part B. 
TARIFFS AND TARIFF COMBINATIONS AVAILABLE 
A consumer supplied under either Tariff 'D' or 'V' will not be supplied 
under any other tariff at the same premises. Otherwise, a consumer may 
elect to be served under any one or more of the Tariffs 'A', ' C and 
'I' as may be appropriate to the purposes for which the supply is 
required. 
Branch Boundaries 
Transmission Lines - 500 kV 
- 330 kV 
- 220 kV 
Power Sources.Thermal - Base 
- Peak ® 
- Hydro ® 
Snowy H/dro 
o 
2 
o 
U) 
> 
T l 
m 
g 
X 
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APPENDIX 7 
SELF-FINANCING IN THE ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY 
IN NEW SOUTH WALES 
The capital requirements of the industry in New South Wales occur 
at two levels. The thirty odd County Councils, the retailing bodies, 
sustain their own capital development programmes with help from the 
Rural Electricity Subsidy Scheme (see Chapter Nine), while the ECNSW 
maintains its own programme. 
(a) EANSW and Retailing Bodies 
As in Victoria and other electricity undertakings, the EANSW has 
become increasingly aware of the need for self-financing over the last 
decade. Annual reports from 1956 onward have invariably made comment 
on this need,^ As was clear in the case of the SECV, the industry has 
had little choice in the matter due to imperfections in the capital 
market. In 1964 the EANSW reported: 
[we can see]...a pattern consistent with that which has 
continued over the last ten years or more, when loan 
funds received by the electricity supply industry have 
not increased at the same rate as the capital need of 
the industry. 
Only one attempt can be found in the Reports of an assessment as 
to whether this situation was good or bad, and it is far from conclusive. 
The statement read: 
The steadily increasing demands for capital by electricity 
councils in New South Wales coupled with the growing 
restrictions on the availability of loan funds makes 
the question of financing capital works from revenue 
one of increasing importance. 
Whilst it is widely accepted in the electricity 
supply industry that the financing of capital works 
from revenue should be at the maximum regardless whether 
loan monies are available or not, there is clearly a 
limit to the capacity of supply authorities to do this 
For example: 
The Authority believes that in order to provide for adequate 
development supply authorities may soon have no alternative 
but to provide an increasing amount year by year from revenue 
to assist in financing capital works. [EANSW Annual Report 1956.p.5] 
In keeping with trends for some time evident overseas, 
the capital needs of the industry are being met to a greater 
degree from internal sources. [EANSW Annual Report 1962.p.7] 
EANSW Annual Report 1964.p.26. 
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and much more research is necessary before any recommendations 
can be given. 
A number of supply authorities have been seeking guidance 
from the Authori ty in this matter, which is recognized as 
being of the utmost importance but the complexities involved 
call f or a much closer study than has been possible in the 
past. 
When approached about the closer study the Authority was only able to 
report that the study was continuing. The same Annual Report of the 
EANSW included a table which shows the disparity between capital 
expenditure and loan raisings. It is reproduced as Table A7.1. 
From it we can see that the shortfall for 1966 was $21.3m. In one 
way or another this had to be made up. The bulk of it came from 
'internal funds'. 
Because of the large number of organisations concerned, and 
therefore the wide variety of tariff structures and depreciation 
policies, it is impossible to split this figure into smaller amounts. 
Therefore we cannot get any idea of the extent to which prices have 
been inflated to earn surpluses for capital development on the 
retailing side of the industry in New South Wales. 
Table A7.1 
Calendar Year 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 
Total capital 
expenditure 
$ million 
Total loan 
expenditure 
$ million 
17.5 21.6 23.5 30.5 31.5 32.2 34.0 39.4 45.0 45.2 
12.9 15.0 14.4 17.7 17.3 22.9 19.4 22.4 25.0 23.9 
Percentage of 
capital works ^^ 
financed from 
loan 
69 61 58 55 71 57 57 56 53 
(b) Electricity Commission of New South Wales 
In arriving at the total amount of internal financing for the 
industry in New South Wales there can be a number of combinations of 
earning rates between the ECNSW and the Councils. On one hand, the 
ECNSW could increase its tariffs, earn more surplus and channel this 
back into the Councils through the EANSW. In this case the surpluses 
of the Councils would fall. In the opposite case the ECNSW could 
EANSW Annual Report 1967. p.31, 
T a b l e A 7 . 2 
THE ELECTRICITY COMMISSION OF NEW SOUTH WALES 
CAPITAL EXPENDITURE - FINANCING 
A p p l i c a c i o n Source 
F inanc ia l 
Year Capi ta l 
Expenditure 
Loan 
Redemption Tota l 
External Interna l 
Tota l State 
Treasury 
Other 
Loans Surplus Other 
$ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ 
1958/59 39 ,516 ,950 1 ,019 ,080 40 ,536 ,030 20,895,000 3 ,575 ,920 175,604 15,889,506 4 0 , 5 3 6 , 0 3 0 
1959/60 31 ,603,078 1 ,166 ,000 32,769,078 20,000,000 3 ,383,366 967,690 8 ,418 ,022 32 ,769 ,078 
1960/61 31 ,788,832 1 ,304 ,000 33,092,832 17,400,000 2 ,875,898 1 ,721,414 11 ,095 ,520 33 ,092 ,832 
1961/62 47 ,643 ,118 1 ,422 ,000 49,065,118 16,400,000 3 ,876,102 820,076 27 ,968 ,940 49 ,065 ,118 
1962/63 55,265,334 1 ,545 ,260 56,810,594 16,000,000 5 ,187,928 1,748,444 33 ,874 ,222 56 ,810 ,594 
1963/64 44,428,656 1 ,703,732 46 ,132,388 15,200,000 4 ,568 ,602 3 ,845,178 22,518,608 46 ,132 ,388 
1964/65 49 ,577 ,680 1 ,812 ,720 51 ,390 ,400 15,200,000 5 ,596,602 1 ,359 ,250 29,234,548 51 ,390 ,400 
1965/66 62 ,503 ,690 1 ,966 ,560 64 ,470 ,250 15,000,000 4 ,409,246 424,122 44 ,636 ,882 6 4 , 4 7 0 , 2 5 0 
1966/67 70,396,785 2 ,127 ,690 72,524,475 14,250,000 8 ,862 ,052 916,220 48 ,496 ,203 72 ,524 ,475 
1967/68 72,488,106 2 ,295 ,190 74,783,296 14,200,000 15,649,221 711,043 44 ,223 ,032 74,783,296 
1968/69 70,764,596 2 ,421 ,640 73,186,236 14,400,000 11,805,115 835,041 46 ,146 ,080 73 ,186,236 
K5 
bo 
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reduce its tariff and its own surpluses, and thereby allow the Councils 
to increase their surpluses. Different combinations of these policies 
could allow the industry to maintain the same level of internal 
financing. Table A7.2 shows the amount of internal financing carried 
out by the ECNSW alone. The figures were provided in response to a 
written request for information. 
In Chapter Ten we looked briefly at the redistributive effects 
which resulted from the policy of self-financing and uniform tariffs in 
Victoria. We had earlier concluded that the benefits which accrued to 
the nation as a result of extra stability of the capital market were 
achieved partly at the expense of electricity consumers. We also 
concluded that it was possible that the combination of uniform tariffs 
and self-financing resulted in a redistribution of income from city 
consumers (with lower capital costs) to country consumers (with higher 
capital costs) . 
The first conclusion applies equally to Victoria and New South 
W a l e s . The second one is not as clear. Let us leave aside the Rural 
Electricity Subsidy Scheme for the moment which does represent a 
redistribution. In the absence of uniform tariffs, and with each 
local authority responsible for the raising of its own surpluses, it 
is likely that consumers throughout the State of New South Wales are 
only contributing towards the amount required for capital development 
in their own area. 
So it appears that the organizational structure in New South 
Wales which permits a closer approximation of costs and tariffs, also 
permits a more equitable (in terms of equality of costs and benefits) 
distribution of the burden of self-financing between different 
geographically situated consumers. 
2 7 4 
A P P E N D I X 8 - C.I. 1 
E S T I M A T E D SECV DAY OF SYSTEM MAXIMUM 
DEMAND BY CLASSES - MIDWINTER 1968 
M « g a w a t t s 
2400 
2200 
2000 
1800 
1600 
U O O 
1200 
1000 
800 
600 
4 0 0 
200 
2 7 5 
A P P E N D I X 8 - C.l. 2 
M I D W I N T E R C L A S S L O A D S - E S T I M A T E D S E C V 
DAY OF S Y S T E M M A X I M U M D E M A N D - 1 9 6 8 
Me gaw a t t s 
100 0 -
I N D U S T R I A L 
SOO . 
6 0 0 -
400 -
200 -
12 
T i m e of Day 
2 7 6 
A P P E N D I X 8 - C . I . 3 
TOTAL A N D DOMESTIC C L A S S LOAD 
( a v e . w e e k d a y ) 
Megawatts 
JULY FEB. 
1920 1 6 0 0 -
UAO 1200_ 
960 8 0 0 _ 
ABO AOO^  
12 
TIME OF DAY 
2 7 7 
A P P E N D I X 8 - C. I .4 
TOTAL A N D COMMERC I A L C L A S S LOAD 
(ave. w e e k d a y ) 
M e g a w a t t s 
JULY F E B . 
1 9 2 0 1 6 0 0 _ 
U A O 1 2 0 0 -
960 aoo. 
AaO A00_ 
C O M M E R C I A L 
MN 6 12 
T I M E OF DAY 
18 MN 
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APPENDIX 8 - C.1.5 
AND INDUSTRIAL CLASS LOAD 
(ave. weekday) 
Megawat-ts 
JULY FEB. 
1920 1600. 
UAO 1200 . 
960 8 0 0 -
^80 AOO 
I N D U S T R I A L 
MN 
T-
6 
—r 
12 1ft MN 
TIME OF DAY 
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A P P E N D I X 8 - C . I . 6 
TOTAL DOMESTIC A N D L I G H T I N G 
& H E A T I N G L O A D S 
( a v e . w e e k d a y ) 
M e g a w a t t s 
8 0 0 -
600 -
/.00„ 
200 H 
TIME OF DAY 
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A P P E N D I X 8 - C.1.7 
T O T A L D O M E S T I C AND 
C O O K I N G L O A D S 
(ave.weekday) 
M e g a w a t t s 
800-
600_ 
0^0-
200_ 
MN 
C O O K I N G 
TIME OF DAY 
APPENDIX 9 
TARIFF CALCULATIONS FOR CHAPTER TWELVE 
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix) (x) (xi) (xii) (xiii) 
Days of Hours/ Total Average GWh GWh Price/ Total 7o MW New Growth GWh Total 
Tariff Operation day hours MW.1968 produced sold kWh Revenue change demand produced sold revenue 
(iii)x(iv) (v)x.88 (vi)x(vii) (MW.) (ui)x(x) (xi)x.88 (xii)x(viL) 
(a) (b) (c) $m 
OFF-PEAK MONTHS 
2300-0630 181 7.5 1357.5 1000 1357 1195 0.4 4.8 + 10 1100 1493 1314 5.3 
0630-1700 181 10.5 1900.5 1300 2471 2174 0.6 13.0 +5 1365 2594 2283 13.7 
1700-1900 181 2 362.0 1300 471 414 0.6 2.5 +5 1365 494 435 2.6 
1900-2300 181 4 724.0 1300 941 825 0.6 5.0 +5 1364 988 870 5.2 
PLATEAU MONTHS 
2300-0630 123 7.5 922.5 1100 1015 893 0.4 3.6 +10 1210 1116 982 3.9 
0630-1700 123 10.5 1291.5 1600 2066 1818 1.6 29.0 -5 1520 1963 1727 27.6 
1700-1900 123 2 246.0 1800 443 390 2.4 9.3 -5 1710 421 370 8.9 
1900-2300 123 4 492.0 1400 689 606 1.6 9.6 -5 1330 654 576 9.2 
PEAK MONTHS 
2350-0630 61 7.5 457.5 1200 549 483 0.4 1.9 +10 1320 604 531 2.1 
0630-1700 61 10.5 640.5 1800 1153 1015 3.4 34.5 -5 1710 1095 964 32.8 
1700-1900 61 2 122.0 2100 256 225 4.6 10.3 -10 1890 231 203 9.3 
1900-2300 61 4 244.0 1600 390 344 3.4 11.7 -5 1520 371 326 11.1 
8,760 11,801 10,3.''2 135.2 12,024 10,581 131.7 
(a) Estimated from Figure 11.3 
(b) Represents 12 per cent losses between production and sales. 
(c) See Table 12.6 
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APPENDIX 10 
RECENT TARIFF CHANGES 
Since completing most of the text of this thesis the SECV has 
announced some changes to the tariffs which we have given in Appendix 
Five. W e have not incorporated these changes in the text except in 
the case of Chapter Ten where it was felt that they were directly 
relevant. The following are the details of the changes made. 
Domestic 
Tariff GC: This new tariff is the same as Tariff GB except that the 
final block is priced at 1.7 cents (cf. 2.1 cents in Tariff GB). 
It is a restricted tariff, being available only to premises where 
the installation includes a permanently wired electric range, a 
permanently wired electric water heater and an electric refrigerator. 
Industrial 
Low Voltage: Tariff D , Option 1: The final block in this tariff has 
been lowered from 1.9 cents to 1.7 cents. 
High V o l t a g e . Tariff M: New block prices have been struck for the 
energy component of Options 1, 11 and 111 under this tariff. 
The new energy charge is 
First 3 million kWh 0.57 cents per kWh 
Next 12 million kWh 0.52 cents per kWh 
All further consumption 0.44 cents per kWh 
The final block price represents a reduction of 33 per cent on the 
previous price. 
Commercial 
Tariffs M and E have been introduced for high voltage Commercial 
consumers. Tariff E is the same as the previous Tariff E for low 
voltage consumers, except it has a 5 per cent discount. Tariff M is 
identical to the first two options of the new Industrial Tariff M 
(high voltage). 
We have given an interpretation of the reasons for these tariff 
reductions in Chapter T e n . W e concluded that they were brought about 
by the threat of the emergence of large surpluses when the capital 
expansion programme of the sixties came to an end. In this Appendix 
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we will point out some of the likely effects of the change in the 
Domestic Tariffs. 
With its limited conception of its role in fostering the 'public 
interest' (see Chapter Twelve) it is understandable that the SECV should 
attempt to pre-empt the growth of natural gas in the domestic and 
industrial markets, and that it should do so through this particularly 
promotional Tariff GC - 'The more they use the greater will be the 
saving'. 
Unfortunately, the new domestic tariff is bound to encourage the 
domestic cooking load, a load which we saw in Chapter Twelve is already 
priced well below its likely cost of supply. Also it is one of the 
most important single loads to be considered when peak problems are 
being discussed. It is true that the new tariff might encourage some 
people to install off-peak water heaters and so improve the undertaking's 
load factor, but in all cases it will mean a lowering of price to the 
domestic cooking load which, we have argued, should have its price 
increased. 
How should a surplus which arises in a manner such as this be 
passed on to the consumer? If the undertaking had a tariff system 
like that given in Chapter Twelve, the concessions should be made to 
those consumers who previously had their tariffs increased to raise the 
extra funds. 
What could the SECV have done with its tariff system though? 
If it wished to approximate what we have just suggested it could 
have lowered the price for the lighting tariff A which presumably 
is high to help raise the extra funds, but overall the commercial 
tariffs seem to be the ones which have received the least reduction 
of any of the classes. It will be a very interesting indication of 
policy when the SECV is forced to increase its tariffs in the future -
will it return to the previous parities among the classes or will it 
increase all tariffs and maintain the existing differentials among the 
classes? 
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